Wright v. Wright

• Decision Date: 26 February 1875
• Citation: 31 Mich. 380
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Frederick Wright v. Eli Wright

31 Mich. 380

Frederick Wright v. Eli Wright

Supreme Court of Michigan

February 26, 1875

Heard January 28, 1875

Appeal in Chancery from Clinton Circuit.

Decree reversed, and the bill dismissed, with costs of both courts.

Bartow & Fedewa and J. A. Selden, for complainant.

Walbridge Cook & Walbridge and Gould & Lyon, for defendant.

Campbell J. Graves, Ch. J., and Cooley, J., concurred. Christiancy J., did not sit in this case.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

The bill in this cause was filed to compel the conveyance by defendant to complainant of a tract of eighty acres in Clinton county, in specific performance of an alleged agreement.

The agreement on which relief is sought, is averred to have been made in the spring of 1866, whereby it is claimed the defendant, who is complainant's father, agreed, "in consideration of the work already performed by your orator for the said defendant, and the money already paid to him by your orator, and in consideration of the love and affection for your orator, he being the son of the said Eli Wright, defendant, that if your orator would go on to said land and improve it, he, the said defendant, would give your orator a good warranty deed of the same."

The bill avers that in April, 1867, complainant, in pursuance of the agreement, entered into possession, and has made improvements and largely increased the value of the premises; that complainant has repeatedly asked for a deed, and defendant told him to go on and improve the land and he would give a deed at any time, but has lately repudiated the agreement and refused to deed.

The bill does not disclose, what turns out to be the fact, that there never was any written agreement whatever; and it is questionable whether the case made by it is sufficiently indicated as one of a parol contract partly performed. But the testimony has all been taken, and the case may be considered on its merits.

It is not shown by the bill what work or what money entered into so much of the consideration as was claimed to have been valuable. And the contract, as set out, is very vague as to the kind and extent of the improvements to be made, and the time within which they were to be made. The bill furnishes no criterion whereby the court could determine when the work had been performed. Specific performance cannot be granted until the contract is made clear and definite.

But upon looking into the proofs, we find no evidence of any contract, and no evidence of possession taken with a...