Wright v. State
Decision Date | 01 September 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 61,61 |
Citation | 515 A.2d 1157,307 Md. 552 |
Parties | Joseph Melvin WRIGHT and Kenneth D. Coley v. STATE of Maryland. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
John L. Kopolow and Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defenders (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for appellants.
Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH*, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, and COUCH, JJ., and EDWARD D. HIGINBOTHOM, Associate Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit (Retired) Specially Assigned.
This criminal case presents two questions, one relating to petitioner Wright and the other relating to petitioner Coley.
The context of the first question is as follows.The petitioner Wright, along with three codefendants, was tried before a jury on a charge of murder, based upon a theory of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder as well as upon a theory of felony murder, and on a charge of an underlying attempted felony.At the conclusion of the State's case, the trial judge granted a motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the attempted felony on the ground that the State's evidence was insufficient.The trial judge, however, denied the motion as to the murder charge because, in the court's view, there was sufficient evidence of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder for that charge to go to the jury.Thereafter, during the defense case, evidence was presented by a codefendant tending to show that Wright was involved in the commission of the attempted felony.The question is whether, under such circumstances, it was a violation of federal double jeopardy or Maryland common law principles for the murder charge to have been submitted to the jury on a felony murder theory and for Wright to have been convicted of felony murder.
The second question concerns the admissibility in evidence of a plea agreement entered between the State's Attorney and petitioner Coley, and Coley's confession pursuant to that agreement.Coley later rescinded the agreement and pled not guilty.He contends that the admission in evidence of the rescinded agreement and the incriminating statements, which were induced by the promises made by the State as its part of the bargain, violated the Maryland inducement rule set forth in cases such as Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415(1979).
The basic facts of the case, and the particular facts concerning the first issue, are as follows.1PetitionersJoseph Melvin Wright and Kenneth D. Coley were each indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and other offenses, all arising from a single incident.Along with Sheldon Ball and Dwight Gilmore, they were jointly tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
At trial the State presented the testimony of several eyewitnesses to what the State contends was a shooting during an attempted robbery of an A&P supermarket.The gist of the testimony was that Wright, Coley and their accomplices ran into the supermarket wearing masks on their heads and carrying guns.They confronted a security guard; shots were fired, and Wright, Coley and their accomplices fled.The security guard died.
The State introduced no testimony that the men obtained money or property or even approached a cash register.Nevertheless, the State did introduce an edited statement of Coley, which indicated that he had planned a robbery along with others whose identities were deleted from the statement.This same statement was later introduced in unexpurgated form during the defense case, in connection with Coley's testimony.
At the close of the State's case, the defendants moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts.Coley's motion was denied as to all counts.The trial court granted Wright's motion with regard to counts charging conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery with a deadly weapon.The court denied Wright's motion with regard to the charges of conspiracy to commit murder, murder, and violations of the handgun statute, Maryland Code(1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 36B(b) and (d).In connection with granting Wright's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charges of attempted armed robbery and conspiracy to rob, the trial judge ruled as follows (emphasis supplied):
The denial of Wright's motion for judgment of acquittal on the murder count was because the State was proceeding upon a theory of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder as well as felony murder.
Thereafter, the defendants put on their case.In addition, the State nol prossed all remaining charges against all defendants except for the murder and handgun charges.
After the conclusion of the defense case, and in connection with jury instructions, the trial judge decided that the murder charges would be submitted to the jury on a felony murder theory as well as a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder theory, stating as follows (emphasis supplied):
Wright's counsel objected to submitting the felony murder theory to the jury.Nevertheless the trial court instructed the jury regarding felony murder as a possible verdict, as well as willful, deliberate and premeditated murder, and the court defined the elements of attempted robbery as the alleged offense underlying the felony murder theory.2Thus, the court's instructions included the following "I have already instructed you that murder in the first degree is the intentional killing of a human being with deliberation and premeditation.There is also this other type of murder which I have just mentioned, that which we call felony murder.A felony murder means a killing which is unintentional or unplanned but which occurred during the commission of a crime such as robbery or attempted robbery.Any person who participates in a robbery or an attempted robbery where a victim is killed is guilty of felony murder even though he did not do the actual killing or did not know or expect a killing or death would occur and did not assist in the killing itself.
With regard to the count charging each defendant with use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, the trial court instructed the jury that "[t]he crime of attempted robbery is specifically defined in our law as a crime of violence...."
The jurors were given a separate verdict sheet for each defendant, and, under the murder charge on the verdict sheet, there were four boxes to be checked or not: "1. not guilty; 2. guilty of murder in the first degree (deliberate and premeditated); 3. guilty of second degree murder; 4. guilty of felony murder."After deliberations, the jury found Wright guilty of felony murder, guilty of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and guilty of possessing a handgun.Coley was found guilty of felony murder only.3Wright was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a fifteen year concurrent term for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.No sentence was imposed upon Wright for unlawfully carrying a handgun.Coley was sentenced to life imprisonment, fifteen years of which were purportedly suspended.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions...
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