Wright v. State

• Citation: 42 So. 745,148 Ala. 596
• Parties: WRIGHT v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 16 January 1907
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

42 So. 745

148 Ala. 596

WRIGHT v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 16, 1907

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Walker County; Thos. L. Sowell Judge.

Cebe Wright appeals from a conviction. Reversed and remanded.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted for an assault with intent to murder Jack Harris, and his punishment fixed at two years in the penitentiary.

Upon the trial Dr. Stovall was called as a witness, and testified that he was a practicing physician and had been so for a number of years: that he knew Harris, and was called to see him about June 10, 1905, in Walker county, Ala.; that when he got there he examined him, and found that he was cut by a knife or some sharp instrument in about 14 or 15 places; that some of the wounds were painful, and some light. He then proceeded to describe the various wounds on the body. He was permitted, over the objection of the defendant, to testify that he sewed up part of the wounds, and was also permitted to testify that Harris was not bleeding very much when he got to him, but that he had been bleeding a good deal, and was very bloody. He was also permitted to testify that Harris was not very much exhausted when he reached him, but was very weak from loss of blood. The witness Myers was also allowed to testify that just after the cutting Harris was very bloody.

The witness Steadman testified that, "about one-quarter of a mile from where the cutting occurred, the defendant came by my house between sundown and dark, and while talking to me said that he had cut Harris' throat, and stated, further 'I told you there would be trouble down here.' " The solicitor then asked him if, before the difficulty occurred, witness had ever heard defendant say anything about there being trouble there about Hilliard. There was objection to the question, which was overruled, and witness answered "We were talking one day a short while before it occurred, and defendant said that there was going to be some trouble about there some day." On cross-examination the witness testified that, some month or two before the difficulty occurred, he and the defendant were together and were discussing the facts that several people had gotten off the train at Hilliard, drinking and cutting up, and the defendant remarked in that conversation that, if such was not stopped, there would be trouble there some day. Whereupon the defendant moved the court to exclude what witness had said about defendant's predicting that there was going to be some trouble about there some day. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted.

The testimony of the state tended to show that the defendant and Harris had gone from Jasper to Hilliard on the train, and after getting off the train at Hilliard, were "walking along jowering," as the witnesses put it, when one or the other proposed a fair fight, and the other agreed whereupon Harris put down his bundles, held up his hands and said he had no weapon in them, and defendant also stated that he had no weapon, but immediately rushed upon Harris and cut him with a knife some 14 or 15 times. The testimony of the defendant tended to show an assault by Harris on him; that he backed some 8 or 10 steps, until he got up against a tree that had fallen down and could not go any further back; that thereupon Harris threw his right hand back and ran it under his overalls, and said that he would shoot the defendant, whereupon defendant threw down his bundles, jerked out his knife, and commenced cutting him.

At the request of the state the court gave the following charges "(1) The court charges the jury that the interest the defendant has in the case may be considered by them in weighing his own testimony. (2) The court charges the jury that, even though they should find from the evidence that, at the time Cebe Wright cut John Harris, he (Cebe Wright) was in imminent danger of his life, or of suffering great bodily harm, or that the circumstances attending the assault were such as to impress the mind of a reasonable man that the defendant was in actual danger, yet if they also believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered into the difficulty willingly, and that he was not without fault in bringing on the difficulty, then his plea of self-defense must fail. (3) The court charges the jury that in cases of assault with intent to murder the law presumes malice from the use of a deadly weapon, and casts on the defendant the onus of repelling the presumption, unless the evidence which proves the assault shows also that the assault was perpetrated without malice; and whenever malice is shown,...