Wright v. State
| Citation | 340 So.2d 74 |
| Parties | In re Willie James WRIGHT v. STATE of Alabama. Ex parte STATE of Alabama ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL. SC 1778. |
| Decision Date | 05 November 1976 |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and G. Daniel Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, petitioner.
Wm. J. Fuller, Jr., Montgomery, for respondent.
We granted the Attorney General's petition to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision which reversed respondent's conviction for carnal knowledge of an eight-year-old girl. Although the writ was granted May 7, 1976, the case could not be submitted until after oral argument was heard at our October term. After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the petition for certiorari, we reverse and remand this cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The jury found respondent guilty and fixed his punishment at life. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: I. A. because, in addition to Miranda 1 warnings, the trial court should have 'determined that this defendant did knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent'; B. because the trial court admitted the confession, although it was informed the respondent had requested counsel and none was present when the confession was taken; and, II. because the trial court excluded the public from the courtroom, denying respondent a 'public trial.'
We proceed to consider these holdings Seriatim.
This was a revolting sex offense in which respondent assaulted the victim sexually, stabbed her repeatedly, then carried her to an abandoned burned-out house where he laid her in an old bath tub, tied her hands, and forced her panties down her throat with a stick. He left her for dead. Amazingly, the little girl regained consciousness, stumbled to a nearby house where she was taken in, naked and bloody. Thereafter, the police were called and respondent was arrested later that afternoon.
Respondent was read a 'rights form' which informed him of his rights in accordance with Miranda. At this point, he asked to speak to His lawyer, George Cameron. The police called Mr. Cameron and permitted respondent to speak to him over the telephone. After speaking to His lawyer, respondent told the officers that 'Mr. Cameron told him to tell the truth' and 'to talk with you all.'
Approximately 43 hours later, respondent confessed. Officers testified that he was questioned off and on during a period of two days, that they stopped the questioning 'when he got tired of talking . . . (and when he) didn't want to talk to us, we would take him back (to his cell).' Nothing appears to show that 'the statement was the product of an uninterrupted period of continuous questioning'--or that respondent 'was refused access to his family, friends or counsel, or that he had been physically abused.' 2 At no time after the telephone conversation with Cameron, did respondent again request counsel.
At the beginning of the statement which respondent signed, he again acknowledged he was advised of his Miranda rights and delineated them. In the statement, he confessed to the crime. At trial, his defense was irresistible impulse to commit 'pedophilic sex acts.'
We agree with the State's contention that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that it was necessary for the trial court to determine first that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent before proceeding to determine voluntariness. No authority is cited for this proposition. The State argues that this is a 'novel' holding, is an incorrect interpretation of Miranda and is not required by any Alabama statute or case. We agree. The State contends that if a defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent a confession wouldn't be voluntary under Miranda anyway.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, under Alabama law, '(t)he duty rests in the first instance on the trial court to determine whether a confession is voluntary.' Since before Miranda our rule has been that a confession is prima facie involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Its voluntariness must be shown by the State before it can be admitted, irrespective of Miranda. Ex parte State, In re Lewis v. State, 295 Ala. 350, 329 So.2d 599 (1976).
We expressly reject the notion that the trial court must make some express factual or legal or factual-legal determination on the record (as appears to be the holding in the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision) that the defendant 'did knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent.'
We reaffirm our holding in Dotson v. State, 288 Ala. 727, 265 So.2d 162 (1971) (per Maddox, J.):
'A heavy burden rests upon the State to prove that a person in custody 'knowingly and intelligently' waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.'
See also Doston v. State, 48 Ala.App. 381, 265 So.2d 164 (1972) (per Almon, J.) after remand by this Court.
Of course, the trial judge must first satisfy himself that a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent, and he accomplishes this when he rules that a confession is admissible. Else, his ruling would be in error. On appeal it is the duty of the appellate court to be satisfied that the record contains '. . . testimony conclusionary or detailed, as to . . .' defendant's '. . . stating that he understood the Miranda warning . . .' although the record need not show that defendant '. . . expressly Stae(d) that he (understood).' Dotson, supra, 288 Ala. at 728, 265 So.2d at 163.
