Wright v. United States, Case No. 4:10CV02329 ERW
| Decision Date | 20 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:10CV02329 ERW |
| Parties | BYRON ANTHONY WRIGHT, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court upon Movant Byron Anthony Wright's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody [doc. #1], which was filed with this Court on December 13, 2010. The Government filed its Response on March 8, 2011 [doc. #5], and Movant replied on March 18, 2011 [doc. #6].
On March 5, 2009, Movant Byron Anthony Wright ("Movant") was charged in an indictment for intent to distribute fifty or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count One), possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Two), and drug trafficking forfeiture in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Count Three). A superseding indictment was filed on May 14, 2009 [doc. #26], wherein Movant was additionally charged with one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Four).
On December 2, 2009, Movant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and to drug trafficking forfeiture in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 853. The Court sentencedMovant to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months to be followed by five years of supervised release.
On August 3, 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("FSA"), which amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). Among other things, the FSA adjusts upward the amount of cocaine base necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. See United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 957 (8th Cir. 2011) (). Prior to the passing of the FSA, possession of 50 grams of crack cocaine would generate a minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The FSA, however, amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) so that possession of 280 grams of crack cocaine is necessary to generate a minimum sentence of 120 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The current penalty for a defendant who possesses 50 or more grams of crack cocaine is imprisonment of not less than five years and not more than 40 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
In his Motion under § 2255, Movant asks this Court to vacate his previous sentence and sentence him in accordance with the new statutory minimums under the FSA. Movant claims that the continued application of the pre-FSA sentencing guidelines to those sentenced and convicted prior to the FSA's enactment is unconstitutional. Movant also alleges he was subjected to ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as a result of his counsel not arguing that the application of the pre-FSA sentencing guidelines was unconstitutional.
A federal prisoner who seeks relief from a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on grounds that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was inexcess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain relief under § 2255, the movant must establish a violation constituting "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a miscarriage of justice." United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989)).
Claims brought under § 2255 may also be limited by procedural default. A movant "cannot raise a nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional issue in a § 2255 motion if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal but was not." Anderson v. United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Belford v. United States, 975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, even constitutional or jurisdictional claims not raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a § 2255 motion unless the movant establishes "(1) cause for default and actual prejudice or (2) actual innocence." United States v. Moss, 255 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)).
The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to consider claims in a § 2255 motion "'[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'" Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Thus, a movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing "'when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [the movant] to relief.'" Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wade v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 306 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Court may dismiss a claim "without an evidentiary hearing if the claim isinadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based." Shaw, 24 F.3d at 1043 (citing Larson v. United States, 905 F.2d 218, 220-21 (8th Cir. 1990)). Since the Court finds that Movant's claims can be conclusively determined based upon the parties' filings and the records of the case, no evidentiary hearing will be necessary. See Id.
Movant contends that the FSA should be applied retroactively to his sentence because: 1) Congress intended the FSA to be retroactive; and 2) the application of the pre-FSA sentencing guidelines is unconstitutional. Leaving aside the issue of whether this claim is foreclosed by the waiver of post-conviction rights in Movant's plea agreement, Movant's claim must be denied because he is not entitled to resentencing under the FSA.
In order to determine if a statutory amendment is to be applied retroactively, courts must first look to the Congressional intent in enacting the amendment. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Movant claims that it was Congress's intent in enacting the FSA that it should apply retroactively. To support his assertion, Movant cites to two decisions by district courts outside of the Eighth Circuit. See United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp.2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005); United States v. Smith, 359 F.Supp.2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005). Movant also cited United States v. Clary, a 1994 decision of this court that was later overturned by the Court of Appeals. 846 F.Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994). However, Movant's arguments are contradicted by Eighth Circuit precedent.
The FSA acts as a partial repeal of, or amendment to, the Controlled Substances Act, see Orr, 636 F.3d at 958, and the federal Savings Statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, which provides that "[t]he repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, orliability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide . . . ." The FSA is silent on retroactivity, and as a result, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that it may not be applied retroactively. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1047-49 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 (8th Cir. 2010). The Eighth Circuit's finding in United States v. Brown also forecloses the argument that the FSA may be applied retroactively. 2010 WL 3958760 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2010). As the Eighth Circuit noted in Brown, the general savings statute "requires application of penalties in place at time [the] crime was committed unless [the] new enactment expressly provides for its own retroactive application." Brown, 2010 WL 3958760, at *1 (citing United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 579-81 (6th Cir. 2010). This court notes, as the Court did in Brown, that the FSA is without any express language that it is retroactive. Brown, 2010 WL 3958760, at *1. Despite statements made by members of Congress, which Movant suggests portray Congress' intent to have the FSA apply retroactively, no Congressional intent to make the FSA retroactive can be read from the plain language of the statute. Consequently, Movant's argument must fail.1
Further, the cases cited by Movant are unpersuasive. Holland is distinguishable from Movant's case, as the Appellant there had yet to be sentenced when the Fair Sentencing Act was enacted, whereas here, Movant was sentenced eight months prior to its enactment. See United States v. Holland, 2011 WL 98313, at *1 (D. Neb. Jan. 10, 2011). As noted by Movant, the district court decision in Clary was overturned by the Eighth Circuit. See United States v. Clary,34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court, therefore, finds that Movant's arguments based on these cases are without merit.
Movant also argues that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This argument is contradicted by precedent set by the Eight Circuit, which has consistently found the Pre-FSA guidelines to be constitutional, indeed in many of the very cases cited by Movant. See United States v. Watts, 553 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 2009) (); United States v. McLellon, 578 F.3d 846, 861 (8th Cir. 2009); and United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1994) (). These holdings, as...
To continue reading
Request your trial