Wright v. Waste Pro USA Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-02654,2:17-cv-02654 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Anthony Wright, Daniel Hansen, and Kenneth Privette, all individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. Waste Pro USA Inc., Waste Pro of Florida, Inc., Waste Pro of South Carolina, Inc., Waste Pro of North Carolina, Inc., Defendants. |
This matter comes before the court on defendants Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida's ("Waste Pro FL") motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and preemption, ECF Nos. 37, 38; on Waste Pro of South Carolina's ("Waste Pro SC") and Waste Pro of North Carolina's ("Waste Pro NC") motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and preemption, ECF Nos. 39 and 40; and on plaintiffs Anthony Wright ("Wright"), Daniel Hansen ("Hansen"), and Kenneth Privette's ("Privette") (collectively, "plaintiffs") motion to sever and transfer, ECF No. 129. For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro FL's motions to dismiss and DISMISSES them as defendants from this case. The court also DISMISSES all plaintiffs who are not employees of Waste Pro SC or Waste Pro NC. The court GRANTS Waste Pro NC and Waste Pro SC's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA") claim. The court finds that the remaining North and South Carolina plaintiffs do not have standing to sue both Waste Pro NC and Waste Pro SC and orders plaintiffs to file an amended complaint pursuant to the instructions given in this order. The court finds MOOT defendants remaining arguments, but defendants may re-file their motions regarding standing and failure to state a claim if plaintiffs do not properly re-plead their complaint. This order also renders MOOT plaintiffs' motion to sever and transfer.
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants individually on a collective and class wide basis. Plaintiffs are waste disposal drivers for defendants. They claim that, due to the defendants' company-wide policies, they were deprived of wages for hours actually worked. According to plaintiffs, defendants did this in the following ways: (1) erroneously calculating their prevailing hourly rate; (2) only paying plaintiffs "half-time" for all hours worked over forty hours in a given workweek; (3) requiring them to perform pre-shift and post-shift duties while not clocked in; and (4) automatically deducting thirty minutes for lunch breaks that defendants knew plaintiffs worked through. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of all other similarly situated non-exempt waste disposal drivers who were paid a day rate and who have been employed by Waste Pro entities throughout the United States, at any time from September 29, 2014 through the final disposition of this matter. Plaintiffs all filed consent forms to join this collective action lawsuit against Waste Pro USA only. ECF Nos. 30-3, 30-4, 30-5. However, each plaintiff specifies that they work or worked for a particular Waste Pro facility—Wright worked at Waste Pro's facility in Florida, Hansen in South Carolina, and Privette in North Carolina.
Plaintiffs filed suit in this court on October 2, 2017, and filed their second amended complaint on December 5, 2017, bringing the following causes of action: (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.; (2) violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act ("SCPWA"), South Carolina Code §§ 41-10-10, et seq.; and (3) violation of the NCWHA, North Carolina General Statutes §§ 95-25.1, et seq.. ECF No. 30-2. On December 20, 2017, Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro FL filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim, and also seeking the dismissal of plaintiffs' North Carolina claim based on preemption grounds. ECF Nos. 37 and 38. The other defendants filed nearly identical motions that same day, with Waste Pro SC and Waste Pro NC declining to bring a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 39 and 40. On January 16, 2018, plaintiffs filed virtually identical responses to all of the motions. ECF Nos. 46, 47, 48, and 49. On February 2, 2018, defendants filed a joint reply to those responses. ECF No. 54. Pursuant to the court's order to conduct jurisdictional discovery, WP USA and WP FL filed their supplemental briefing on the personal jurisdiction issue on November 30, 2018, ECF No. 124, and plaintiffs filed their supplemental briefing on February 15, 2019, ECF No. 141, and filed a reply to plaintiffs' brief on February 25, 2019, ECF No. 143.
The matters have been fully briefed and are now ripe for the court's review.
When the defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists. See In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir.1997). When the court decides a personal jurisdiction challenge without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). "In considering the challenge on such a record, the court must construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction." In re Celotex Corp., 234 F.3d at 628 (quoting Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)). However, the court need not "credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences." Masselli & Lane, PC v. Miller & Schuh, PA, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000).
Defendants' standing argument implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction and is governed by Rule 12(b)(1). Crumbling v. Miyabi Murrells Inlet, LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 640, 643 (D.S.C. 2016). The determination of subject matter jurisdiction must be made at the outset before any determination on the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). "The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion if subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1)." Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995). If the plaintiff cannot overcome this burden, then the claim must be dismissed. Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2005). When a party contends that "the complaint [] fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based[,] . . . all the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true." Luna-Reyes v. RFI Const., LLC, 57 F. Supp. 3d 495, 499 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). "[A] trial court should dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) only when the jurisdictional allegations are 'clearly . . .immaterial, made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly unsubstantial and frivolous.'" Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 679. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Defendants Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro FL seek dismissal of plaintiffs' second amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(2).1 ECF No. 37 at 4. The court has considered whether it may exercise jurisdiction over these entities under various legal grounds—general personal jurisdiction, specific personal jurisdiction, joint employer / single integrated enterprise theory ("JE/SIE theory"),2 and agency theory. The court has analyzed the evidence the parties have put forth in their supplemental briefings and finds that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the court should exercise personal jurisdiction over Waste Pro USA or Waste Pro FL under any of these legal grounds.
In evaluating a challenge to personal jurisdiction under a state's long-arm statute, the court engages in a two-step analysis. Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 1993). First, the long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction under the facts presented. Id. Second, if the statute does authorize jurisdiction, then the court must determine if the statutory assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Id. South Carolina's long-arm statute extends to the outer limits allowed by the Due Process Clause. Foster v. Arletty 3 Sarl, 278 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2002). Consequently, the only question before the court is...
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