Wright v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:09-cv-99-J-32JBT
• Parties: JOEL DALE WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. SEC'Y FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

JOEL DALE WRIGHT, Petitioner,

v.SEC'Y FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:09-cv-99-J-32JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DONE AND ORDERED: March 19, 2013

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Joel Dale Wright is a death-sentenced inmate of the Florida penal system who is represented by counsel. He initiated this action by filing a Petition (Doc. #1) for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 6, 2009. He is proceeding on an Amended Petition (Doc. #15) and Petitioner's Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus Petition (Doc. #17) (hereinafter Petitioner's Memorandum). Petitioner challenges his 1983 state court (Putnam County) judgment of conviction for first degree murder, sexual battery, burglary of a dwelling and second-degree grand theft.

The following grounds are raised in the Amended Petition: (1) Petitioner was deprived of his rights under Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the State failed to disclose material and exculpatory evidence and/orthe State presented misleading evidence and/or defense counsel unreasonably failed to discover and present exculpatory evidence; (2) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of the trial; (3) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of the trial; (4) Petitioner was denied his right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury due to juror misconduct, the trial court's failure to adequately inquire into such misconduct and the trial court's failure to ensure that Petitioner's jury was fair and impartial; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument during the guilt phase denied Petitioner a fair trial; (6) Petitioner was denied an adversarial testing when the jury did not hear that the victim's house had been regularly burglarized; (7) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel; (8) the Florida Supreme Court failed to comply with the requirements of Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992), when it affirmed Petitioner's sentence of death on direct appeal; (9) the trial court violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by restricting Petitioner's right of cross-examination; and (10) the trial court violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by permitting a police officer to comment upon Petitioner's exercise of his right to remain silent.

Respondents filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #22). Petitioner replied. See Reply to State's Response to Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition (Doc. #27).

On January 13, 2011, Petitioner's Motion to Interview Jurors (Doc. #28) was filed. In preparing a response to this motion, Respondents discovered additional pertinent documents that were missing from the record on appeal. Therefore, they sought and were granted leaveto file an Amended Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #39) (hereinafter Response¹ ), in which they more fully addressed the juror misconduct claim raised in ground four. They also filed their Response to Motion to Interview Jurors (Doc. #30). Petitioner sought and was granted leave to file a reply to Respondents' Response to Motion to Interview Jurors. Petitioner filed Petitioner's Response to Order to Show Cause, Reply to Response to Motion to Interview Jurors and Reply to Amended Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #41). Thus, this case is now ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

The Florida Supreme Court summarized the evidence presented at Petitioner's trial and the trial proceedings as follows:

The facts reflect that the body of a 75-year-old woman was found in the bedroom of her home on February 6, 1983. The victim was discovered by her brother, who testified that he became concerned when she failed to respond to his knock on the door. Finding all the doors to her home locked, he entered through an open window at the rear of the house and subsequently found her body. Medical testimony established that the victim died between the evening of February 5 and the morning of February 6 as a result of multiple stab wounds to the neck and face, and that a vaginal laceration could have contributed to the victim's death.

The state's primary witness, Charles Westberry, testified that shortly after daylight on the morning of February 6, appellant came to Westberry's trailer and confessed to him that he had killed the victim; that appellant told him he entered the victim's house through a back window to take money from herpurse and, as appellant wiped his fingerprints off the purse, he saw the victim in the hallway and cut her throat; and that appellant stated he killed the victim because she recognized him and he did not want to go back to prison. Westberry further stated that appellant counted out approximately $290 he said he had taken from the victim's home and that appellant asked Westberry to tell the police that appellant had spent the night of February 5 at Westberry's trailer. When Westberry related appellant's confession to his wife several weeks later, she notified the police. The record also reflects that a sheriff's department fingerprint analyst identified a fingerprint taken from a portable stove located in the victim's bedroom as belonging to appellant, and that, over appellant's objection, the court instructed the jury on the Williams[² ] rule and permitted Paul House to testify for the state that approximately one month before the murder, he and appellant had entered the victim's home through the same window that was found open by the victim's brother, and had stolen money.

In his defense, appellant denied involvement in the murder and introduced testimony that, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. on February 5, a friend had dropped him off at his parents' home, which neighbored the victim's, and that he left at 8:00 p.m. to attend a party at his employer's house. Testifying in his own behalf, appellant stated that he returned to his parents' home, where he resided, at approximately 1:00 a.m. on February 6, but was unable to get into the house because his parents had locked him out. Appellant testified that he then walked by way of Highway 19 to Westberry's trailer, where he spent the night. Appellant also presented a witness who testified that, late in the night of February 5 and early in the morning of February 6, he had seen a group of three men whom he did not recognize in the general vicinity of the victim's home.

After the close of the evidence but prior to final arguments, appellant proffered the newly discovered testimony of Kathy Waters, who had listened to portions of the trial testimony, followed newspaper accounts of the trial, anddiscussed testimony with various persons attending the trial. Her proffered testimony revealed that, shortly after midnight on February 6, she had observed a person, who may have been similar in appearance to appellant, walking along Highway 19, and had also seen three persons, whom she did not recognize, congregated in the general vicinity of the victim's house. The trial court denied appellant's motion to re-open the case, noting that the rule of sequestration is rendered "meaningless" when a witness is permitted "to testify in support of one side or the other, almost as if that testimony were tailor-made," after the witness has conferred with numerous people concerning the case. The jury found appellant guilty as charged.

Appellant, in the penalty phase, presented the testimony of members of his family relating to his character and upbringing, as well as a nine-year-old psychological report which indicated that at that time appellant was depressed, emotionally immature, and had difficulty controlling his impulses.[³ ] By a nine-to-three vote, the jury recommended that appellant receive the death sentence.

. . . .

In imposing the death sentence, the trial judge found the following four aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder took place after the defendant committed rape and burglary; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; (4) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated,and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances.

Wright v. State, 473 So.2d 1277, 1278-79, 1281 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam).

In his initial brief on direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred, and thereby violated Petitioner's rights under the Constitutions of the United States and Florida, by: (1) restricting Petitioner's right of cross-examination; (2) refusing to allow Petitioner to reopen his case to present the testimony of Kathy Waters; (3) instructing the jury to consider evidence of a prior crime committed by Petitioner for the limited purpose of proving the identity of the perpetrator; (4) permitting a witness to comment upon Petitioner's exercise of his right to remain silent; and (5) restricting defense counsel's final argument and/or refusing to instruct the jury on the law governing circumstantial evidence. Petitioner also challenged his grand theft conviction on the ground that the corpus delicti was not established other than by Petitioner's confession. Additionally, Petitioner raised the following issues with respect to the sentencing phase of his trial: (1) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed for the purpose of preventing a lawful arrest; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; (3) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), violates the federal constitution by depriving the Petitioner of his right to a trial by his peers; and (4) Florida's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and...