Wright v. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways

Citation204 Okla. 380,230 P.2d 462
Decision Date17 April 1951
Docket NumberNo. 34952,34952
PartiesWRIGHT et ux. v. STATE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The State, or the Department of Highways of the State, in taking real estate by condemnation for public use may acquire fee simple title by appropriate proceedings therefor, and upon determination that the proposed improvements and intended use justify the same.

2. Generally, the terms 'lands' or 'real property' or 'real estate' as used in statutory or constitutional provisions as to eminent domain include the land itself with all buildings and structures thereon.

3. Where condemnation proceedings, including appraisement, cover a small area excluded by the court as not needed, and such small area is apparently inconsequential and of no affect on the value fixed by appraisement, and the condemnor seeks no reduction in the appraisement nor reappraisal, no right is thereby afforded the landowner to vacate the proceedings and require new proceedings conforming more strictly to the area taken.

4. In condemnation proceedings by the State, or the Department of Highways of the State, while the right of appeal is fully provided, there exists in the landowner no right to supersede the judgment of the trial court rendered on answer and exceptions to the Commissioner's report.

Young, Young & Young, of Sapulpa, for plaintiffs in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Finis O. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

WELCH, Justice.

The State Department of Highways, desiring to construct a modern paved highway through and over certain property in the outskirts of the City of Tulsa, commenced this proceedings in condemnation to take Lots 10 and 11, Block 6 of Opportunity Heights, as platted in a certain subdivision in a stated section, township and range in Tulsa County. Pursuant to proper resolution plaintiff sought to take the fee simple title to said Lots 10 and 11, excepting only oil and gas rights.

Following order appointing commissioners they filed their report setting out their appraisement of the damage to defendants and their property at $6000.

Defendants, by timely answer or exception to the commissioners' report, resisted the State's effort to take fee simple title, denied that the plaintiff had made good faith effort to acquire said real estate by purchase, and resisted what was referred to as the State's intention and effort to condemn and take more property than was necessary, including certain improvements on said lots, and entered demand to have a jury trial to fix and determine the value of the property to be taken. There was also suggestion in the answer that the court by its decree fix and determine the title and interest which the State was entitled to take.

Shortly thereafter the State deposited the $6000 condemnation money and filed its petition for injunction seeking to restrain defendants from removing certain improvements from said Lots 10 and 11. There was a temporary restraining order with notice of application for injunction and a subsequent hearing following which the court permitted the restraining order to continue in full force and effect. Thereafter the defendants answered further and the cause was tried on all questions other than the jury question as to the amount of condemnation money ultimately to be paid by the State.

Upon this trial it developed that the 200 feet right of way desired by the State took all of Lot 11 aforesaid, and all of Lot 10 aforesaid except a small triangular corner thereof, which corner contained about 1/100 of an acre, and was bounded by three sides in length 34.3 feet by 20.5 feet by 27.5 feet. Based upon such trial the court found and decreed that the State could condemn and take all of said Lot 11 and all of said Lot 10 except the aforesaid small triangular portion of said Lot 10. The court decreed that the State could take said property with fee simple title excepting only oil and gas rights, including the improvements thereon consisting of a small frame dwelling house and garage. The court reserved for future jury trial the question of the adequacy of the appraised amount for condemnation damage. As to that reservation for future trial there was no controversy, but from the balance of the judgment the defendants prosecute this appeal.

We shall separately state and discuss the grounds and contentions on which the defendants seek reversal.

On the contention that no effort was made to purchase before resorting to condemnation, we have examined the record and find ample evidence to support the finding against defendants on the point. It is apparent from the record that reasonable effort was made to handle the whole matter by agreement, and that the parties could not agree. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the details of the record on that question.

Defendants contend that the State was not entitled to take this real estate with fee simple title. The statute under which the State proceeded provides in material substance that 'the Department of Highways is authorized to acquire lands, or such interest therein, as in its discretion may be necessary.' Title 69 O.S.A. § 46. There were resolutions by the Highway Commission locating the highway and declaring the necessity to acquire fee simple title. All the proceedings from the original petition and original notice to defendants referred to the State's desire and intention to take fee simple title. Upon the aforesaid trial the court found and decreed in favor of the State's right to take the premises with fee simple title. Under such circumstances the rule seems to be settled that the real estate may be taken with fee simple title. That was decided, though with some dissenting views, in the case of Ramsey v. Leeper, 168 Okl. 43, 31 P.2d 852, and Harn v. State, 184 Okl. 306, 87 P.2d 127. In view of these decisions and the statute above quoted, we must deny this contention of defendants. No authority is cited supporting the contention that the State cannot take fee title.

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting the injunctive relief preventing defendants from moving their house and garage from the premises involved. On that point the record discloses that upon the first notice to defendants, and the first hearing, with all parties appearing the court appointed appraisers and they reported an appraisement of $4000; that thereafter, on motion of defendants, or perhaps by agreement of the parties, the court vacated that appraisement and appointed new appraisers who returned the aforesaid appraisement of $6000. There is strong implication in the record that this first appraisement of $4000 might have been based upon the taking of the land or the valuation of the land exclusive of the value of the improvements, and that such method of appraisement was not satisfactory to the defendants, and that it was upon such premises that the court vacated the first appraisement, but the...

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6 cases
  • State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Lamar Adver. of Okla., Inc.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • June 3, 2014
    ...or by the hand of man, as buildings, fences, or other structures....” Wright v. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways, 1951 OK 119, ¶ 11, 230 P.2d 462, 463 (quoting 29 C.J.S. § 66, p. 855). Accordingly, Lamar is entitled to the fair market value of the property interests taken, whether real or pe......
  • State v. Lamar Adver. of Okla., Inc., Case Number: 110896
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • June 3, 2014
    ...or by the hand of man, as buildings, fences, or other structures. . . ." Wright v. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways, 1951 OK 119, ¶11, 230 P.2d 462, 463 (quoting 29 C.J.S. § 66, p. 855). Accordingly, Lamar is entitled to the fair market value of the property interests taken, whether real or ......
  • Arp v. State Highway Commission
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • August 12, 1977
    ...Declaration of Taking Act, (40 U.S.C.A. §§ 258a through 258e) and under certain state laws. See 40 U.S.C.A. § 258b; and Wright v. State, 204 Okl. 380, 230 P.2d 462, 466 (1951). In those jurisdictions there are specific statutory provisions which preclude an appeal from operating to delay th......
  • Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Byrum
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • May 13, 1952
    ...over the premises in question if the applicable award has been deposited with the court clerk for the landowner. In Wright v. State, 204 Okl. 380, 230 P.2d 462, we held that while the landowner could appeal from the action of the trial court fixing damage, the landowner could not supersede ......
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