Plaintiff, Jack L. Wright, an inmate of the Kansas State Penitentiary (KSP) at Lansing, Kansas, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for the alleged unconstitutional interference by state prison authorities with the free exercise of his religion.
Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis was granted, summons issued, an answer was filed, and a pre-trial conference was conducted. Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which, after oral argument to the Court, was granted with respect to plaintiff's due process and monetary damages claims, but denied as to plaintiff's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief from unconstitutional interference with plaintiff's religious beliefs.
Plaintiff's claim arises from the allegation that he is a practitioner of the Sikh religion which prohibits the cutting of hair from one's body. Plaintiff has been punished by the prison officials because of his refusal to comply with Administrative Policy No. 207 of the Kansas Department of Corrections which require all inmates to be clean-shaven except for sideburns and mustaches.
Thus, the central issue presented by the case is whether prison officials may validly prohibit plaintiff from following the dictates of his religion which prevent him from shearing hair from his body.
This Court has already undertaken an extensive discussion of the controlling legal principles. In our order of January 24, 1978, in which we established the framework for the summary judgment hearing which was held on March 29, 1978, we wrote:
It is clear that the State's regulation of the hair length of a prison inmate is not per se unconstitutional. Daugherty v. Reagan, 446 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1971); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974); Ralls v. Wolfe, 448 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F.Supp. 1 (D.Minn.1972). However, the instant action is distinguishable from these cases in that the hair regulation challenged herein is alleged to infringe upon the plaintiff's right to freely exercise his religious beliefs. When an inmate is coerced by a state-imposed sanction to perform acts contrary to the fundamental tenets of his religion, the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religious expression is infringed. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 5 (1972); Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F.Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.1976); Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F.Supp. 1132 (E.D.Mich.1976); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F.Supp. 153 (S.D.Iowa 1974); aff'd sub nom Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
Of course, the circumstance of imprisonment is a factor which bears upon the lawfulness of limitations placed on religious practices; and while in custody, inmates have only such rights in practice of their religion as can be exercised without impairing the requirements of prison discipline, Kennedy v. Meacham, supra 382 F.Supp. 996; Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F.Supp. 1126 (S.D.Ill.1976). But where the actions of prison officials curtail religious freedoms, the State must show compelling justification for such deprivations. Griffin v. Bennett, No. 76-84-C3 (D.Kan., June 2, 1976); Long v. Harris, 332 F.Supp. 262 (D.Kan.1971), aff'd 473 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1971). The State's asserted justification for this restriction on plaintiff's religious practices must be shown to outweigh the inmate's First Amendment rights. Kennedy v. Meacham, supra; Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964).
We further expounded upon the applicable law in our order of May 25, 1978, which denied that portion of defendants' summary judgment motion which concerned plaintiff's prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief invalidating Rule 207:
It is well-settled that the supervision of state prisons is a legitimate and important state function, and state prison authorities are vested with a wide degree of discretion in the daily control and operation of their facilities. Marchesani v. McCune, 531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 846 97 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed.2d 117; Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 93 S.Ct. 1381, 35 L.Ed.2d 611 (1973); Evans v. Moseley, 455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 93 S.Ct. 160, 34 L.Ed.2d 146; Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 859 75 S.Ct. 84, 99 L.Ed.2d 677 (1954). "The practical effect of incarceration upon individual liberties is given expression in the oft-quoted words of the Supreme Court, `. . . lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system,' Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948.)" Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa C.D.1973), aff'd 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974); accord: Long v. Harris, 332 F.Supp. 262 (D.Kan.1971) aff'd 473 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1972). Equally established is the basic principle that a citizen does not lose all his or her rights as a result of incarceration, Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); see also, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra 418 U.S. 555-56 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Thus, the federal court cannot eschew its responsibility to investigate alleged constitutional deprivations by reason of the wide discretion vested in prison administrators. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Lee v. Crouse, 284 F.Supp. 541 (D.Kan.1967) aff'd 396 F.2d 952 (1968). . . .
. . .
Defendants, in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment cite several cases purportedly upholding prison grooming regulations in the face of similar First Amendment challenges. However, after a careful reading of these cases, the court finds them to be factually distinguishable either because a fundamental tenet of an established religion was not implicated New Rider v. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 1, Okla., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973) cert. denied 414 U.S. 1097 94 S.Ct. 733, 38 L.Ed.2d 556 (uncut hair not fundamental tenet of Indian beliefs) see concurring opinion; Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa C.D.1973), aff'd 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974) (uncut hair not fundamental tenet of Church of New Song); United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F.Supp. 1 (D.Minn.1972) (uncut hair not fundamental tenet of Indian religion); Williams v. Batton, 342 F.Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.C.1972) (religion not even specified, thus not established); Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F.Supp. 523 (D.C.Calif.1971) (religion not even specified); Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970) (prisoner claimed he was a religion, not established religion); Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970) (prisoner relied upon a personal "divine revelation" and scripture from Old Testament of Bible, not fundamental tenet) or because the basis for the claim is an asserted right other than to freedom of religious expression. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976) (freedom of choice); Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976) (equal protection and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment); Ralls v. Wolfe, 448 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1971) (freedom from discrimination); Daugherty v. Reagan, 446 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1971) (unspecified civil rights); Poe v. Werner, 386 F.Supp. 1014 (M.D.Pa.1974) (equal protection); Collins v. Haga, 373 F.Supp. 923 (W.D.Va. 1974) (personal preferences).
The above-cited cases which upheld prison hair regulations against constitutional challenges other than the interference with religious freedoms are not controlling here for an additional reason. The right to freely practice one's religion is regarded as one of the most cherished values enumerated in the United States Constitution. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-215 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). It has also been recognized that religion subserves the rehabilitative function in prisons in that it provides "an area within which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his individuality." Barnett v. Rodgers, 133 U.S. App.D.C. 296 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cochran v. Rowe, 438 F.Supp. 566, 570 (N.D.Ill.1977). While the right may not be absolute, it sufficiently implicates important First Amendment values to be entitled to significant protection. Cruz v. Beto, supra; Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 702-03 91 S.Ct. 2068, 29 L.Ed.2d 810; Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307, 311 (10th Cir. 1973).
With these legal principles in mind, and having found that Sikh Dharma is a recognized religion, we formulated four principle issues to be focused upon at trial:
(1) Is uncut hair a fundamental tenet of the Sikh religion?
(2) Is the plaintiff a sincere adherent of the Sikh religion?
(3) Does the State's legitimate interest in security within its penal institutions outweigh the plaintiff's right to practice the Sikh religion?
(4) Could the State's interest in security be served in a less-restrictive manner which would not
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