Wright v. Lockhart

• Decision Date: 20 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1194,89-1194
• Citation: 914 F.2d 1093
• Parties: James C. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1093

914 F.2d 1093

James C. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.

No. 89-1194.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 16, 1990.

Decided Sept. 20, 1990.

T. Craig Jones, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

Joseph Svoboda, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and HANSON, ^* Senior District Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

James C. Wright, an inmate incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Corrections, appeals from a final order entered in the United States District Court ¹ for the Eastern District of Arkansas denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.

I.

On July 20, 1978, Wright was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery. Through appointed counsel, Wright pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and the state trial court ordered Wright committed to the Arkansas State Hospital for a mental examination on July 28, 1978. The state trial court also ordered that Wright be examined at the Ozark Regional Mental Health Center (Ozark Center). The Arkansas State Hospital and Ozark Center concluded that Wright was sane. The psychiatrist from the Ozark Center qualified his report by stating that Wright might suffer from an "underlying psychosis" and recommended further evaluation.

Three weeks prior to trial, Wright filed a petition pursuant to Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 43-2006 (1977) ² for a Certificate of Summons to Nonresident Witnesses, seeking a court order compelling several physicians, psychiatrists, medical staff, and family members to testify in support of his insanity defense. Wright also filed a Motion for Depositions, seeking to depose the nonresident witnesses as an alternative to requiring their attendance at trial. The state trial court denied both motions. However, the trial court permitted the reports from the various medical facilities where Wright had been treated to be admitted into evidence.

On the second morning of a two-day jury trial, five jurors read a newspaper article containing inadmissible evidence of other charges pending against Wright. After Wright moved for a mistrial, the state trial court extensively questioned each juror who admitted reading the article. Each juror stated that the portions of the article they had read had been covered in court the previous day. No juror had read the portion of the article stating that Wright had been charged with other unrelated offenses. Each of the affected jurors further stated that nothing in the article would prevent them from rendering a fair verdict. After conducting this voir dire, the trial court concluded that Wright could still obtain a fair trial and denied Wright's motion for a mistrial.

The jury found Wright guilty of aggravated robbery. Because Wright had been convicted of four or more previous felonies, he was sentenced as a habitual offender to 55 years imprisonment. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590 S.W.2d 15 (1979) (Wright ). In 1985, Wright filed two Ark.R.Crim.P. 37 petitions for post-conviction relief. The first petition was returned to him as untimely because it was not filed within three years of the date of his commitment as required by Ark.R.Crim.P. 37.2(c). The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the second petition because the claims had been litigated at trial and were insufficient to void the conviction.

In January 1986, after exhausting his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b), Wright filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising 16 grounds for relief. Wright subsequently filed an amended petition raising four additional grounds for relief, some of which were repetitive of those contained in the initial petition. The state answered both the initial and amended petitions in a timely fashion, and Wright filed a reply. After reviewing the issues raised in the petition, the district court appointed counsel to represent Wright. Wright's counsel thereafter filed an amended habeas petition in which he realleged four grounds for relief.

The district court found that Wright had failed to raise 12 of his claims before the state courts, and that he was procedurally barred from raising them in federal court because he had failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1972). ³ The district court rejected the remainder of Wright's claims on the merits, holding as follows: (1) the state trial court did not err in denying his motions for compulsory process requiring seven out-of-state witnesses to appear and testify on behalf of his insanity defense; (2) the state trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial after five members of the jury had read a newspaper article which summarized the first day of trial and mentioned that other unrelated charges were pending against Wright; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial or continuance when one of Wright's witnesses failed to appear for trial because the proposed testimony was probably irrelevant and in any event cumulative; (4) the tape-recorded confession given by Wright after his arrest was voluntary; (5) the trial court did not err in admitting drugs found in the possession of Wright into evidence; and (6) the trial court's refusal to grant Wright's motion for an examination by a specialist for alleged physical symptoms did not deprive him of his right to effectively assist counsel at trial. Wright filed a timely appeal of the district court's order, raising three issues for review.

II.

Wright first argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant his petition because of the trial court's refusal to issue a summons of compulsory process or order depositions of witnesses material to his insanity defense. Wright points out that his state of mind was the only issue at trial because he had confessed to the aggravated robbery. Wright contends that the trial court's denial of compulsory process was arbitrary and deprived him, as an indigent defendant, of his sixth amendment right of compulsory process to compel the witnesses necessary to present an adequate insanity defense. Wright argues that the anticipated testimony was not remote in time and would have had a direct impact on whether he was criminally insane at the time he committed the offense. In response, Lockhart contends that the trial court did not err in refusing to order compulsory process or depositions because the proffered testimony was conflicting, remote in time, or cumulative.

Wright objected to the trial court's refusal to order compulsory process or depositions of the following seven witnesses: (1) Dr. D. Sidhu, a pediatrician who had counseled Wright on two occasions, the second time approximately four months before the crime was committed; (2) Dr. Kenneth Cole, a California psychiatrist who had diagnosed Wright as schizophrenic in 1975 and 1977; (3) David Bourne, program director of the Atascadero State Hospital in California, who had some knowledge of Wright's psychological problems; (4) Eric Wright, Wright's brother, who had seen Wright in a condition of stress a few weeks before the crime; (5) Mrs. Barbara Wright, Wright's mother, ⁴ who had seen him in a stressful condition sixteen days before the crime; (6) Dr. Richard Helfrey, an osteopath who had treated Wright more than seven or eight years before the trial; and (7) Dr. John Holbrook, a physician who had treated Wright in 1966. Wright now concedes that it was proper for the trial court to refuse to compel Doctors Helfrey and Holbrook because they had not treated him within seven or eight years of the trial and their proffered testimony would have been remote. However, Wright contends that the state courts and the district court focused on these more remote witnesses in order to deny access to the others.

On Wright's direct appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the state trial court's decision not to compel the attendance of the nonresident medical witnesses was not an abuse of discretion because the proffered testimony was conflicting and remote. Wright, 590 S.W.2d at 18. ⁵ The district court held that these findings of fact were fairly supported by the record and thus entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) (1988). Wright v. Lockhart, No. PB-C-86-10, slip op. at 13 (E.D.Ark. Sept. 24, 1987). After reviewing the record, the district court concluded

[t]he bulk of the testimony of the uncalled witnesses and the individuals to be deposed was remote in time. While it might have had some peripheral relevance, it cannot be said that the evidence would have directly impacted on a jury determination as to whether [Wright] was criminally insane when he committed the charged offenses.

Id. at 15.

The sixth amendment provides in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his [or her] favor." U.S. Const.Amend. VI. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1922-23, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (Washington ), the Supreme Court held that the right to compulsory process was incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.

Id. at 19, 87 S.Ct. at 1923....