Wyatt v. Riley

• Decision Date: 04 April 1974
• Citation: Wyatt v. Riley, 293 So.2d 288, 292 Ala. 277 (Ala. 1974)
• Parties: Ray WYATT et al. v. E. W. RILEY and Dimmis W. Riley. SC 420.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 288

293 So.2d 288

292 Ala. 277

Ray WYATT et al. v. E. W. RILEY and Dimmis W. Riley.

SC 420.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 4, 1974.

Rehearing Denied May 2, 1974.

Corretti, Newsom, Rogers & May, Birmingham, for appellant C. O. Osborn.

Hardin, Stuart & Moncus, Burmingham, for appellant James G. Clark, Jr.

Billy L. Church, Pell City, for appellant Ray Wyatt.

Whitmire, Morton & Coleman, Birmingham, Prentiss M. Rainey, Springville, Nash, NeSmith & Walker, Oneonta, for appellees.

BLOODWORTH, Justice.

Respondents Ray Wyatt and C. O. Osborn appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County declaring a warranty deed (and contemporaneous purchase money mortgage) executed by complainants, E. W. Riley and wife Dimmis W. Riley, converying 2,810 acres to respondent Osborn, to be null and void and ordering both the deed and mortgage set aside on the ground that they were procured by undue influence. Respondent James G. Clark, Jr., appeals from that portion of the decree which ordered five promissory notes executed by complainants to respondent Clark (an alleged 'finder's fee' for procuring the same conveyance of land) to be canceled and set aside. We affirm.

The bill as last amended alleges, in substance, that respondent Wyatt on the date the deed was executed had acquired and exercised undue influence over the complainants; that by reason of such undue influence, Wyatt, while acting in concert with all other respondents, induced the complainants to convey their land to Osborn for a consideration greatly less than its value. It alleges: that, for the purpose of inducing said conveyance, respondents falsely represented to complainants that the terms of the sale were in the best interest of the complainants; that $333.50 per acre was the fair value of the land; that it would be in the complainants' best interest if they would not discuss or inform their regular attorney about the sale until after the sale had been made; that respondents would engage for the complainants a competent and independent counsel to represent their best interests in the transaction; and, that the complainants would not incur the expense of a real estate broker's commission. The bill alleges that the representations were false, and that the respondents made such representations with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether the representations were true or false.

Testimony was taken ore tenus for eight days before The Honorable L. P. Waid, Circuit Judge. The court issued two decrees in this matter, the first on May 7, 1973, and a supplemental decree on May 15, 1973. In these two decrees the court made extensive findings of fact and concluded, viz.:

'Considering all of the evidence, the Court finds that they, the complainants, were under undue influence from the respondents Wyatt, and that the beneficiary of the influence, the respondent Osborn, was aware of the influence being exerted by the respondent Wyatt.'

And, with regard to respondent Clark, the court concluded, viz.:

'The checks were without consideration, and a 'finder's fee' was not mentioned in any of the various contracts drawn up in the transactions and were not discussed by the complainants with any lawyer, and were not presented to the complainants until many drinks later after the deed was signed.'

Accordingly, the court canceled the deed, the purchase money mortgage, the notes given as a finder's fee to Clark and ordered damages paid in the amount of $13,216.00 as compensation for timber removed from the land by respondent Osborn.

Respondent Osborn sets forth twelve assignments of error attacking the trial court's decree; respondent Clark, five assignments of error; and respondent Wyatt, twelve assignments of error. In sum, these assignments of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's decree.

Respondents argue that undue influence, as a species of fraud, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; that influence to be undue must be such as to overpower the will of the grantor and dominate it to such an extent that the will of another is substituted for that of the grantor; that the burden is on the party seeking to set aside a deed to prove such influence or to prove a confidential relationship giving rise to a presumption of undue influence; and finally, that when a transaction is fairly susceptible to two constructions, the one which will free it from imputation of fraud will be adopted.

While we do not dispute the above stated principles of law, as applied to this cause, we think there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings of undue influence. Accordingly, we affirm.

It is well established that where evidence is heard orally before the trial court, the finding of the court has the effect of a jury's verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly erroneous, whether in law or equity. And we must affirm the trial court's decree, if fairly supported by credible evidence under any reasonable aspect. Jackson v. Rodda, 291 Ala. 569, 285 So.2d 77 (1973). This rule has been applied in numerous cases where a deed was sought to be set aside because of the incompetency of the grantors, or undue influence or both. See Chrisman v. Brooks, 291 Ala. 237, 279 So.2d 500 (1973) and cases cited therein.

While the evidence in the case at bar is conflicting on many points, the testimony most favorable to the complainants tends to show that complainants Mr. and Mrs. Riley were 83 and 74 years of age respectively at the time of the conveyance; that Mr. Riley had had a stroke a few years earlier and that he had not been physically or mentally well since that time. Several witnesses testified to the effect that Mr. Riley was not mentally alert, was emotionally slow, was depressed, disinterested, forgetful, etc. Mr. Riley's personal physician testified that it was his opinion that Mr. Riley probably did not have the mind or mental sufficiency to understand a complicated transaction.

With regard to Mrs. Riley, there was testimony that Mrs. Riley was an alcoholic as well as having a long history of other mental problems for which she has been hospitalized from time to time and for which she was being treated at the time of the conveyance. There was testimony that Mrs. Riley is also deaf which added to her communication problem.

The events leading up to the conveyance as they appear from the testimony most favorable to complainants are as follows: Respondent Wyatt had been a friend of some years of the Rileys, but was not particularly close. Sometime in January, 1972, Wyatt invited Mr. Riley to fly with him and respondent Osborn to Florida 'for the trip.' After this trip, Wyatt began to see the Rileys more frequently. Shortly thereafter, Wyatt suggested to Mr. Riley that he had a man who would buy the Rileys' land if Mr. Riley wanted to sell. Mr. Riley stated that he would not sell without consulting his attorney. (Mr. Riley had a regular attorney, a Mr. Rainey, on a retainer of $600 per month.) Mr. Wyatt stated that there wasn't any need to consult an attorney; that he had an attorney who was good and had done considerable work for him who would take care of everything; that he didn't want Mr. Riley to discuss the...