Wright v. St. John's Hosp. of Hosp. Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis

• Decision Date: 28 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 4-91-0476,4-91-0476
• Citation: 171 Ill.Dec. 250,593 N.E.2d 1070,229 Ill.App.3d 680
• Parties: , 171 Ill.Dec. 250 Dorene WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL OF the HOSPITAL SISTERS OF the THIRD ORDER OF ST. FRANCIS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1070

593 N.E.2d 1070

229 Ill.App.3d 680, 171 Ill.Dec. 250

Dorene WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL OF the HOSPITAL SISTERS OF the THIRD ORDER OF ST. FRANCIS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-91-0476.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

May 28, 1992.

Gregory A. Scott, Scott & Scott, P.C., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard J. Wilderson, Bradley E. Huff, Graham & Graham, Springfield, for defendant-appellee.

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Dorene Wright, brought an action for retaliatory discharge against defendant, St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

St. John's Hospital hired plaintiff in August 1981 to work as a licensed practical nurse (LPN). In 1983, during the course of her employment, plaintiff injured her back while bathing and repositioning a patient. During 1983 and 1984, as a result of her back injury, plaintiff was seen by several physicians and hospitalized several times. Her doctor, Walter W. Wheelhouse, wrote a letter in July 1984, stating his opinion that plaintiff could not return to her normal duties as an LPN "since she is unable to lift patients, as most nurses would do in their daily activities."

Plaintiff instituted an action with the Illinois Industrial Commission in March 1983 under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). In August 1984, plaintiff and defendant executed a settlement contract lump sum petition and order in the sum of $60,000, settling her Industrial Commission action. That agreement included statements that plaintiff's injury was to the "whole person" and that "petitioner has chosen another line of work."

In November 1984, Dr. Wheelhouse reduced plaintiff's weight-lifting restriction. Plaintiff then attempted to return to work as an LPN. However, Dr. Pradeep Kulkarni, the hospital's employee health physician, examined her in January 1985 and concluded that she "was not physically capable * * * of performing the physical activities required of an LPN at St. John's Hospital." Defendant then offered her several alternative positions at the hospital, but plaintiff either declined those positions or did not have the requisite qualifications to be hired.

In February 1985, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendant. Count I sought injunctive relief, ordering defendant to rehire plaintiff as an LPN. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that count in August 1990. Count II accused defendant of retaliatory discharge (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h)) and sought both compensatory and punitive damages. In August 1990, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on count II. Plaintiff now appeals that judgment.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

"Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law." (Gardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. (1991), 213 Ill.App.3d 242, 246, 157 Ill.Dec. 88, 91, 571 N.E.2d 1107, 1110; ill.rev.stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c).) The party moving for summary judgment must show, as a matter of law, that it is entitled to judgment. (Gardner, 213 Ill.App.3d at 250, 157 Ill.Dec. at 93, 571 N.E.2d at 1112.) In making this decision, the trial court may draw inferences from undisputed facts; if reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed facts, the issue should be decided by the trier of fact and the motion should be denied. "In light of the standard, the trial court does not have any discretion in deciding the matter." (Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1992), 146 Ill.2d 263, 272, 166 Ill.Dec. 882, 886, 586 N.E.2d 1211, 1215.) On review, this court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo--that is, this court must determine if the trial court correctly decided that no genuine issues of material fact were present. Shull v. Harristown Township (1992), 223 Ill.App.3d 819, 824, 166 Ill.Dec. 142, 145, 585 N.E.2d 1164, 1167; Zale Construction Co. v. Hoffman (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 235, 240, 98 Ill.Dec. 708, 711-12, 494 N.E.2d 830, 833-34; see also Fegan, Appellate Court Should Rethink Standard of Review for Summary Judgments, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Nov. 26, 1991, at 2, col. 1.

We note with some perplexity that the trial court's order in this case included a section entitled "findings of fact." As stated earlier, a trial court should grant a motion for summary judgment only when no genuine issue of material fact exists. When granting that motion, a trial court resolves only questions of law. By definition, a trial court should deny summary judgment if it must make "findings of fact." Because we are reviewing this case de novo, we will disregard the trial court's purported "findings of fact" as we determine whether defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

III. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

Plaintiff raises two arguments on appeal: (1) what we consider to be a "traditional" claim of retaliatory discharge, and (2) a claim that she has a statutory right under the Act to be assigned by the hospital to some suitable alternative employment. We will address the traditional claim first.