It is, of course, the duty of the Court of Criminal Appeals to determine from the record in this case whether the state met its burden 'in view of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the in-custody statement.' Dotson, supra.
Although the majority opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals alludes to the 'continuous period of questioning' of respondent, the dissent reveals the following:
'From the time of this man's arrest until the time the statement was executed, approximately 43 hours elapsed. Nothing in the record indicates that the statement was the product of an uninterrupted period of continuous questioning. On the contrary, the record reflects the following in Officer King's testimony:
'. . ..
'No evidence was presented that made it appear appellant was refused access to his family, friends or counsel, or that he had been physically abused and not given food or drink.'
We also agree with the State that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its holding that the confession should be suppressed because the 'defendant wanted an attorney and none was present when the confession was obtained.'
We agree with that part of the dissent which concludes that defendant was afforded his right to confer with his own counsel viz.:
'. . . An evidentiary hearing was held out of the jury's presence to determine the voluntariness of the confession. At its conclusion, the trial judge found the evidence sufficient to show that the admission in question was freely given by the appellant.
'The record showed the appellant was arrested at approximately 5:30 P.M., on August 13, 1974, and was brought to jail. He was advised of his constitutional rights by Officer King, who read them to him from a 'Miranda Card.'
'On being informed of these rights, appellant asked to speak to His lawyer, George Cameron. At that point, the officers contacted Mr. Cameron.
'From the record:
'. . ..
'Here this man was afforded the right to confer with his own counsel and only after he talked with his attorney was any interview conducted. As is shown from the record, the appellant acted on the advice of his counsel when he made the incriminating statement.
'The statement made to the police was two pages in lengh and was signed at the bottom of each page by the appellant. Near the middle of the last page, the appellant initialled a correction. It was dated August 15, 1973, and indicated a time of 12:05 P.M.
'In addition to the written confession, appellant also executed a written statement delineating his constitutional rights. Included in this statement of rights was the admonition concerning the right to confer with, presence, of, and appointment of counsel.
'Also, in the confession proper, at the very beginning, we find that appellant again was apprised of his right to counsel in this language:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Beskurt
... ... Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155 (5th Cir.2006) (and noting that claim was of structural error); Tillman v. Bergh, No. 2:06CV11555, 2008 WL 6843654 at *15 (E.D.Mich. July 2, 2008) (unpublished); Chase v. Berbary, 404 F.Supp.2d 457, 464 (W.D.N.Y.2005); Wright v. State 340 So.2d 74, 7980 (Ala.1976) (accused may waive the right to a public trial expressly or by failing to object); Fisher v. State, 480 So.2d 6, 7 (Ala.Crim.App.1985) (same); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d 787, 81213, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 (1991); People v. Lang, 49 Cal.3d ... ...
-
Wash v. Sublett
... 176 Wash.2d 58 292 P.3d 715 STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael Lynn SUBLETT, Petitioner. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Christopher Lee Olsen, Petitioner. No. 848564 ... Bergh, 2008 WL 6843654, at *15 (E.D.Mich.2008) (unpublished); Chase v. Berbary, 404 F.Supp.2d 457, 464 (W.D.N.Y.2005); Wright v. State, 340 So.2d 74, 7980 (Ala.1976) (accused may waive the right to a public trial expressly or by failing to object); Fisher v. State, 480 ... ...
-
White v. State
... ... Initially, it was the duty of the trial judge to determine the admissibility of the video tape of the defendant's interrogation by the police before submitting it to the jury. Ex parte Shula, 465 So.2d 452, 454 (Ala.1985); Wright v. State, 340 So.2d 74, 76 (Ala.1976) ... By statute, a circuit court has "exclusive original jurisdiction of all felony prosecutions." Alabama Code (1975), § 12-11-30(2). "It is the duty of the trial court to make certain that a defendant can, and will, obtain a fair and ... ...
-
Robinson v. State
... ... State courts similarly hold. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 340 So.2d 74, 79-80 (Ala. 1976) (holding that defense counsel's assertion that excluding the public during the appellant's trial "is within the [c]ourt's discretion," coupled with counsel's failure to object to the closure, amounts to the appellant's waiver of the right to claim a ... ...