Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 27 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 485S143,485S143
• Citation: 490 N.E.2d 732
• Parties: Michael W. WRIGHT, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 732

490 N.E.2d 732

Michael W. WRIGHT, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below).

No. 485S143.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 27, 1986.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Jo Ann Farnsworth, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Petitioner Michael W. Wright was charged in March, 1977, with four counts of murder. On October 29, 1977, the trial court was presented with a plea bargain agreement and certification of acknowledgement of rights. The plea agreement recommended one sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder, one sentence of life imprisonment for second degree murder, and two sentences of fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25) years for two counts of second degree murder, said sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court, after advising Petitioner of his rights and finding a factual basis for the guilty pleas, accepted the sentencing recommendations made in the plea agreement. On December 9, 1983, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. At a hearing on September 26, 1984, the post-conviction court granted Petitioner's motion to have the factual allegations in the petition deemed admitted as the prosecution had not filed an answer to the petition. Nonetheless, the court found Petitioner had not presented any error and denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner now appeals this denial and raises the following two issues:

1. Petitioner was not sufficiently advised of his rights such that his guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and

2. Petitioner was improperly induced into entering into the plea agreement by his counsel's misstatement of the law.

I

Petitioner initially argues that the post-conviction court did not advise him in the guilty plea hearing of his right to a public and speedy trial, and of the possibility of his sentence being increased due to prior convictions. The controlling statute at the time the plea was entered by Petitioner was Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns Supp.1977) [repealed by Acts 1981, P.L.298 Sec. 9, effective September 1, 1982, amended and recodified as Ind.Code Sec. 35-35-1-2 (Burns Supp.1985) ], which set out advisements a trial court shall give a defendant before accepting a guilty plea. Since Petitioner entered his plea prior to our opinion rendered in German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234, reh. denied, the standard of review to be applied is whether the entire record of proceedings indicates Petitioner was advised of and understood his rights. Crocker v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 686. Under this standard of review, while strict compliance with terms of the guilty plea statute is required, the exact language of the statute need not have been used. Blankenship v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 714. Further, in a proceeding for post-conviction relief the petitioner has the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.R.P.C. 1 Sec. 5. In reviewing a denial of post-conviction relief, we will not set aside the post-conviction court's ruling unless the evidence is without conflict and leads solely to a result different from that reached by the trial court. Pharris v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 79.

Petitioner alleges the trial court failed to advise him that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving a right to a "public and speedy" trial by jury in addition to failing to advise him of the effect his prior convictions could have on his sentencing. However, in several cases we have held the advisement regarding a public trial may be inferred from the trial court's discussion of the make-up and function of a jury and the right to confront one's accusers. Blankenship, supra; Albright v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 270. While the trial judge did not use the words "public and speedy" in advising Petitioner of his rights and in describing the trial Petitioner was relinquishing, he did inform him that he was giving up a trial by jury which was set to commence the same day as the guilty plea hearing, the right to subpoena witnesses to testify in his behalf, and the right to confront and cross-examine any witness who testified against him. The right to a "public and speedy" trial was adequately communicated to Petitioner through the discussion of the make-up of the jury, the type of rights he was waiving regarding his accusers, and repeated references to "the jury" particularly in view of the fact the trial was to begin that very day and Petitioner relinquished it to enter his plea.

Petitioner further contends he did not enter a plea of guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court failed to advise him of the effect his prior convictions may have on his sentencing. However, in the instant case the trial judge had no discretion in sentencing Petitioner to life imprisonment for the First Degree Murder Charge. At that time, Indiana had no death penalty and the sole penalty for First Degree Murder was life imprisonment. Ind.Code Sec. 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975) provided only two penalties for the Second Degree Murder Convictions, life imprisonment and an indeterminate sentence of fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25) years. There was no possibility of the court sentencing Petitioner in any other manner for Second Degree Murder. In Stonebreaker v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 837, 839, this exact argument and plea agreement were resolved in favor of the State by our stating:

"3] Appellant further claims that he was not advised that his prior criminal record could be used to enhance his penalties. Although appellant did have a prior criminal record, and under some circumstances it might be used to enhance a penalty, such was not an element in the case at bar. Since the death penalty was not available in Indiana at that time, the life sentence for the First Degree Murder charge was of...