A. "Traditional" Retaliatory Discharge

To sustain an action for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must prove three propositions: (1) defendant discharged plaintiff; (2) defendant did so in retaliation for her conduct; and (3) defendant's discharge of plaintiff clearly violated public policy. (See Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc. (1988), 119 Ill.2d 526 529, 116 Ill.Dec. 694, 696, 519 N.E.2d 909, 911; Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill.2d 520, 524-26, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 630, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356; Scheller v. Health Care Service Corp. (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 219, 222-23, 92 Ill.Dec. 471, 473-74, 485 N.E.2d 26, 28-29.) A defendant in a retaliatory discharge action is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists in that the plaintiff cannot prove any one or more of these propositions.

Construing the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, as we are required to do under In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 176-77, 90 Ill.Dec. 892, 897, 483 N.E.2d 210, 215, we hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment because defendant showed that plaintiff was not discharged in retaliation for her filing a claim with the Industrial Commission.

The complaint alleges that defendant retaliated against plaintiff because of her workers' compensation claim; however, the record establishes that defendant refused to rehire plaintiff as an LPN solely because of her inability to perform the physical tasks of an LPN. (See Scheller, 138 Ill.App.3d at 223, 92 Ill.Dec. at 473, 485 N.E.2d at 28.) Portions of plaintiff's December 1986 deposition were added to the record as part of defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's response to that motion. From that deposition, the following conclusions are clearly evident: (1) plaintiff's disability limited her physical abilities; (2) the defendant hospital had established basic physical ability requirements that its LPNs had to meet; and (3) plaintiff's physical inability to meet these standards, not some act of retaliation, precluded plaintiff from returning to work as an LPN for defendant. Plaintiff testified as follows:

"Q. [By Counsel for defendant:] Was it your intention at that time to pursue a different line of work?

"A. * * * I was agreeable to working at another line of work since I was told I could not work as an LPN.

"Q. You had been been told by Dr. Wheelhouse you could not work as an LPN?

"A. Dr. Wheelhouse and the hospital because the hospital statement was I could not work as an LPN with any limitation on my position.

* * * * * *

"Q. * * * Were you offered some kind of position?

"A. No, I was not. I was told LPN's could not be employed by the hospital with any restrictions at all.

* * * * * *

"Q. Dr. Wheelhouse in May of '85 states you still have not progressed to preaccident condition and have some weakness in limitation. Do you agree with that?

"A. Yes, I do.

"Q. That that was your condition in May of '85?

"A. That I had not returned to previous before-injury condition, yes, I do.

"Q. And that you had weakness?

"A. Yes, I do.

"Q. Advised caution with heavy lifting or overhead lifting? That is July of '84 he advised caution with heavy lifting and overhead lifting, is that right?

"A. Yes.

"Q. He continues to feel that those limitations were still applicable in May of 1985. You disagree with that?

"A. I assume that is what he felt, if that is what the letter says.

"Q. Do you feel you have limitations?

"A. Yes, I feel I have slight limitations.

"Q. What are those?

"A. Well, I still do have the problem, to some degree, with my eyes. I still have slight weakness on the left side.

* * * * * *

"Q. [Did] [a]nyone ever told [sic ] you that you are physically able to perform the LPN job at St. John's Hospital?

"A. Dr. Trudeau sent a letter in fact stating in his opinion I was capable of functioning as an LPN as nursery or newborn nursery or pediatrics or even in the health care office.

"Q. Who said that, Dr. Trudeau?

"A. Dr. Trudeau. And Dr. Wheelhouse and I had talked about it the last time I was in his office. He said there was many functions I could function as I could not return to the same floor I was on because of the heavy lifting.

"Q. Has anyone ever told you you could work without those restrictions and restrictions to those areas as LPN?

"A. No, sir.

* * * * * *

"Q. The complaint that has been filed in the ...