Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 23 April 1903
• Parties: WRIGHT v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

34 So. 233

136 Ala. 139

WRIGHT v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 23, 1903

Appeal from Bibb County Court; W. L. Pratt, Judge.

John Wright was convicted of trespass, and appeals. Affirmed.

An affidavit made before a justice of the peace charged that the defendant "did enter upon the premises of J. N. Campbell and J. G. Moore, and failed or refused, without legal cause or good excuse, to immediately leave or vacate said premises on being ordered or requested to do so by J. N. Campbell and J. G. Moore, who were in actual or constructive possession of said premises, against the peace and dignity of the state of Alabama." There were demurrers interposed to this affidavit, and there was also an amendment allowed, but under the opinion on the present appeal it is unnecessary to set out the grounds of the demurrer or the amendment, the rulings thereon being shown only in the bill of exceptions. The state introduced as a witness J. N. Campbell, who testified that he and J. G. Moore were in possession of the premises mentioned in the complaint at the time the defendant entered upon said premises; that, after the defendant entered upon said premises he was requested by witness and said Moore to leave said premises, but that defendant failed and refused to leave immediately, as requested; that the defendant's entry upon the land owned by the witness and Moore, and the request, and the defendant's refusal to comply therewith all happened within 12 months before the commencement of the prosecution, and that said lands were situated in Bibb county; that the said lands were deeded to the witness and J G. Moore by the Berney National Bank. The defendant objected to each of the questions calling forth the above testimony and moved to exclude the answers thereto, upon the ground that the lands had not been shown to be any part of the curtilage of the prosecutors, and that the statement that the witness and Moore were in possession of the land was the statement of a conclusion or opinion of the witness. The court overruled each of the objections and motions, and to each of these rulings the defendant separately excepted. This witness further testified that, after he and Moore had taken possession of the lands trespassed upon by the defendant they had allowed some railroad contractors to erect a camp on said lands, and said contractors were so occupying the lands at the time the defendant entered upon them and refused to leave when notified; that said contractors did not pay any rent for the use of said lands, but were allowed to occupy them with the understanding that they would leave said lands at any time they were notified by the witness and Moore to do so. This witness further testified that the prosecution in this case was commenced within 60 days after notice was given the defendant to leave the premises. The defendant objected to this testimony on the ground that it was illegal and immaterial. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The witness further testified that he and Moore took possession of the premises in 1897, and were in possession at the time the defendant entered upon the land. The defendant objected to this testimony, and moved the court to exclude it, on the ground that it was a statement of a conclusion or opinion of the witness. The court overruled the objection and motion, and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted. The witness further testified, against the objection and exception of the defendant, that he and Moore were in possession of the lands in question when the defendant entered upon them, and also at the time they notified the defendant to leave and the defendant refused to do so. J. G. Moore, a witness for the state, testified to substantially the same facts as were testified to by J. N Campbell. The defendant moved to exclude all the testimony of the witness Moore, and duly excepted to the court overruling his motion. The defendant's evidence tended to show that he and his brother owned the land which was trespassed on that the deed to Campbell and Moore from the Berney National Bank did not include said land, and that the state's witnesses Campbell and Moore were not in possession of the part of the lands which the defendant entered upon. The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: "(1) The court charges the jury that unless you believe from the evidence that the place trespassed on was the dwelling of J N. Campbell or J. G. Moore, then you cannot convict. (2) The court charges the jury that, if the land belonged to the Wrights, then they had a good right and legal excuse for being there, and you will find them not guilty. (3) If you believe from the evidence that the land belonged to the Wrights, then they would have a legal right there, and you will find defendant not guilty. (4) The court charges the jury that if you believe all the evidence in the case you will find defendant not guilty. (5) The court charges the jury that, unless the Wrights were warned before they went on the land, then you will find them not guilty. (6) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that you must believe from the evidence that the defendant did go back on the land after Moore and Campbell took possession under the Berney National Bank deed, at which the warning was given, you must acquit the defendant. (7) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if you believe from the...