Wright v. State

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ORFINGER, J.
• Citation: Wright v. State, 161 So. 3d 442 (Fla. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 30 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5D12–3654.,5D12–3654.
• Parties: Amber WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

161 So.3d 442

Amber WRIGHT, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D12–3654.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 30, 2014.

Paula C. Coffman and Jeffrey D. Deen, Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional Counsel, Orlando, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion

ORFINGER, J.

Amber Wright appeals her conviction for the first-degree murder of Seath Jackson.

Wright contends that law enforcement's failure to timely provide her the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), tainted her subsequent admissions. We agree, reverse Wright's conviction, and remand for a new trial.¹

FACTS

Wright was one of five young people charged with Jackson's murder. Fifteen-year-old Wright and Jackson had been in a relationship, but broke up acrimoniously. Using text messages, Wright and Charlie Ely lured Jackson to a trailer, where Kyle Hooper, Wright's brother, along with Michael Bargo, her boyfriend, and Justin Soto, beat and shot Jackson before placing his body in a bag and burning it in a backyard fire pit.² The remains were then shoveled into five-gallon paint buckets and thrown in a rock quarry.

Two days after the murder, Mrs. Tracey Wright, Wright and Hooper's mother, called Sheriff's Deputy David Rasnick, telling him that Hooper knew something about Jackson's disappearance.³ When Deputy Rasnick arrived at the Wright residence, Wright, Hooper, Ely, and Mrs. Wright were all present. Because Hooper became emotional, Deputy Rasnick read him the Miranda warnings. Deputy Rasnick's supervisor arrived and told him that investigators wanted to interview “the kids” at the station. Deputy Rasnick passed that request on to them, and went next door to find Soto. Deputy Rasnick, Soto, Ely, Wright and Hooper went to the station in Deputy Rasnick's marked Marion County Sheriff's Office vehicle, while Mrs. Wright followed behind in her own car. Pursuant to the policies of the sheriff's office, Deputy Rasnick collected the cell phones of those who rode in his car. No one was handcuffed or expressed any reluctance about going to the sheriff's office. Instead, the group seemed “nonchalant.” Ely rode in the front, while Hooper, Wright and Soto rode in the back. At the time, Deputy Rasnick regarded Hooper as a “person of interest,” but neither he nor Wright were suspects.

At the sheriff's office, Wright had three videotaped interviews with Detective Rhonda Stroup. The first interview took place in a “soft room.” Wright and her mother sat together on a large couch, while Detective Stroup sat across from them in a chair. The conversation was calm and patient. Detective Stroup's questions were factual in nature, and did not accuse or confront either Wright or her mother. During this interview, Wright told Detective Stroup that Jackson “just showed up” at the trailer. Wright claimed that Hooper struck the first blow, frightening her and Ely into hiding in Ely's room until the next morning. When she woke, the house smelled like bleach.

This first interview lasted about twenty minutes, but the video recording continued for an additional hour. During that time, Wright and her mother primarily stayed in the soft room, which was unlocked. While Detective Stroup was out of the room, she was, among other things, interviewing Hooper, who confessed to the murder and implicated the others, including Wright. Detective Stroup then returned for a second interview. This time, Wright was moved to a “hard room,” a more traditional police interrogation room. To this point, Wright had not been given the Miranda warnings.

Detective Stroup began the second interview by accusing Wright of lying and stating that the interview was “where the rubber hits the road.” Detective Stroup informed Wright that Hooper had told her “everything,” and if Wright continued to lie, she would be treated “like a piece of garbage.” Detective Stroup indicated that she wanted “mutual respect” and the truth, and when pressed, Wright replied, “I'm gonna tell you the truth.” Notwithstanding Wright's professed willingness to be truthful, she continued to dissemble, prompting Detective Stroup to tell Wright that she was “done with being lied to” and that further lies would lead to her walking out, which was “not what you want.” Finally, Wright admitted her involvement in Jackson's murder, largely as described by Hooper, prompted by Detective Stroup's questions. At the conclusion of the second interview, Detective Stroup asked Wright to confirm that no one had offered her anything in exchange for her statement, no one had threatened to beat her, she understood her rights, and her statements were free and voluntary. To all of this, Wright responded, “yes ma'am.” Detective Stroup then arrested Wright for murder and handcuffed her.

Shortly after the second interview ended, Detective Stroup realized that no one had Mirandized Wright. As a result, she escorted Wright, in handcuffs, back to the soft room for a third interview. At the start of the third interview, Detective Stroup told Wright that she was giving her “the chance to be the honest one.” Detective Stroup informed Wright that she had not been read her rights, and then presented a Miranda waiver form to Wright, noting, “[T]his is something I have to do, OK?” Detective Stroup read the warnings on the form to Wright, ultimately asking, “Do you understand these rights?” Wright nodded affirmatively. Detective Stroup then asked, “Having these rights in mind, do you want to talk about this? And if [so] put your initials right there.” Wright complied, saying, “Might as well get it all out.” After Wright signed the waiver form, Detective Stroup questioned her calmly, frequently referring to inculpatory information gleaned from their just-completed, un-Mirandized second interview. Wright's answers were consistent with her statements in the second interview. By the time Detective Stroup read Wright her Miranda rights, Wright had been at the sheriff's office for more than six hours.⁴

Wright later moved to suppress all of her statements, arguing that they were the product of custodial interrogations, that she had not been Mirandized before the first or second interview, and that the failure to do so tainted the admissions made in the third interview. While the State agreed to the suppression of the second interview, it argued against suppressing the first or third interviews. The State contended that Miranda warnings were not needed for the first interview as it was not the result of a custodial interrogation. It also argued that the Miranda warnings given prior to the third interview cured any taint from the second, un-Mirandized interrogation. Based on the State's concession, the trial court agreed to suppress Wright's second interview. Without elaboration, the court denied suppression of the first and third interviews. Wright was ultimately found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Wright appeals, contending that the admission of her first and third interviews with Detective Stroup violated her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

ANALYSIS

Our review of a suppression order presents a mixed issue of law and fact, with deference given to findings of fact supported by competent, substantial evidence, while the application of law to the facts is reviewed de novo. State v. Perez, 58 So.3d 309, 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Here, the trial court made no oral or written findings; rather, it rendered an unelaborated order denying suppression of the first and third statements.

Both the United States and Florida Constitutions provide that a person may not be “compelled” to be a witness against himself or herself in any criminal matter. Amend. V, U.S. Const.; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. To protect the right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court requires that any individual held for custodial interrogation must be clearly informed as to his or her rights, including the “right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and ... [the] right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If the rights specified in Miranda are not respected, then no evidence obtained from the interrogation of a person in “custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way” may be used against that person. Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A defendant may waive these rights, but the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id.

“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” Id. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The prophylactic Miranda warnings “insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (quotations omitted)). Therefore, “unless and until [the Miranda ] warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant].” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. “A Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (emphasis omitted). This presumption is irrebuttable for the purposes of the State's case in chief. Id. at 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285.

WRIGHT'S FIRST INTERVIEW

The first issue we consider is whether Wright's initial interrogation by Detective Stroup was custodial. Police are not required to give Miranda warnings to every...