Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 16 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 6, September Term 2009.,6, September Term 2009.
• Parties: Edwin WRIGHT v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

983 A.2d 519

411 Md. 503

Edwin WRIGHT v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 6, September Term 2009.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 16, 2009.

Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, of Baltimore, on brief), for petitioner.

Susannah E. Prucka, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland of Baltimore), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.

ADKINS, J.

Petitioner Edwin Wright was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and unlawful distribution of cocaine. Wright was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, found guilty on the first two charges, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. During jury selection, the trial court conducted voir dire by posing a roster of questions to the venire in quick succession, and then permitting jurors to respond only after all questions had been asked. Because this method of voir dire did not effectively ensure a fair and impartial jury, we vacate Wright's convictions, and remand the case for a new trial.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

On May 6, 2006, Petitioner Edwin Wright was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and unlawful distribution of cocaine. He was tried before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on March 28-29, 2007. Before trial, the trial court conducted a voir dire of the fifty-person venire panel. During the voir dire, the venirepersons were asked, as a group, a roster of seventeen questions.

At the end of this collective questioning, each venireperson was called to the bench individually and asked if he or she had any information in response to the voir dire questions. The court then asked the venireperson if he or she could be fair and impartial. At the conclusion of this process, counsel for Wright and for the State moved the trial court to strike a number of jurors for cause, based on the information uncovered during the trial court's questioning. Wright's counsel objected to this voir dire method, arguing that "the problem is [the jurors' abilities] to remember all the questions." The trial court overruled the objection, saying that in the court's understanding, the chosen method "complie[d] with ... reported cases." The trial court went on to say that "this is an extremely effective way of accomplishing what is sought to be accomplished in the voir dire process. The jurors do remember the questions."

Ultimately, Wright was convicted of possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison without parole. Wright appealed on the grounds that the selected voir dire method prevented the empaneling of a fair and impartial jury.¹ In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. While the Court of Special Appeals characterized the challenged voir dire method as "somewhat flawed," it concluded that the flaws were not so egregious as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in relying on the chosen voir dire method.²

DISCUSSION

There is only one issue in this case: did the trial court's voir dire method deprive Wright of a fair and impartial jury, as guaranteed to him by both the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights? See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21. We evaluate voir dire methodology under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 160, 923 A.2d 44, 52 (2007).

We begin from the premise that the "overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury." Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819, 823 (2000). Indeed, the only purpose of voir dire in Maryland is to illuminate to the trial court any cause for juror disqualification. See Stewart, 399 Md. at 158, 923 A.2d at 51. Without a comprehensive and effective voir dire, a trial judge cannot properly winnow the venire to only those jurors who will be able to perform their duties without prejudice. See White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 240, 821 A.2d 459, 463 (2003) ("Without adequate voir dire, the trial judge is unable to fulfill his or her responsibility to eliminate those prospective jurors who will be unable to perform their duty impartially.").

Within this overall framework, however, the trial court has "broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire...." Dingle, 361 Md. at 13, 759 A.2d at 826. That discretion extends to both the form and the substance of questions posed to the venire. See, e.g., White, 374 Md. at 242-44, 821 A.2d at 465 (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to pose "compound" voir dire questions to the venire as a whole, followed by extensive individual voir dire); Stewart, 399 Md. at 162, 923 A.2d at 53 (holding that the trial court was not required to ask voir dire questions on a subject merely because the questions were requested by a party). A trial court reaches the limits of its discretion only when the voir dire method employed by the court fails to probe juror biases effectively. See, e.g., White, 374 Md. at 241, 821 A.2d at 464 (holding that "the conclusions of the trial judge are entitled to less deference" if voir dire is "cursory, rushed, and unduly limited").

In this case, the selected method of voir dire strayed too close to the "cursory" and "unduly limited" techniques that we have proscribed. It is evident from the record that the trial court's questioning did not properly engage at least some members of the venire panel. For example, the following exchange occurred between the trial judge and Juror 567:

THE COURT: Do you have any information to give the Court in response to the questions that I've asked?

JUROR 567: No.

THE COURT: Is there any reason you would not be able to reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case —

JUROR 567: No.

THE COURT: — based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?

* * *

THE COURT: [] But the questions that I asked to the panel as a group, did you hear those questions?

JUROR 567: Yeah, I — some of `em.

THE COURT: Okay.

The lack of proper comprehension in this exchange illustrates a systemic problem with the voir dire method used in this case. The presentation of a lengthy roster of questions to the venire, without providing the opportunity to answer each question as it was posed, required each venireperson to comprehend and retain far too much information to guarantee that the questions were answered properly.

In order to understand fully the difficulty associated with the retention of this information, it is worth examining both the full list of the questions posed and the manner in which they were presented to the venire. The trial court's statement to the venire ran as follows:

THE COURT: As I said, the case before the Court this morning is the State of Maryland v. Edwin Wright. The Defendant, Edwin Wright, in this proceeding has been charged with possession with intent to distribute CDS and possession of CDS on May 6th, 2006 in the 1100 block of Preston Street in Baltimore City, State of Maryland.

Does any member of the panel have any knowledge concerning this case either from hearing, seeing or reading about it in the mass media or from any other source whatsoever?

There are various individuals whose names may be mentioned during the course of this trial or who may be called as witnesses. Those persons are Detective Kenneth Ross, Detective Chris Faller F-a-l-l-e-r, Detective Kyle Johnson, chemist Anthony Rumber, R-u-m-b-e-r, Chemist Angela Ellis and Terry Wilson.

Does any member of the panel have any knowledge of the individuals whose names I have just mentioned?

Does any member of the panel know or have any relationship or knowledge of the Defendant, Mr. Edwin [Wright]?

* * *

Does anyone know or have any relationship whatsoever, past or present, with Mr. Wright's counsel, Sharon A.H. May?

* * *

Does anyone know or have any relationship, past or present, with the Assistant State's Attorney in this matter, Rita Wisthoff-Ito?

* * *

This question is in three parts and it concerns both you and members of your immediate family. And by immediate family, I mean your parents, children, brothers, or sisters, spouse. I do not mean cousins, nephews, in-laws or other individuals unless they reside with you.

Has any member of the panel or any member of your immediate family ever been convicted — ever been the victim of a crime?

Has any member of the panel or any member of your immediate family ever been convicted of a crime?

Has any member of the panel or has any member of your immediate family ever been incarcerated in a jail or penal institution within the last five years?

Has any member of the panel or any member of your immediate family have any pending cases?

Has any member of the panel or any member of your immediate family had any other experience with the criminal justice system which would or might affect your ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror in this case?

Does any member of the panel have any religious, moral or other beliefs which would interfere with your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in this case based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?

The accused in this case is African-American. Does any member of the panel feel that he or she is unable to reach a fair and impartial verdict simply because the accused is African-American?

Does any member of the panel have such strong feelings concerning controlled dangerous substances, that is CDS, that you would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?

Is there any member of the jury panel friendly with, associated with, or related to anyone in the Baltimore City Police Department, the ...