Wurl v. Polson School Dist. No. 23

• Decision Date: 10 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-066.,05-066.
• Citation: 2006 MT 8,127 P.3d 436
• Parties: Holly WURL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. POLSON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 23, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

127 P.3d 436

2006 MT 8

Holly WURL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. POLSON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 23, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 05-066.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs August 23, 2005.

Decided January 10, 2006.

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For Appellant: J. Tiffin Hall, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana.

For Respondent: Debra A. Silk, Tony Koening, Montana School Boards Association, Helena, Montana.

Chief Justice KARLA M. GRAY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Holly Wurl (Wurl) appeals from the judgment entered by the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, on its order granting summary judgment to Polson School District No. 23 (School District). We affirm.

¶ 2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the School District.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The School District employed Wurl as a speech-language pathologist from August of 1993 through June of 2002. Wurl's employment with the School District was governed by nine separate written employment contracts, with each contract encompassing a term of one year. The final contract between the parties was signed by Wurl on June 4, 2001, and provided that the School District would employ Wurl for the 2001-2002 school year. The contract was entitled "Teacher Contract," stated that Wurl was "a legally qualified and certified teacher under the School Laws and Regulations of Montana" and referred to Wurl throughout as a "Teacher." It is undisputed that Wurl is not a legally qualified and certified teacher under Montana law. The contract also referred to a Master Agreement (MA), which is a separate collective bargaining agreement between the School District and the Polson unit of the Montana Education Association (PMEA). Among other things, the MA contains provisions governing the termination of teachers and grievance procedures culminating, at the sole option of the PMEA, in submission of grievances to binding arbitration.

¶ 4 On May 13, 2002, at a meeting of the School District's Board of Trustees (Board), the Board voted unanimously to not renew Wurl's contract for the 2002-2003 school year. It is undisputed that the Board did not follow the procedures outlined in the MA for termination of a teacher. Nor did Wurl initiate a grievance under the MA to challenge the Board's decision. Rather, in May of 2003, Wurl brought this action against the School District alleging that the Board's act of terminating her employment with the School District without following the MA termination procedures constituted a breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She also brought claims for wrongful discharge and violation of her right to due process as guaranteed by the Montana and United States Constitutions.

¶ 5 The School District subsequently moved the District Court for summary judgment as to the entirety of Wurl's complaint. The School District first asserted that Wurl could not bring an action under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), §§ 39-2-901 through -915, MCA, because her complaint clearly alleged that her employment was covered by either a written contract for a specific term or a collective bargaining agreement, thus making the WDEA inapplicable pursuant to § 39-2-912(2), MCA.

¶ 6 The School District further asserted that Wurl's remaining claims failed because they were based on her allegation that the Board failed to follow the termination procedures set forth in the MA. The School District contended that the MA did not directly apply to Wurl's employment because she was not a "teacher" as contemplated in the MA, and that the provisions of the MA were not incorporated into her employment contract. Thus, the School District asserted Wurl was not entitled to the rights afforded teachers under the MA termination procedures. As a result, according to the School District, Wurl's employment was governed by a written contract for a specified term which expired by its own terms and did not require the School District to renew the contract or otherwise extend Wurl's employment. On this basis, the School District argued there was no breach of contract, no breach of the implied covenant of good fair and fair dealing, and no violation of due process rights, and it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The School District also argued, in the alternative, that, if the MA applied to Wurl's employment, it still was entitled to summary judgment on her claims because she failed to follow the grievance procedures set forth in the MA.

¶ 7 In response to the School District's motion for summary judgment, Wurl argued that her employment was subject to the provisions of the MA because her employment contract, by its terms, specifically incorporated the MA. She further argued that the School District should be equitably estopped from arguing that she could not bring her claims because she failed to follow the MA's grievance procedures. Finally, Wurl conceded that her employment was excluded from coverage under the WDEA.

¶ 8 The District Court subsequently entered its order granting summary judgment to the School District as to the entirety of Wurl's complaint. The District Court concluded that § 39-2-912(2), MCA, precluded Wurl from bringing a claim under the WDEA. The court also concluded that nothing in the employment contract indicated an intent by the parties that Wurl's employment be covered by the MA; that, other than the MA's salary schedule, the provisions of the MA were not incorporated by reference into the employment contract; and that Wurl's employment was not otherwise subject to the MA because Wurl was not a "teacher" as defined in the MA.

¶ 9 Based on these conclusions, the District Court further concluded that Wurl's employment with the School District was governed by a written contract for a specified term which did not provide Wurl with a reasonable expectation of continued employment beyond the term of the contract. Thus, the court determined that the School District did not breach the contract or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and did not violate Wurl's right to due process. The District Court also concluded that, even if Wurl's employment were governed by the MA, her failure to pursue the MA's mandatory grievance procedures barred her from bringing her claims. The court did not address Wurl's equitable estoppel argument. The District Court entered judgment on its order granting summary judgment to the School District and Wurl appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standards applied by the district court. Cole v. Valley Ice Garden, L.L.C., 2005 MT 115, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 99, ¶ 16, 113 P.3d 275, ¶ 16. With regard to summary judgments, Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides that

[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

¶ 11 We observe in this case that the District Court's order granting the School District summary judgment includes a section entitled "FINDINGS OF FACT," in which the court set forth the facts relevant to the issues raised by the parties in their briefs. We recently clarified however, that in a summary judgment proceeding

the parties are not arguing over what happened or presenting conflicting evidence; they merely need to know which of them, under the uncontested facts, is entitled to prevail under the applicable law. In such a case, the district court judge need not weigh evidence, choose one disputed fact over another, or assess credibility of the witnesses.

Cole, ¶ 4. Thus, it is inappropriate for a district court to enter "findings of fact" when addressing a summary judgment motion. Rather, the court simply should set forth the undisputed facts relevant to the legal issues raised, as well as any disputed facts which may preclude entry of summary judgment. Here, however, our review of the record, the parties' briefs and the District Court's order reveals that the facts as "found" by the District Court are undisputed by the parties. Consequently, although the court erred in articulating the undisputed facts as "findings of fact," the error is harmless here.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to the School District?

¶ 13 As noted above, the employment contract at issue in this case is entitled "Teacher Contract," states that Wurl was "a legally qualified and certified teacher under the School Laws and Regulations of Montana" and refers to Wurl throughout as "Teacher." The parties do not dispute that Wurl is not a legally qualified and certified teacher under Montana law. However, neither party contends that this inaccuracy or potential ambiguity in the employment contract makes the contract void or unenforceable. Indeed, both parties' arguments are premised on the belief that the employment contract is a valid, binding contract. Moreover, our resolution of the issue before us, as set forth below, does not require a determination of whether Wurl is a "teacher" as defined by the employment contract, the MA or Montana law.

¶ 14 Wurl appears to argue alternative positions with regard to the relationship between her employment contract and the MA. She begins by arguing that whether the parties intended her employment to be covered by the MA is a question of fact which remains disputed and, therefore, should not have been decided by the District Court on summary judgment; in essence, this would constitute an argument that her contract is ambiguous. She also contends, however, that the language in her contract and the MA clearly provide that the entirety of the MA is incorporated by reference into her...