Wright v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 03 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21 CV 792 ACL |
| Parties | VICKIE WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
VICKIE WRIGHT, Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
No. 4:21 CV 792 ACL
United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
October 3, 2022
MEMORANDUM
ABBIE CRITES-LEONI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Vickie Wright brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner's denial of her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that, despite Wright's severe impairments, she was not disabled as she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
This matter is pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). A summary of the entire record is presented in the parties' briefs and is repeated here only to the extent necessary.
For the following reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
I. Procedural History
This case has a lengthy procedural history. Wright filed her applications for benefits on
May 23, 2013.[1] (Tr. 260-72.) She claimed she became unable to work on October 31, 2011, due to obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”), anxiety, and “nerves.” (Tr. 305.) Wright was 58 years of age at her alleged onset of disability date. After her application was denied initially, she appealed to an ALJ. (Tr. 173-86.) On November 19, 2015, an ALJ issued a decision finding Wright was not disabled. (Tr. 155-65.) On October 14, 2016, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ, finding that Wright's response to the proffer of the post-hearing evidence was not adequately addressed. (Tr. 171.) The Appeals Council directed the ALJ to offer Wright an opportunity for a supplemental hearing, pursuant to her request for such. Id.
On November 2, 2017, an ALJ issued another decision, following a hearing, finding Wright was not disabled. (Tr. 11-23.) On May 2, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Wright's request for review. (Tr. 1-5.) Wright appealed that decision to this Court. (Tr. 605-10.) The Commissioner requested that this Court remand the case and offer Wright another opportunity for a supplemental hearing. (Tr. 612.) The undersigned granted the Commissioner's request on February 28, 2019. (Tr. 612-13.)
On May 7, 2019, the Appeals Council remanded the case to an ALJ, indicating that the ALJ erred in not granting Wright a supplemental hearing on post-hearing consultative reports. (Tr. 616.) On May 3, 2021, after a subsequent hearing, an ALJ found that Wright was not disabled. (Tr. 460-77.) Wright filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council on May 17, 2021, which was denied.[2] (Doc. 9 at 5-6.) Thus, the May 3, 2021
decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
In this action, Wright, proceeding pro se, first argues that the ALJ erred in that Wright was not “represented by counsel/attorney, while under stress suffering severe anxiety, representing self.” (Doc. 30 at 4.) She next argues that the ALJ erred in failing to “consider all evidence and complaints of Plaintiff/Claimant's or issues that causes Plaintiff/Claimant's disability, causing the inability to work.” Id. Finally, Wright argues that the ALJ erred “due to the fact all evidence was not weighed, considered, and entered into as evidence and some evidence was misconstrued and discriminatory.” Id. at 5.
II. The ALJ's Determination
The ALJ first found that Wright met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016.[3] (Tr. 463.) She stated that Wright has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 31, 2011, her alleged onset of disability date. Id. In addition, the ALJ concluded that Wright had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, obesity, anxiety, and OCD. Id. The ALJ found that Wright did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 464.)
As to Wright's RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except: she is limited to no direct interaction with the public, casual and infrequent interaction with co-workers, and occasional interaction with supervisors
(Tr. 467.)
The ALJ found that Wright was unable to perform her past relevant work as a home health aide, but was capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 475.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Wright was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 31, 2011, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 476.)
The ALJ's final decision reads as follows:
Based on the application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits filed on May 23, 2013, the claimant is not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act.
Based on the application for supplemental security income filed on May 23, 2013, the claimant is not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.
(Tr. 477.)
III. Applicable Law
III.A. Standard of Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This
“substantial evidence test,” however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the Commissioner's findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire administrative record and consider:
1. The credibility findings made by the ALJ.
2. The plaintiff's vocational factors.
3. The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.
4. The plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to exertional and non-exertional activities and impairments.
5. Any corroboration by third parties of the plaintiff's impairments.
6. The testimony of vocational experts when required which is based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth the claimant's impairment.
Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence which fairly detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). However, even though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also have supported an opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2003). Put another way, a court should “disturb the ALJ's decision only if it falls outside the available zone of choice.” Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
III.B. Determination of Disability
A disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists ... in significant numbers in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner
looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 343 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the...
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