Wright v. Houston Independent School District

Citation393 F. Supp. 1149
Decision Date05 May 1975
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 72-H-1484.
PartiesMrs. Vella WRIGHT and Miss Saora Meyers v. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Larry Watts, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.

William Key Wilde, Houston, Tex., for defendants.

Memorandum and Opinion:

SINGLETON, District Judge.

The above-styled-and-numbered cause concerns two former school teachers in the Houston Independent School District who were not recommended for reemployment for the fall semester, 1971, school year.

JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS

The defendants have raised two jurisdictional arguments. The case was brought pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging $50,000 each, actual damages, and $100,000 each, punitive damages. The defendant has asserted that since the Fifth Circuit has held that "a school district, under Texas law, is of the nature of a municipality," Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1970), and the Supreme Court has held that a municipality is not a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for either law or equity cases, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), the court lacks jurisdiction under 1983. The defense ignores two arguments. The suit is not only against the school district but also against the superintendent of schools in his official capacity. He is a person for 1983 purposes, for injunctive relief at the very least. Monroe v. Pape, supra; City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra; Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964); Harkless v. Sweeny, supra; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). In the second place, there has never been a Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court case holding that a suit would not lie against a municipality, and by implication a school district, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, clearly states that if $10,000 or more is in controversy then § 1331 jurisdiction is available. At least for purposes of determining the jurisdictional question the court has determined that there is sufficient amount in controversy. Whether or not that amount can be recovered is another question.

The second jurisdictional argument is one which arises from the case of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that in situations in which officers of a state government are sued for damages in their official capacities for actions they have taken in those capacities the damages invariably come from the state treasuries, not from the pockets of the officials. Because the state ultimately pays any money award assessed in such cases, such suits violate the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendants in this case assert that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant a back-pay award to the plaintiffs should they win on the merits because the school district is to be construed as the "state" for purposes of the eleventh amendment. There is really no serious question that prospective injunctive relief could be granted in this case. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), Edelman v. Jordan, supra.

The eleventh amendment, unchanged since its ratification in 1798, reads:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

Although the amendment speaks only in terms of the state, it has long been held that the amendment applies to situations in which the "action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state," no matter which official or what arm of the state is the nominal party. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945); Edelman v. Jordan, supra. Edelman concerned the State Welfare Department, the Illinois Department of Public Aids and its director.

The instant suit concerns the school district of Houston, Texas, and the question becomes whether or not the school system in Texas is such that the school districts in the state constitute agencies of the state which can successfully invoke the eleventh amendment against suits for monetary awards.

Characterizing a school district as "state" or "nonstate" for eleventh amendment purposes is not an easy task. Edelman did not address itself to the issue of what is or is not the "state." The court has been directed to the language of Fleming v. Upper Dublin Public School District, 141 F.Supp. 813 (E. D.Pa.1956), for the proper method of determining the limits of a state for eleventh amendment purposes:

The answer to that federal question, as to whether a particular state agency is entitled to immunity from federal jurisdiction, must depend upon the characteristics, capacities, powers and immunities of such agency as they are defined by the law of the State.

I. Immunities

The immunity of the school board from suit, as defined by Texas law, is an area of some confusion. The cases are not very helpful on the question of eleventh amendment immunity. It must be remembered that governmental immunity invoked by a state and its agencies is not identical to eleventh amendment immunity found in the United States Constitution.

There are Fifth Circuit cases which, applying Texas law, hold a Texas school district is in the nature of a municipality. Harkless v. Sweeny, supra; Campbell v. Masur, 486 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973). Traditionally, municipalities have been held unprotected by eleventh amendment immunity because they are political corporations politically distinct from the state. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 10 S.Ct. 363, 33 L.Ed. 766 (1889). Yet, Texas cases have held that the school district is merely an agency or arm of the state and is suable only in situations in which the state has waived its governmental immunity as, for example, in the cases specifically provided for in the Texas Tort Claims Act, injuries caused by a motor-driven vehicle. Vernon's Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 (1969). The seeming contradiction is only the result of the difference in concepts of the immunity based on governmental immunity and the immunity based upon the eleventh amendment. There is a similar difference between the concept of "state" for fourteenth amendment purposes and "state" for eleventh amendment purposes. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667, 94 S.Ct. at 1358, 39 L.Ed.2d at 675, n. 12.

