Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 11 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 173, 2007.,173, 2007.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: Clifford WRIGHT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

953 A.2d 188

Clifford WRIGHT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 173, 2007.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: January 9, 2008.

Decided: February 11, 2008.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. A. No. 0607070551.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

William A. Gonser, Jr., Andrew W. Gonser, Nancy Y. Gorman, Tanisha L. Merced, Gonser and Gonser, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.

Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, constituting the court en banc.

STEELE, Chief Justice.

A Superior Court jury found Clifford Wright, defendant-appellant, guilty of two counts of delivery of cocaine. Wright makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the common law corpus delicti rule.¹ Second, Wright argues that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the substance Wright delivered was, in fact, cocaine. Following initial briefing, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to address the evidence in the record, other than Wright's confession, that established that the substance delivered was actually cocaine.² We find that the testimony of Wright's uncharged co-conspirator, Cannon, independently established that Cannon provided Wright with cocaine and that Wright then delivered that cocaine to others. The evidence sufficiently supports Wright's convictions. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

FACTS

Police arrested and charged Raheem Cannon with possession with intent to deliver cocaine and other related drug crimes in June 2006. On July 13, 2006, Detective Thomas Abram called Cannon to the New Castle County Police Headquarters for questioning about an incident that involved both Cannon and Wright. After Detective Abram assured Cannon that he would not be prosecuted for his statements, Cannon confessed to selling cocaine to Wright two different times on the evening of July 8, 2006.³

Cannon had been selling cocaine on a daily basis for about two years. He never used cocaine himself, but had used marijuana and pills before entering a drug diversion program. Wright, Cannon's roommate for a brief time, regularly bought cocaine from Cannon every other week for over a year.

On July 8, Cannon went to a friend's house for a "get together." Because "business [was] kind of slow," he called Wright to see if he "[knew] anybody looking for anything." After "a little bit of time," Wright called him back. Cannon testified that during the first call, Wright requested "a 1/16" or 1.6 grams of cocaine.⁴ Cannon bagged the drugs for Wright before meeting him in the parking lot of Tailgates Bar in New Castle County. Cannon explained that he knew the substance he had placed in small baggies was cocaine because "[i]f you deal with it every day you can just tell by the texture and the smell and just the look of it." The cocaine that he bagged for Wright was a mixture of powder and chunks and had a "fuelly smell" like gasoline. Cannon had received the cocaine from someone else. In the two years he had been selling cocaine, Cannon testified, no drug purchaser had ever complained that Cannon sold fake cocaine.

The cocaine that Cannon took to Wright had a street value that approached $80 to $100. After Wright paid Cannon $100 for the cocaine, Cannon went back to the "get together." Some time later, Wright called him and requested another $80 to $100 worth of cocaine, and Cannon made a second delivery to Wright at the same location. At this second delivery, Wright was standing with someone that Cannon did not know. Cannon assumed that person intended to buy the drugs from Wright. He acknowledged, however, that he never saw Wright give the drugs to anyone. The police never recovered any of the cocaine in question.

In light of Cannon's statement, Detective Abram questioned Wright about the cocaine purchases.⁵ Before invoking his Miranda rights, Wright admitted to purchasing cocaine from Cannon two times on the evening of July 8, 2006. Wright also stated that he delivered to others both quantities of the drugs that he bought from Cannon. When Detective Abram asked whether he had also requested drugs for himself, Wright replied, "Not for me. I don't do it." The police arrested Wright and charged him with two counts of delivery of cocaine.

In exchange for immunity for his statements inculpating Wright, Cannon testified for the prosecution about his role in supplying Wright with cocaine at Wright's trial. Before the State introduced Wright's confession to Detective Abram, Wright's counsel objected and moved for dismissal based upon the State's failure to establish the corpus delicti for either of the two counts of delivery of cocaine. Finding that Cannon's testimony furnished independent evidence of the corpus delict, the trial judge denied the motion. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Wright's counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming that the State failed to present sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the substance involved was indeed cocaine. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that Cannon's assertion that the substance was cocaine, given his drug dealing experience, sufficiently established the relevant element of the crime charged. The jury convicted Cannon of both charges. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

We first note that the General Assembly changed the Delaware common law in 1996 when it enacted, and the Governor signed, S.B. 256, which added the following subsection (c) to 11 Del. C. § 301: "In any prosecution for any compound crime, including but not limited to first degree murder under § 636(a)(2) or (a)(6) of this title or for second degree murder under § 635(2) of this title, the corpus delicti of the underlying felony need not be proved independently of a defendant's extrajudicial statement."⁶ The synopsis to the bill provided:

The Delaware Supreme Court recently reversed a first degree murder conviction based upon the corpus delicti rule. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180 (Del. 1995). In doing so, the Court adopted an interpretation of the rule that is applied in only a small number of states. This statute will change the Delaware corpus delicti rule to bring it in accord with the rule applied in a majority of states.⁷

The explanation of the corpus delicti rule in Delaware and the reasons why the "trustworthiness" position was consistent with our precedent do not represent the entirety of the DeJesus opinion.⁸ In DeJesus, after examining the corpus delicti rule in Delaware, we then applied the Rule to the compound crime of felony murder.⁹ Section 301(c), however, establishes that this approach may not be applied to prosecutions "for any compound crimes."¹⁰ Because this case does not include a compound crime, the charges here do not implicate section 301. Therefore, the "trustworthiness" approach to the corpus delicti rule, as explained by DeJesus and its progeny,¹¹ still applies. The "trustworthiness" approach to the corpus delicti rule remains the law in Delaware for all prosecutions that do not involve compound crimes.

To satisfy the policy behind our corpus delicti rule, the State must present "some evidence of the existence of a crime, independent of the defendant's confession, to support a conviction."¹² Recently, in Bailey v. State,¹³ we noted that "[t]his Court has never precisely defined the specific quantum of independent evidence required by the State to establish the corpus delicti."¹⁴ In qualifying this observation, however, we also stated that the "defendant is sufficiently protected by requiring proof of the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt upon all the evidence taken together, provided that some evidence apart from the confession is adduced."¹⁵ "Once the State has produced some evidence of a crime, independent of the defendant's statement, then the policy behind the corpus delicti rule is satisfied and the confession may be admitted into evidence."¹⁶

Wright first argues that, at the time he raised his objection, the evidence of the alleged drug offenses failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged. In cases involving these challenges, we have reviewed properly preserved objections to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the corpus delicti under the same standard as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.¹⁷ To articulate precisely our standard of review corpus delicti challenges will be reviewed for whether a rational trier of fact, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.¹⁸

We start by addressing whether the State established evidence, other than Wright's own confession, for either count of delivery of cocaine. To be convicted of delivery of cocaine, the State must prove that Wright delivered, or possessed with intent to deliver, cocaine.¹⁹ Because "the more prudent approach is to apply the corpus delicti rule to any admission of the defendant that may tend to prove an element of the criminal offense,"²⁰ we must look at the circumstantial evidence the State presented through Cannon.

The State established, through Cannon's testimony, that Wright delivered cocaine. Cannon, as Wright's cocaine supplier, called Wright to see if Wright had someone to distribute or sell cocaine to further down the chain. Cannon testified that he called Wright and "asked him did he know anybody who that [sic] wanted anything. . . ." Cannon testified that he then made two cocaine deliveries to Wright. On the second delivery, Wright had someone with him. After both deliveries, Wright paid Cannon for the drugs. Cannon believed it must have been another person's money because (Cannon believed) Wright would not...