Wright v. People

• Decision Date: 13 November 1984
• Citation: Wright v. People, 690 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1984)
• Docket Number: 82SC384
• Parties: Jack WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1257

690 P.2d 1257

Jack WRIGHT, Petitioner, v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 82SC384.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Nov. 13, 1984.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel A. Bellis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.

L. Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol.Gen., Laura E. Udis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent.

NEIGHBORS, Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Wright, 662 P.2d 489(Colo.App.1982), upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's Crim.P. 35(c)motion to vacate his 1964 conviction.We affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I.

In 1964, the defendant, Jack Leon Wright, then 19 years old, was charged with aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in connection with the robbery of a convenience store in Northglenn, Colorado.The defendant initially entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to the charges.After a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Charles A. Rymer, found him to be sane, the defendant tendered a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery.Before accepting the defendant's plea, the Adams County District Court judge read the information to the defendant, advised him of the possible consequences of his plea, and explained the penalties that could be imposed by the court.The defendant persisted in pleading guilty and the court accepted his plea to the aggravated robbery charge.¹The court sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term at the state reformatory.The conspiracy charge was dismissed on the People's motion, apparently as part of a plea agreement.

In January of 1977, following his conviction for a subsequent aggravated robbery, the defendant appeared in the Adams County District Court for sentencing pursuant to the "little"Habitual Offender Act.§ 16-13-101(1), 8 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.).²At the sentencing hearing, the defendant admitted the existence of two prior felony convictions, one of which was the 1964 conviction for aggravated robbery, in exchange for having a third habitual criminal count dismissed.³

In 1979, a Jefferson County District Court jury found the defendant guilty of fourteen counts of theft, theft by receiving, burglary, and conspiracy.During the habitual criminality phase of the trial, the prosecution offered the 1964Adams County aggravated robbery conviction as one of the predicate felonies.Defense counsel attacked the validity of that conviction, arguing that the Crim.P. 11 advisement had been fatally defective because the Adams County judge merely read the information to the defendant and failed to explain to him the nature of the charge and to ascertain the defendant's understanding of the charge.After reviewing the transcript of the 1964 providency hearing, the Jefferson County judge agreed that the 1964 advisement had been inadequate because there was no explanation of the charge, nor was there a determination that the defendant understood the nature of the charge.Consequently the 1964 felony conviction was not admitted into evidence during the trial which resulted in the imposition of a life sentence upon the defendant.⁴

On June 11, 1980, the defendant filed a pro se motion under Crim.P. 35(c) in the Adams County District Court to vacate and set aside the 1964 judgment of conviction.At the hearing on the motion, the defendant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the Adams County District Court from reconsidering the issue of whether there had been a proper Crim.P. 11 advisement in 1964, because the Jefferson County District Court had previously ruled that the advisement was constitutionally infirm.The trial court denied the defendant's motion, finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable, that a reconsideration of the defendant's 1964 guilty plea was barred due to the defendant's reaffirmation of that plea in the 1977 proceedings, and that, in any event, the 1964 plea was valid.

The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the Adams County District Court on the basis that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable to Crim.P. 35(c) proceedings.The court further held that since the defendant had admitted his guilt to the 1964 felony during the 1977Adams County proceedings, the district court did not err in determining that the 1964 guilty plea had been entered in compliance with the requirements of Crim.P. 11.

II.

The defendant first claims that since the Jefferson County District Court had previously ruled that the 1964 Crim.P. 11 advisement was fatally defective, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the re-litigation of that issue in the Adams County District Court.We reject his argument.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is an integral part of the concept of double jeopardy which is proscribed by the United States and Colorado Constitutions.U.S. Const. amend. V;Colo. Const. art. II, § 18;Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469(1970);People v. Horvat, 186 Colo. 202, 527 P.2d 47(1974).We have recognized that the doctrine is as applicable to criminal proceedings as it is to civil proceedings.Trujillo v. People, 178 Colo. 136, 496 P.2d 1026(1972).The doctrine of collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit."Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194.

Whether a district court in a Crim.P. 35(c) proceeding is barred from considering the validity of a Crim.P. 11 advisement previously found to be invalid for the purpose of sentence enhancement in an habitual criminal proceeding is a question of first impression in Colorado.This issue, however, was addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court in Hall v. State, 273 Ind. 507, 405 N.E.2d 530(1980).In Hall, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of burglary in 1965 and escape in 1967.The defendant was later charged with rape and one count of habitual criminality, based on the 1965 and 1967 felony convictions.He was convicted on the rape charge, but the habitual offender count was dismissed by the trial court on the basis that the state's exhibits were insufficient to show the defendant's knowing and voluntary entry of his pleas of guilty.The defendant was subsequently charged with murder, but was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.Again, the 1965 and 1967 convictions were offered into evidence as two of three prior felony convictions supporting the habitual criminal count.The defendant argued that the 1965 and 1967 convictions should not have been admitted since the issue of the validity of his prior convictions was an issue of ultimate fact which had been determined adversely to the state at his previous trial.The court rejected the defendant's argument, stating:

There is no merit to defendant's allegation that collateral estoppel applies to the facts in his case.It is clear that the habitual offender charge in the instant case is based upon the fact of two prior felony convictions.The action of the trial court at the previous habitual offender trial did not operate to "acquit"defendant of the two prior felony convictions.Its action involved only the sentencing to be imposed upon the 1977 rape charge and a determination of defendant's status as an habitual offender based upon the evidence presented at that time.

Hall, 405 N.E.2d at 536-37(emphasis in original).

We find persuasive the reasoning in Hall quoted above, which recognizes that, in the context of habitual criminality proceedings, collateral estoppel does not apply to trial court rulings which merely exclude evidence concerning the defendant's status as an habitual criminal.⁵Thus, the Adams County District Court was not bound to set aside its judgment of conviction on the basis of the Jefferson County District Court's evidentiary ruling that the defendant's 1964 conviction was inadmissible because the Crim.P. 11 advisement was constitutionally inadequate.The defendant's 1964 conviction still exists and he now seeks to have it vacated.We conclude that the issues actually litigated in each court lack the identity necessary to fulfill one of the requirements of collateral estoppel.SeePomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396(1974).Moreover, the adequacy of the defendant's 1964 Crim.P. 11 advisement was not an issue necessary to the determination of the defendant's guilt on the substantive crimes charged in 1979, nor was the 1964 conviction in any way a part of the final judgment.Id.Since the 1964 plea was not admitted into evidence by the Jefferson County District Court, no issue of ultimate fact was resolved.

III.

We next turn to the issue of whether the Adams County District Court erred in concluding that the 1964 Crim.P. 11 advisement had been adequate.The defendant contends that, even if collateral estoppel does not apply, the trial court erred in finding that the providency hearing advisement was adequate.We reject his argument.

This court has recently examined the requirements for a valid guilty plea.Ramirez v. People, 682 P.2d 1181(Colo.1984);People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37(Colo.1983);People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377(Colo.1983).We have recognized that due process of law requires that a conviction based on a guilty plea must be voluntarily and understandingly made, and that a plea cannot be either a voluntary or a knowing and intelligent admission of guilt unless the defendant receives real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.Ramirez, 682 P.2d at 1184;Leonard, 673 P.2d at 39.We have also recognized that the degree of explanation the court is required to give is dependent on the nature and complexity of the crime.E.g., Muniz, 667 P.2d at 1383;Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834(C...