Wu v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 23 January 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-7653,87-7653 |
| Citation | 863 F.2d 1543 |
| Parties | 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 3, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,622, 50 Ed. Law Rep. 973 Dr. Kathleen Johnson WU and Dr. Hsiu Kwang Wu, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dr. Joab THOMAS, in his official capacity as President of the University of Alabama; The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, a body corporate; Dr. Roger E. Sayers, individually and in his official capacity as Academic Vice-President of the University of Alabama; Dr. Richard Peck, individually and in his official capacity as Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences of the University of Alabama; Dr. Max Hocutt, individually and in his official capacity as chairperson of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Alabama; and Dr. John Formby, individually and in his official capacity as head of the Department of Finance, Economics, and Legal Studies of the University of Alabama, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Susan Williams Reeves, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Stanley Jay Murphy, The University of Alabama, C. Glenn Powell, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before TJOFLAT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and WISDOM *, Senior Circuit Judge.
The appellants in this case, Kathleen and Hsiu Kwang (H.K.) Wu, are employed on the faculty at the University of Alabama. Kathleen Wu is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy; H.K. Wu is a full professor of Finance and Economics. 1 Both Kathleen and H.K. Wu have tenure.
In 1980, Kathleen Wu began to complain that officials at the University of Alabama were discriminating against her because of her gender in matters concerning equal pay and opportunity for promotion. She eventually filed a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC); after exhausting her administrative remedies with the Commission, Ms. Wu brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against several of the university's officials. In that suit (Wu I ), Ms. Wu sought relief under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206 (1982), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. (1982), and under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). 2
According to H.K. Wu, subsequent to Kathleen Wu's filing of her EEOC charge he was summarily removed from the chairmanship of his department without cause, notice, or explanation. In November 1985, Dr. John Formby, the department's new chairman, invited Mr. Wu to look for work somewhere else. As a result of this action, Kathleen Wu filed a second charge with the EEOC on March 12, 1986, contending that Dr. Formby's treatment of her husband was in retaliation for her prosecution of Wu I.
The district court tried Wu I from March 31 to April 9, 1986. In October 1986, the district court held for the university officials. See Wu v. Thomas, No. 84-2159 (N.D.Ala. Oct. 24, 1986), aff'd 847 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.1988). H.K. and Kathleen Wu allege in the instant case that following the district court's decision, several university officials continued to harass them.
Specifically, H.K. Wu alleges that in August 1986, Dr. Formby again suggested that he look for another job. In addition, Mr. Wu alleges that university officials have denied him various important teaching assignments, removed him without notice from a Graduate Admissions Committee, and have given him pay raises lower than those received by comparable members of his department. These measures, he contends, have diminished his academic reputation, thus denying him opportunities outside the University of Alabama and causing him emotional distress. 3
Kathleen Wu alleges that university officials have destroyed at least one favorable student evaluation of her performance, have entered inaccurate ratings of her performance on her permanent record, and have publicly threatened her for attempting to investigate this matter. Ms. Wu further alleges that university officials sought to force one of her former students to sign an affidavit implicating Ms. Wu in wrongdoing, and that she has been denied reasonable classroom facilities and compensation for approved professional expenses. University officials also have threatened to remove her from classes she traditionally has taught, have excluded her from vital departmental decisions, have called her a "trouble-making woman [who is] essentially dishonest," and have leveled other groundless charges at her. Ms. Wu contends that as a result of these incidents her reputation in the academic community has suffered and she has experienced emotional distress. 4 These incidents led Ms. Wu to file a third retaliation charge with the EEOC.
On January 21, 1987, the EEOC issued a no cause determination and a right to sue letter on Ms. Wu's second EEOC charge. H.K. and Kathleen Wu then brought this suit, alleging that officials at the University of Alabama, the appellees, had violated 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (1982) by retaliating against H.K. and Kathleen Wu for bringing Wu I. They sought relief under that statute 5 and under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). 6
In response to the appellants' complaint, the appellees filed an answer, labeled a "motion to dismiss," which denied that anyone connected with the university had retaliated against H.K. and Kathleen Wu, and which raised the affirmative defenses of res judicata, nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, and sovereign immunity. The district court, sua sponte, converted the appellees' answer to a motion for summary judgment, and on October 27, 1987 the court entered a final order granting appellees summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The appellants now challenge the district court's decision.
The district court advanced four independent grounds for its award of summary judgment. We examine each ground separately.
As its first ground for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the appellants "failed to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites to suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Specifically, the district court first determined that Kathleen Wu's suit was barred because she had not yet requested or received a right to sue letter for her third EEOC charge. Second, the district court determined that H.K. Wu had no actionable claim because he had made no independent EEOC charge, and because "his suit [could not] rest on [Kathleen Wu's] filed charges with the EEOC."
This circuit has long required plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit under Title VII. See, e.g., Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897 (5th Cir.1977) 7 ("It is clear that a single individual plaintiff in a civil action under Title VII must satisfy two jurisdictional requisites: (1) a charge must have been filed with [the] EEOC and (2) the statutory notice must have been received from [the] EEOC.") We have refused, however, to demand such exhaustion in all situations, recognizing that literal compliance does not always effectuate the purpose of the requirement, which is to promote informal settlements. Thus, we have noted that Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.1968).
One such area in which we have recognized that strict compliance with Title VII is unnecessary is where the plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC, but in her judicial action the plaintiff raises related issues as to which no filing has been made. Thus, we have stated:
As long as allegations in the judicial complaint and proof are "reasonably related" to charges in the administrative filing and "no material differences" between them exist, the court will entertain them. As we have noted ..., "the 'scope' of the judicial complaint is limited to the 'scope' of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination."
Judicial claims which serve to amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus earlier EEO complaints are appropriate. Allegations of new acts of discrimination, offered as the essential basis for the requested judicial review are not appropriate.
Ray v. Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.1970)).
Kathleen Wu's second EEOC charge, which the district court apparently overlooked, stated as follows:
The University retaliated against me by [Dr. John Formby] calling my husband and suggesting that he would be happier teaching somewhere else. This was retaliation against me because (1) I have a discrimination suit pending against the University; (2) the University knows that if my husband took another job in a different city I would be likely to follow him because of our marital relationship.
We think that the allegations contained in Ms. Wu's complaint in the instant case are reasonably related to this charge, serving only to amplify the claim of retaliation with additional instances of wrongful retaliatory conduct on the part of university officials. Moreover, we question whether requiring a right to sue letter with regard to the third EEOC charge would serve any purpose--given the university's reaction to her previous charges, we hardly can expect that it suddenly will decide to avail itself of the good offices of the EEOC and reach an informal settlement with Kathleen and H.K. Wu. We therefore conclude that Ms. Wu's failure to receive a right to sue letter on her third EEOC charge is no obstacle to this...
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