Wright v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 13 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:10-cv-770-T-33TGW |
| Parties | OTIS J. WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
OTIS J. WRIGHT, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Case No. 8:10-cv-770-T-33TGW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
Dated: July 13, 2011
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Otis J. Wright's timely-filed 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. Wright is proceeding on his amended petition (hereinafter "petition" or "Petition"). (Doc. 4). Wright challenges his conviction and sentence entered by the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County, Florida. A review of the record demonstrates that, for the following reasons, the petition must be denied.
On January 15, 2002, the State Attorney's Office for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County, Florida, filed a two count Felony Information charging Wright with one count of Sexual Battery, a life felony, in violation of § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2001), and one count of Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony punishable by life, in violation of § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). (Exhibit 1-A). On August 24, 2004, an Amended Felony Information was filed charging Wright with one count of Sexual Battery, a life felony, in
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violation of § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2001), and one count of Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony punishable by life, in violation of § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). (Exhibit 1-B).
On March 12, 2004, the State filed a Notice of Intent To Use Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Committed by the Defendant. (Exhibit 1-A, R 67). On August 25, 2004, after jury trial, Wright was found guilty as charged. (Exhibit 1-C). The state trial court designated Wright a sexual predator. (Exhibit 1-D).
Wright was adjudged guilty of Sexual Battery and Kidnaping on August 25, 2004, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison on each count, with the sentences running concurrently. (Exhibit 1-E).
Given that Wright has not challenged Respondent's statement of the procedural history of this case, a recitation of the procedural history of Wright's criminal conviction is unnecessary. The issues are fully briefed and the case is ripe for decision. The record is fully developed and the claims of the petition raise issues of law, not issues of fact. See Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.23 952, 959 (11th Cir. 2002). Because of the deference due the state court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the state courts' determination of Wright's claims largely governs review of those same claims.
This petition, filed in 2010, is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). AEDPA affects this Court's review of both
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factual findings and legal rulings entered by the state courts in the rejection of Wright's federal claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1), this Court's review of state court factual findings must be highly deferential; such findings are presumed correct, unless rebutted by a petitioner with clear and convincing evidence. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008), affirmed, ___U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002). Moreover, relief which was denied in state court due to asserted factual error can only be granted on habeas where the state court resolution turned on a determination of facts which was not just incorrect but unreasonable. Wood, 542 F.3d at 1285; 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2).
Similarly, the legal rulings of claims adjudicated in state courts only provide a basis for federal relief where the state court adjudication was either "contrary to" clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or involved an "unreasonable application" of such law. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); Haliburton v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 342 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003). In [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court discussed these standards at length. The Court explained that a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if either (1) the state court applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) when faced with materially indistinguishable facts, the state court arrived at a result different from that reached in a Supreme Court case. The question is whether the state court correctly identified the proper rule of law to be applied. Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1344-45; Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). A state court decision is not "contrary to" established federal law
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even if a federal court might have reached a different result relying on the same law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1344-45.
A state court ruling is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case. An unreasonable application may also occur if a state court unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context. A federal court does not independently review the correctness of the state court adjudication; the "unreasonable application" analysis requires a showing that the state court ruling is not simply incorrect or erroneous, but objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-410; Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1345; Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241. The measuring stick for both the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" assessments of the state court merits adjudication is "clearly established federal law," which refers only to the holdings, and not dicta, of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state law decisions. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241.
In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for relief where constitutional error is determined to exist on habeas review. This test is "less onerous" then the harmless error standard enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). "The test is whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.' " Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Although no constitutional error has occurred in this case, any
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possible error would clearly be harmless beyond any reasonable doubt based on the facts and the record herein.
AEDPA requires greater deference to state court decisions than the traditional de novo standard of review; Wright has the burden to overcome the presumption of correctness attached to state court factual findings or to establish that the state court legal rulings were contrary to, or unreasonable applications of, established federal law. Crawford, 311 F.3d at 1295.
To have a facially valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component.
The standard of review is "doubly deferential" when "a Strickland claim [is] evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard." Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S.--- ,129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009). "The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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Wright alleges that "the trial court erred in allowing hearsay and unconfrontable testimony into evidence which violated" his constitutional rights. Wright raised this claim on direct appeal. (Exhibits 2-4). The State courts correctly found that the out-of-court statements of Kelly Ostroski, the victim,1 were properly allowed into evidence because each statement fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The statements were not testimonial. Moreover, if there were any error in the admission of any of the statements, the error was harmless.
The evidence at trial showed that on September 17, 2001, between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m., two women, Chakakhan Hines and Lautausha Austin, while on their way to work in Ms. Hines' vehicle, saw the victim walking...
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