Wyatt v. Beall

• Decision Date: 29 September 1938
• Docket Number: No. 75.,75.
• Parties: WYATT v. BEALL et al., State Roads Commission.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

1 A.2d 619

WYATT
v.
BEALL et al., State Roads Commission.

No. 75.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 29, 1938.

1 A.2d 619

Dissenting Opinion Oct. 6, 1938.

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OFFUTT, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Suit by Clinton Wyatt against J. Glenn Beall and others, constituting the State Roads Commission of Maryland, for an injunction restraining the construction of new highway bridges. From a decree of dismissal, the complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and URNER, OFFUTT, PARKE, and MITCHELL, JJ.

R. E. Lee Marshall and Paul F. Due, both of Baltimore, for appellant.

Thomas M. Jenifer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and William L. Rawls and William L. Marbury, Jr., both of Baltimore (Herbert R. O'Conor, Atty. Gen., and Marbury, Gosnell & Williams, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

J. Purdon Wright, of Baltimore, for Public Service Commission, amicus curiae.

BOND, Chief Judge.

A taxpayer, in this suit, contests the constitutionality of an Act of 1937, chapter 356, looking to the construction of new bridges, and the legality of refunding measures of the State Roads Commission under the authority of an act adopted immediately prior, chapter 355. The case was argued and submitted below on a bill for an injunction to restrain proposed action under the statutes, and an answer to that bill; the court below held none of the objections well founded, and dismissed the bill; and the complainant appeals.

Chapter 356, adding eighteen new sections to article 89B of the Code, Title, "State Roads," to follow immediately after section 104, provides for construction or other acquisition of highway bridges and tunnels to overcome disadvantages from separation of parts of the State by its broad waterways, the cost to be paid by the issue of revenue bonds payable exclusively from tolls to be charged on the bridges and tunnels, and appropriated to that purpose. Both in the statute and in the form of bonds determined on, it is declared repeatedly that they are to be so payable, and shall not constitute a debt or obligation of the State. "The issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions of this sub-title shall not directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the State to levy or to pledge any form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any appropriation for their payment." Section 107. These words are repeated in the form of bond.

The State Roads Commission is required to build any new bridges or tunnels resolved upon by it, and in section 113 it is provided that by resolution or trust indenture of that body prior to the issue of the bonds it might covenant "to pay the cost of maintaining, repairing and operating any project or projects constructed or acquired under the provisions of this subtitle, and, inasmuch as such project or projects will at all times belong to the

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State, such resolution shall have the force of contract between the State and the holders of the bonds issued for such project or projects."

The commission is authorized to fix the tolls, and to revise them from time to time, but so fixing and adjusting them as to provide a fund sufficient with any other revenues from the projects to pay the cost of maintenance if that should be left payable from tolls, and the bonds and interest as they should become due. A sinking fund for future financing in connection with the bonds is provided for. There was, accordingly, no provision for resort to taxation for any outlay on the projects authorized.

Plans for carrying highways across or under the State's waterways have been considered for a number of years, and one of the questions now raised is on the possibility of conflict with provisions made for a previous plan, under which nothing has been done. The 1938 plan, authorized by the statute now considered, is a comprehensive one deemed feasible with the aid of funds offered by the Federal government. Three bridges, forming together a highway from Virginia to the north of the Susquehanna River, and a bridge across the bay, were resolved upon by the State Roads Commission, a bridge across the Potomac River, below Washington, one across the Patapsco at Baltimore, one across the Susquehanna River to replace an old bridge between Havre de Grace and Perryville, and one across the bay at one of two designated sites. Permission of Congress for these crossings was granted in an Act of April 7, 1938, 52 Stat. 205, upon the condition that tolls which might be charged to pay the cost of construction and maintenance should be reasonable, and in no event should continue beyond forty years.

The Federal government having announced its plan to aid public projects by its Emergency Administration of Public Works, to the extent of 45 per cent of the cost, the State Roads Commission made application for this aid for the three bridges planned, and duly resolved to proceed with the plan so aided. It resolved to issue revenue bonds under a trust indenture as the act permitted, but only to defray cost. The cost of maintenance and operation was undertaken by the commission itself by its resolution under the authority of section 113.

The present bill of complaint seeks an injunction, generally, against any action under the authority of the statute, chapter 356, and specifically from constructing the bridges, proceeding with the application to the Federal government, issuing the revenue bonds, pledging the tolls, exercising a power to condemn, actually charging the tolls, and also from proceeding with a refunding plan under chapter 355.

It is questioned whether the statute, chapter 356, was enacted in compliance with the constitutional requirement, article 3, section 27, that no bill shall "become a law until it be read on three different days of the session in each House, unless two-thirds of the members elected to the House where such bill is pending shall so determine by yeas and nays." The complaint is that in the House of Delegates the three readings of this bill occurred on one and the same calendar day, although not all on the same legislative day, and occurred without the necessary suspensions of rules. The facts appear to be that all three readings occurred on April 5, 1937, but that the House on Saturday April 3 took a recess until the following Monday, and on Monday resumed the unfinished session of April 3, until an adjournment in the afternoon, and then met next as of April 5. During the resumed session of April 3, the bill was received from the Senate, and referred to a committee, and during the same session the rules were suspended to receive the report, according to entries in the Journal; but there is no entry of suspension for the separate, additional purpose of the second reading. The second reading was had, and the bill passed to the...