Wrye v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: WEISS
• Citation: Wrye v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 910, 92 A.D.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
• Decision Date: 31 March 1983
• Docket Number: CIBA-GEIGY
• Parties: Norma WRYE, Individually and as Executrix under the Last Will and Testament of Jack A. Wrye, Deceased, Respondent, v.CORPORATION, Appellant.

Page 910

461 N.Y.S.2d 910

92 A.D.2d 341

Norma WRYE, Individually and as Executrix under the Last Will and Testament of Jack A. Wrye, Deceased, Respondent, v. CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

March 31, 1983.

Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, P.C., Glens Falls (Michael Malina and Mark David, of counsel, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York City), for appellant.

Patrick J. Mannix, Glens Falls (Benjamin R. Pratt, Jr., of counsel, Miller, Mannix, Lemery & Kafin, P.C., Glens Falls), for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and SWEENEY, MAIN, CASEY and WEISS, JJ.

WEISS, Justice.

The underlying action to obtain benefits under a pension plan was commenced by service of a summons and complaint in Glens Falls on December 7, 1981. These papers were forwarded to defendant's division headquarters in Ardsley, New York, and were allegedly not discovered by a responsible representative until December 18, 1981. Defendant's attorneys made repeated, but unsuccessful attempts to speak to plaintiff's attorney, Patrick Mannix, a sole practitioner, on the telephone from December 21, 1981 through January 4, 1982. On January 4, 1982, defense counsel sent a letter by express mail to Mannix. That same day, defendant received a letter at its Glens Falls plant from Mannix, dated December 30, 1981, inquiring about its apparent default. On January 5, 1982, Mannix denied defendant's request for an extension of time to answer. The next day a second request for an extension was denied and an answer was served. In the meantime, without entering a default judgment, Mannix filed a note of issue for an assessment of damages, and returned the answer in a letter dated January 11, 1982. On February 19, 1982, defendant moved for an order compelling an acceptance of its answer. The motion was denied and the instant appeal ensued.

Defendant argues that since the motion to compel acceptance of its answer was essentially one for an extension of time to answer (CPLR 2004), which preceded any application for entry of a default judgment, the court enjoyed a broader range of discretion in excusing its default (A & J Concrete Corp. v. Arker, 54 N.Y.2d 870, 872, 444 N.Y.S.2d 905, 429 N.E.2d 412; see Williams v. City of New York, 85 A.D.2d 633, 445 N.Y.S.2d 18). It is necessary to reconsider the rule previously followed by this court. We have held that an application to extend the time to answer must be made prior to the expiration of the original answering period (Citibank v. Cummings, 79 A.D.2d 1068, 435 N.Y.S.2d 391; Keith v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 56 A.D.2d 671, 391 N.Y.S.2d 479, mot. for lv. to app. den. 42 N.Y.2d 801, 396 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 364 N.E.2d 1345). The Keith case was decided in an era when discretion to vacate defaults traditionally had been exercised more liberally in favor of a defendant (see Sortino v. Fisher, 20 A.D.2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186; Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C3215:24 [1982-1983 supp.], pp. 303-304). However, the Court of Appeals in Barasch v. Micucci, 49 N.Y.2d 594, 427 N.Y.S.2d 732, 404 N.E.2d 1275 and its progeny, determined that all parties to an action will be treated equally with respect to time requirements. A rigid rule evolved depriving the court of discretion where a default is due to "law office failure" (see Q.P.I. Rests. v. Slevin, 58 N.Y.2d 769, 459 N.Y.S.2d 30, 445 N.E.2d 206, revg. 88 A.D.2d 844, 451 N.Y.S.2d 409). However, after Barasch, the Court of Appeals ameliorated the rule somewhat to recognize a broader range of discretion in the court when considering a motion for an extension of time under CPLR 2004 so long as it precedes a motion to dismiss for failure to serve a timely complaint (see A & J Concrete Corp. v. Arker, supra). Thus, by moving for an extension prior to a defendant's motion to dismiss, a plaintiff who has failed to serve a timely complaint may avoid the consequences of his inaction even where the original time period has expired. Then, in Eaton v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 56 N.Y.2d 900, 453 N.Y.S.2d 404, 438 N.E.2d 1119, the Court of Appeals extended the same consideration to a defendant by noting that "Respondent * * * could have moved for an extension of time to answer" (id. at 903, 453 N.Y.S.2d 404, 438 N.E.2d 1119). Today, following the mandate of Eaton and A & J Concrete Corp., we hold the prevailing rule of equal treatment necessitates that defendants be allowed to move for an extension of time to answer, notwithstanding expiration of the original answering period. The only limitation remaining is that the extension motion must precede the application for a default judgment. To hold otherwise would create a disparity between the positions of plaintiff and defendant inconsistent with the standard set forth in Barasch and Eaton. Nor does such a determination conflict with the statute, which by its express terms authorizes an extension "whether the application * * * is made before or after the expiration of the time fixed" (CPLR 2004; emphasis added). ¹

Turning to the merits of this case, we initially note that plaintiff had not applied for a default judgment prior to defendant's motion for an extension. ² The mere filing of a note of issue for an assessment of damages does not satisfy the requirements of an application for default (CPLR 3215, subd. [e] ). Therefore, although Special Term enjoyed a broader range of discretion in deciding defendant's motion, that court failed to exercise this discretion (A & J Concrete Corp. v. Arker, 54 N.Y.2d 870, 872, 444 N.Y.S.2d 905, 429 N.E.2d 412, supra; LoPinto v....