Wright v. Sandestin Invs., LLC

Decision Date12 December 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 3:11cv256/MCR/EMT.
PartiesKaren Marie WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. SANDESTIN INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a Sandestin Golf and Beach Resort, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Garrity, Marie A. Mattox, Marie A. Mattox PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.

Brian Stephen Duffy, Matthew Greer Hawk, McConnaughhay Duffy etc., William T. Krizner, Krizner Group, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

M. CASEY RODGERS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Karen Marie Wright (Wright) filed this lawsuit against her former employer, Defendant Sandestin Investments, LLC, d/b/a Sandestin Golf and Beach Resort (Sandestin Investments), alleging pregnancy discrimination, in violation of federal and state law, see42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), Fla. Stat. § 760.10, and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Pending before the court is Wright's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on the FMLA count (doc. 34), which the defendant opposes (doc. 44), and Sandestin Investments' motion for summary judgment (doc. 45), which Wright opposes (doc. 54). Having fully considered the record and the parties' arguments, the court finds that there are genuine issues of fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment on either motion.

Background1

From 2002 through the date of her termination, Wright was an employee of Intrawest ULC (“Intrawest”), which operated the Sandestin Golf and Beach Resort (“the Resort”). She worked full time as an executive administrative assistant for several different vice presidents of the company, most recently for Vice President Matthew Lindley. Throughout her employment, Wright shared the office suite with one or two other executive assistants who worked for various executives.

In late 2009, Wright received approval from Intrawest to take FMLA leave for the birth of her child, and she began her maternity leave on Monday, January 11, 2010. Prior to beginning this period of leave, Wright was told of a possibility that, when she returned, she would be working for Lindley and also an anticipated new vice president, Steve Schaefer. Wright was scheduled to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2010. During her absence, Linda Taylor, who was the only other executive assistant at the time, also took a leave of absence. Lauren Callahan temporarily filled in for Taylor, and ultimately stayed on full time. When Taylor returned from her leave of absence, she began working part-time for the new vice president, Mr. Schaefer.

On March 15, 2010, during Wright's approved maternity leave, Intrawest sold the Resort to Defendant Sandestin Investments, LLC (Sandestin Investments). Wright acknowledged in her deposition that no one made any negative comment or expressed hostility toward her because of her pregnancy or maternity leave. However, on March 22, 2010, Wright discovered something was amiss regarding her job when informed by a personal friend that someone else's voice was on Wright's office phone voicemail; Wright called her own number and verified it was Taylor's voice. Wright telephoned Sandra Fowler, Director of Human Resources, about the matter and was informed that her position had been eliminated. Fowler suggested that Wright could apply for other available jobs with the company, but Wright asserts none of the suggested positions was comparable in pay to her prior position. Wright received a formal letter from Fowler confirming her termination dated April 2, 2010, while she was still on maternity leave, stating that her termination was due to a reorganization that would have occurred regardless of her current use of family medical leave. According to Wright, although the ownership of the resort changed from Intrawest to Sandestin Investments, nothing changed with regard to the operation of the business and no one else was terminated in the transition.

Fowler had been Director of Human Resources for Intrawest, and she kept the same position when the resort's ownership transferred to Sandestin Investments. Fowler testified that Sandestin Investments retained every Intrawest employee who chose to continue their employment after the transition of ownership; the supervisory positions did not change; she could not recall anyone who chose to leave or was terminated other than the plaintiff; and she testified that vacation and sick leave accrual was not altered during the transition, stating, “at the time, everything stayed the same.” (Doc. 36–1, at 12). Fowler explained that Sandestin Investments attempted to make the transition to the new ownership as seamless as possible for employees. According to Fowler, the human resources department had to recreate a new system of employee record keeping “from a blank slate” because Intrawest took all of its files, but she explained that we transitioned everything in, and then it was afterwards whenever we changed the structure.” (Doc. 36–1, at 12–13). However, Fowler explained that FMLA leave approved by Intrawest did not transition and Sandestin Investments did not honor Intrawest's FMLA leave “because we were a new company.” (Doc. 36–1, at 15).

Sandestin Investments's President John Russell was not aware of and could not recall any list prepared of employees who were identified for position elimination. He stated the company reviewed positions individually as they determined staffing levels in connection with the transition of ownership from Intrawest to Sandestin Investments. Wright's supervisor, Lindley, testified that he did not know who made the decision to terminate Wright but that he had been a party to discussions about possible cost-saving measures and he was “pretty sure” it had come up while she was out on leave.2 (Doc. 56–5 at 7). Lindley testified that he no longer had enough work to justify an administrative assistant and suggested eliminating Wright's position, but he could not recall if this came up in a meeting or informal discussion; he did not make this recommendation in writing. Lindley said he did not make the decision to terminate Wright, and he acknowledged that he was satisfied with her job performance. Accordingly to Lindley, after Wright began her maternity leave, he handled most of his own work and assigned tasks to Callahan and Taylor when necessary.3

Another executive, Ned Webster, testified that the executives were under pressure to eliminate overhead just prior to the sale and during the transition. According to Webster, Lindley had made the suggestion to eliminate Wright's executive assistant position during one of their regular morning executive committee meetings several months before and that he (Webster), Lindley and Russell were the final decision makers. He testified that Wright would have been allowed to return to work but for the company's decision to eliminate her position.

Wright presented the deposition of Peter Reed, who had been director of finance for Intrawest and kept the same position after the transition to Sandestin Investments. He later became vice president of finance. He testified that he did not know whether there had been any reorganization of the work force during the transition of ownership.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). [T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material” and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of fact is material if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. See id. “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985)). The court must view all the evidence, and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993), but the nonmoving party must present more in support of his claim than evidence which is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” to survive a properly supported summary judgment motion, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Pregnancy discrimination claims are analyzed the same as sex discrimination claims under Title VII. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir.2012). A plaintiff must show that the employer intended to discriminate against her because of her pregnancy, using either direct or indirect evidence. Id.

Under the FMLA, any employer who interferes with, denies, or retaliates against an employee based on the exercise of FMLA rights is liable for damages. See29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) & (2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c); see also Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir.2001). To be eligible for benefits, an employee must have worked for the employer for 12 consecutive months and at least 1,250 hours. An “employer” for purposes of FMLA coverage includes one who is a “successor in interest” of an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). “To state a claim of interference with a substantive [FMLA] right, an employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the benefit denied.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1206–07. The right to reinstatement may be denied in certain circumstances, however, such as a reduction in force. See O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353–54 (11th Cir.2000). An employer may “raise its alleged lawful reasons...

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