Wright v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium, Case No: 5:11-cv-193-Oc-29PRL
| Decision Date | 11 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 5:11-cv-193-Oc-29PRL |
| Parties | IRAMM WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - MEDIUM, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is before the Court on Iramm Wright's ("Petitioner's") habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Petitioner is an inmate currently confined at the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida. He brings this action to challenge the combined 420-month sentence imposed in his five 2005 drug related convictions in the United States Court for the Southern District of Florida (SDFL Case No. 1:05-cr-20437).
Petitioner argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced under the career offender provision of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual because one of the underlying convictions used to do so was not a qualifying predicate felony for enhancement (Doc. 1 at 3). Respondent asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider thepetition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 5). Petitioner did not reply to the response.
After consideration of the issues raised by Petitioner, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed as an improper filing under § 2241. Furthermore, if the petition were not due to be dismissed, it would fail on the merits.
On August 5, 2005, Petitioner was found guilty of: (1) conspiracy to obstruct, delay, and affect interstate commerce by means of robbery by planning to take cocaine from alleged narcotics traffickers using actual or threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), (b)(1), and (b)(3) (count one); (2) conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (count two); (3) attempt to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (count three); (4) using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (count four); and (5) possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(3) (count five) (Doc. 5-1 at 11).
Petitioner was sentenced as a "career offender" under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual ("USSG") to serve a total of 420 months in prison, consisting of 240 months as to count one and 360 months as to counts two, three, and five, all to be served concurrently, and 60 months as to count four to be served consecutively to counts one, two, three, and five (Doc. 5-1 at 13).1 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. United States v. Reed, 259 F. App'x 289 (11th Cir. 2007).
Subsequently, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he raised seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and argued that his enhancement for leadership should be vacated because of the Eleventh Circuit's reversal of his co-defendants' convictions (Doc. 5-1 at 18; SDFL Case No. 1:09-cv-20723-HUCK). Petitioner's motion was denied in its entirety (Doc. 5-3; Doc. 5-4).
Petitioner filed the instant petition on April 11, 2011 (Doc. 1). In the petition, he argues that pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), his prior conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest withviolence is no longer a "crime of violence" under USSG. § 4B1.2, and as a result, he is "actually innocent of his underlying enhanced sentence imposed under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2[.]" (Doc. 1 at 3). Thus, Petitioner alleges, he was improperly enhanced as a career offender. Id.
Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot bring this claim in a § 2241 petition (Doc. 5 at 3). Respondent also argues that Petitioner's claim fails on the merits because, even considering the holding in Johnson, Petitioner's conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence was a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2. Id.
Petitioner has styled this action as a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides a means for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence. Here, however, Petitioner challenges the validity of his sentence because he claims it was improperly enhanced. Ordinarily, an action in which an individual seeks to collaterally attack his conviction should be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district of conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003). However, because Petitioner's previous § 2255 motion was denied by the court which imposed his sentence, Petitioner may not file another § 2255 motion without first receiving permission fromthe appropriate United States Court of Appeals, which Petitioner has failed to do. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Darby v. Hawk-Sawyer, 405 F.3d 942, 945 (11th Cir. 2005) ().
Because Petitioner is barred from filing another § 2255 motion, he filed this petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) expressly limits the circumstances under which a § 2241 motion may be filed, Petitioner asserts that he is allowed to file this motion under § 2241 because his claim was "foreclosed by circuit precedent at the time when [he] was permitted under the AEDPA to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct [his] underlying sentence" (Doc. 1 at 3).
Under § 2255(e)'s savings clause, a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if an otherwise available remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Specifically, § 2255(e) provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the courtwhich sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). A recent Eleventh Circuit opinion discussing the savings clause clarifies that where, as here, a petitioner challenges only a "fundamental defect in sentencing," he must establish two necessary conditions before he may invoke § 2255(e)'s saving clause: (1) the claim must be based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision; and (2) the Supreme Court decision must have overturned a circuit precedent that squarely resolved the claim so that the petitioner had no genuine opportunity to raise it at trial, on appeal, or in his first § 2255 motion. Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013)( the test set forth in Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999)).2 Thisthreshold showing is a jurisdictional requirement, and where it is absent, federal courts lack authority to consider the merits of a petitioner's § 2241 petition. Williams, 713 F.3d at 1338.
Petitioner points to Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) as a retroactively applicable Supreme Court case that shows he is "actually innocent" of being a career offender (Doc. 1 at 3). Specifically, Petitioner asserts that this case proscribes the use of his prior conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer and/or resisting an officer with violence as a predicate felony for sentencing enhancement under USSG § 4B1.2 because the conviction should not have been considered a crime of violence.3 Even setting aside the issue of Johnson's retroactivity, the case does not aid Petitioner.
Under Florida law, a battery occurs when a person "[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person." Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)(1)-(2). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that a Florida felony conviction for battery is not categorically a "violent felony" under the "elements" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)'s Armed Career Criminal Act.4 559 U.S. 133. The Supreme Court determined that in order for a crime to qualify as a violent felony under the elements clause, it must involve "violent force," defined by the Court as "force capable of causing physical pain or injury toanother[.]" Id. at 140. The Johnson Court concluded that because criminal liability under § 748.03(1)(a) is satisfied by any intentional physical contact, no matter how slight, that crime does not have the use of physical force as an element, as required by the ACCA definition of "violent felony." Id. at 136-43. Unlike the petitioner in Johnson, Petitioner was not convicted of simple battery under Florida Statute § 784.03. Rather, he was convicted of "battery on a law enforcement officer and/or resisting arrest with violence." (Doc. 1 at 3).
The Florida offense of resisting an officer with violence is defined as "knowingly and willfully resist[ing], obstruct[ing], or oppos[ing] any officer [in the execution of his duties] by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer." Fla. Stat. § 843.01. Florida courts have held that "doing violence" requires that the defendant "use . . . physical force or violence" against an officer, Harris v. State, 5 So. 3d 750, 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), and have interpreted the term "offering to do violence" as an attempt to use force on an officer or a threat to use force. See Jordan v. State, 438 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1983); Scullock v. State, 377 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1979).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that a Florida conviction for resisting arrest with...
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