Wright v. State, No. 71534

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: BARKETT; SHAW; OVERTON
• Citation: 586 So.2d 1024
• Docket Number: No. 71534
• Decision Date: 29 August 1991
• Parties: 16 Fla. L. Weekly S595 Mac Ray WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Page 1024

586 So.2d 1024 16 Fla. L. Weekly S595 Mac Ray WRIGHT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee. No. 71534. Supreme Court of Florida. Aug. 29, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 30, 1991.

Page 1025

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Giselle D. Lylen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.

BARKETT, Justice.

Mac Ray Wright appeals from his convictions of first-degree murder and the sentence of death, along with other convictions and sentences stemming from the same trial. We reverse the convictions, vacate the sentences, and remand with instructions as set forth below. ¹

Page 1026

The victim, Sandra Ashe, lived with her children in a single-family dwelling that was owned by her mother, Bessie Webster, and leased to Ashe in Ashe's name. The appellant, Mac Ray Wright, fathered children with Ashe and lived at the house off and on. ² Testimony revealed a long history of domestic problems between Ashe and Wright. Wright was known by friends and relatives to have trouble controlling his temper, a problem exacerbated by heavy consumption of alcohol. Witnesses testified that he had been abusing alcohol for many years.

On June 8, 1986, Ashe drove to the home of Dedilia Gayle (a/k/a Dee Dee Morgan), a girlfriend of Wright's for nearly three years. Latonya Ashe, one of Ashe's daughters, said her mother became upset when Ashe saw Wright's car at Gayle's house because Wright "had told a story that he wasn't messing with Dee Dee no more." Later that night, Latonya overheard her mother and Wright fight about Wright's relationship with Gayle. Ashe demanded that Wright return her house key and threatened to call the police if Wright refused. She changed the locks on her door the next day, June 9.

Gayle testified that on June 10, the day of the shooting, she saw Wright in the street. He got $10 from a friend and said he was going to a bar. Later that night, Wright went to her house and drank as many as six beers before he left at about 10 p.m. Odessa Ingram, another former girlfriend of Wright's, said that between 8:30 and 9 p.m. on June 10, she saw Wright sitting in his car, drinking. She described him as "drunk, intoxicated"; he "looked wild"; his eyes were "real red"; his speech was slurred; and he did not recognize her.

At around 11-11:30 p.m. on June 10, Wright tried to use his key to enter Ashe's house. When he could not get in, Wright went to a window and pushed out a screen. He called for Ashe's children to let him in, but they didn't respond. Finally, he knocked down the back door and the kitchen door, entered the house, and started shooting and cursing. Ashe, struck by the bullets, fell outside the house as she tried to flee. Ashe died of bleeding caused by four gunshot wounds, three of which could have been fatal.

On June 16, after talking to his sister, Wright turned himself in to authorities and was booked at the St. Lucie County Jail. When officers accused Wright of the murder, he went berserk. Officer Peggy Gahn testified that Wright picked up a table, struck her, and said "I'm gonna kill you." Wright then struck deputy Gary Farless with a closed fist. Other evidence presented through various witnesses indicated that Wright appeared to have been drinking heavily before he turned himself in. Deputy Lee Morris said Wright appeared to be drunk and spaced out when he surrendered himself to deputies that day. Morris described Wright as having acted like an "absolute wild man," or an "ape" during the altercation.

In the penalty phase, the state showed that Wright previously had been convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of battery of a police officer, and two counts of simple assault. Wright presented witnesses to establish that he and Ashe had a history of domestic disputes, but that they would always get back together. Wright provided for Ashe and the children, was a good father, and took care of his sister who had terminal cancer. Wright's parents had separated when he was young, so he was one of eight children raised by only his mother. One of Wright's brothers had been accidentally shot to death in 1979. Wright was a slow learner, and as a child he often felt headaches, a problem that continued into adulthood. Mental illness ran in his father's family, and he suffered from severe nervous attacks that caused him to shake. His employer said he was a very good worker as a block mason, he took orders and commands well, and he would still be employed but for the criminal charges.

Page 1027

Wright testified that he had an argument with Ashe the day before the murder. The next day, after drinking alcohol and taking the drug percodan, he went over to Ashe's house to talk. When he could not get into the house with his key, he opened the back door and they argued again. He could not remember the details of the murder, but he remembered "this big explosion or this quick snap what had happened." He loved Ashe before and after the killing, and he felt very remorseful.

Psychiatrist Dr. Carmine Ebalo said in the penalty phase that Wright suffered a disturbance in jail that caused him to shake and lose sleep, for which he required medication. She said Wright told her he could not remember much about the murder. He remembered that Wright and Ashe had fought, and the next thing he knew he was walking on the street when he was told police were looking for him. Wright's family has a history of explosive temper and alcoholism, and for many years he had been heavily drinking alcohol, consuming as much as a half-gallon of gin in twenty-four hours. Wright also had been regularly using the drug percodan for six years, and he admitted to having been a user of speed, valium, and marijuana, smoking about two marijuana cigarettes daily. Dr. Ebalo concluded that if Wright had been under the influence of alcohol or drugs on the night of the murder, he was emotionally disturbed and his ability to function was diminished.

The jury found Wright guilty of first-degree murder, burglary, and two counts of battery on a police officer. The jury recommended a life sentence for the murder, but the court overrode the recommendation, finding that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; ³ cold, calculated, and premeditated without any legal or moral justification; ⁴ the murder was committed while Wright was engaged in a burglary or attempted burglary; ⁵ and Wright had three previous violent felony convictions. ⁶ The court found no statutory mitigation, but found nonstatutory mitigation in that Wright was remorseful in court; had a recent history of being a good worker when not in prison; had a family history of mental illness; was raised by his mother in a home of eight after his father left home when Wright was only ten years old; and had a history of alcohol and substance abuse. The court also found that Wright had been drinking alcohol and may have been taking another drug before he committed the murder.

I. JURY SELECTION

We begin by agreeing with Wright's claim that the state unconstitutionally exercised a peremptory challenge for racial reasons. In State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), clarified, State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla.1986), we established procedures to eliminate the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges as required by article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. First,

[a] party concerned about the other side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely objection and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group and that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely because of their race.

Neil, 457 So.2d at 486 (footnote omitted). We clarified that standard in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), where we said that trial courts must exercise their discretion "to provide broad leeway in allowing parties to make a prima facie showing that a 'likelihood' of discrimination exists." Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22. If a judge is in doubt, the doubt should be weighed in favor of conducting an inquiry. See Thompson v. State, 548 So.2d 198, 202 (Fla.1989). In the instant case, Wright, an African American, timely objected after the state peremptorily excused three African American members of the venire, and the

Page 1028

trial court properly exercised its discretion to require the state to explain the challenges. This part of the procedure was spelled out in Slappy:

Once a trial judge is satisfied that the complaining party's objection was proper and not frivolous, the burden of proof shifts. At this juncture, Neil imposes upon the other party an obligation to rebut the inference created when the defense met its initial burden of persuasion. This rebuttal must consist of a "clear and reasonably specific" racially neutral explanation of "legitimate reasons" for the state's use of its peremptory challenges. Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 & n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722-24 & n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ]. While the reasons need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause, they nevertheless must consist of more than the assumption

that [the veniremen] would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. ... Nor may the [party exercising the challenge] rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affirming his good faith in individual selections." ... If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a ... prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause "would be but a vain and illusory requirement."

Id. at 97-98 [106 S.Ct. at 1723] (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 [92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536] (1972), and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 [55 S.Ct. 579, 583-84, 79 L.Ed. 1074] (1935)). Part of...