The Texas cases which clearly establish the immunity of the school district rely solely upon concepts of governmental immunity, derived from theories of sovereign immunity and public policy. Braun v. Trustees of Victoria Independent School District, 114 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1938); Calhoun v. Pasadena Independent School District, 496 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Civ.App. —Houston 14th Dist. 1973); Coleman v. Beaumont Independent School District, 496 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Civ.App.— Beaumont 1973). According to the Coleman case, governmental immunity for school districts is judge-made law introduced in Texas in 1846 by Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex. 764 (1846) and approved by the Supreme Court of Texas as late as 1972 in City of Houston v. George, 479 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.1972).

In the Braun case, which held that governmental immunity was available to a school board, in the face of an argument that the tort was the result of the board's proprietary, not governmental, activities, the court held that there was "no question but that an independent school district is an agency of the state, and, while exercising governmental functions, is not answerable for its negligence in a suit sounding in tort." 114 S.W.2d at 949. Clearly, however, the court is using "agency" in a general sense.

Surprisingly, the Braun court goes on to hold that the independent school district is not comparable to a city or a town. "There is quite a distinction between a school district and a city or town." 114 S.W.2d 950. Rather, the court holds, the school district is akin to a county. There is a reason for the comparison to a county; a municipality has been held under Texas law capable of performing both governmental functions, which were immune from suit and proprietary functions which were not immune from suit. A county, however, is not capable of performing proprietary functions. Since the case turned on the question of proprietary versus governmental function, the Braun court cast the school board in with the counties.

II. Characteristics, Capacities, Powers

A more fruitful approach to state law on the status of the school district vis a vis the eleventh amendment is a study of the school district's characteristics, capacities, and powers. It is interesting to review the cases cited by the Fifth Circuit in Harkless v. Sweeny, 427 F.2d 319 at 321, for its determination that under Texas law a school district is in the nature of a municipality. In both Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W.2d 20 (1931), and Lewis v. Independent School District of City of Austin, 139 Tex. 83, 161 S.W.2d 450 (1942), the school district was characterized as a political corporation or subdivision of the State of Texas, similar to municipal corporations. Although, subject to the plenary power of the legislature, these powers are limited. The Supreme Court of Texas said in Love v. City of Dallas:

We think the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the case of Pearson v. State, 56 Ark. 148, 19 S.W. 499, 35 Am.St.Rep. 91, correctly stated the rule as to legislative power over school districts, and over school district properties or other municipal properties. The court in part said: "The statement that counties and school
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Bradley v. Milliken
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 4, 1976
    ...U.S.) at 159-160 (28 S.Ct. 441, at 454). (Emphasis supplied.) 416 U.S. at 237, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686. In Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 393 F.Supp. 1149, 1158 (S.D.Tex.1975), a school desegregation case, the court placed the following construction upon Edelman The Supreme Cour......
  • Campbell v. Gadsden County Dist. School Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 2, 1976
    ...v. Fair, 6 Cir., 1974, 507 F.2d 281, 287; Miller v. Carson, M.D.Fla., 1975, 401 F.Supp. 835, 848 n. 3; Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., S.D.Tex., 1975, 393 F.Supp. 1149, 1151-58; Smith v. Concordia Parish School Bd., W.D.La., 1975, 387 F.Supp. 887, 891; Note, Damage Remedies for Const......
  • Dunlap v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • July 19, 1977
    ...Redding v. Medica, 402 F.Supp. 1260 (W.D.Pa. 1975); Tatum v. Morton, 402 F.Supp. 719, 725 (D.D.C. 1974); Wright v. Houston Ind. School District, 393 F.Supp. 1149, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F.Supp. 1093, 1096 (E.D.Pa. 1975); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F.Supp. 91......
  • Rogers v. Brockette
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • February 2, 1979
    ...board of trustees, which holds them in trust for the district; they cannot be taken away by the state. Wright v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 393 F.Supp. 1149, 1155 (S.D.Tex.1975), Vacated and remanded on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1978); Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT