Wyatt v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

• Decision Date: 19 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-6140.,91-6140.
• Citation: 974 F.2d 680
• Parties: John F. WYATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

974 F.2d 680

John F. WYATT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-6140.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted June 9, 1992.

Decided June 19, 1992.^*

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James E. Craig, Owensboro, Ky. (briefed), for plaintiff-appellant.

James H. Barr (briefed), John L. Caudill, Asst. U.S. Attys., Louisville, Ky., for defendant-appellee.

Before: KEITH and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.

CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, John F. Wyatt, appeals summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in this action seeking review of the denial of plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.

I.

Plaintiff, John F. Wyatt, filed applications for social security disability and supplemental security income benefits on January 4, 1989. Plaintiff alleged that he had been disabled since November 30, 1987, at age 41, "due to diabetes, a heart attack, carpal tunnel syndrome and vision problems." Plaintiff had a myocardial infarction on March 11, 1986. He was treated by balloon angioplasty, but had no other surgical treatment.¹

Following the denial of his claim at the initial and reconsideration level, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on October 6, 1989. On January 10, 1990, the ALJ issued a decision that plaintiff was not disabled because he was capable of performing a full range of sedentary work. The Appeals Council denied review and this decision became the final decision of the Secretary.

On February 16, 1990, plaintiff suffered another heart attack. Plaintiff reapplied for benefits. In a decision issued on June 28, 1991, plaintiff was found to be disabled as of the date of his second heart attack.

Subsequently, plaintiff appealed the Secretary's earlier denial of benefits, seeking to recover those disability benefits accruing during the period between the alleged onset date (November 30, 1987) and the date on which benefits were ultimately awarded (February 16, 1990). Plaintiff therefore commenced an action for judicial review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The case was referred to a United States Magistrate, who prepared a report and recommendation upholding the denial of benefits. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and on August 30, 1991, issued an order affirming the Secretary's denial of benefits. Plaintiff timely filed this appeal.

II.

This court has jurisdiction on appeal to review the Secretary's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) which specifies that the Secretary's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. "`Substantial evidence' means `more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1983). In determining whether the Secretary's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must examine the evidence in the record "taken as a whole," Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir.1980), and "`must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Beavers v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.1978) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464-65, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)). If it is supported by substantial evidence, the Secretary's determination must stand regardless of whether the reviewing court would resolve the issues of fact in dispute differently. Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam).

The plaintiff has the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving the existence of a disability as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). If the plaintiff is working, and the work constitutes substantial gainful activity, benefits are automatically denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If a plaintiff is not found to have an impairment which significantly limits his ability to work (a severe impairment), then he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Since the ALJ found that plaintiff had not worked since he filed his application for disability benefits on January 4, 1989 and that he suffered from a severe impairment, further inquiry was necessary. If a plaintiff is not working and has a severe impairment, it must be determined whether he suffers from one of the "listed" impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, benefits are owing without further inquiry. In the instant case, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not suffer from one of the listed impairments. In such a case, assuming the individual has previously worked, the Secretary must next decide whether the plaintiff can return to the job he previously held. By showing "a medical basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in his particular occupation," Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir.1978), the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability. In the instant case, the ALJ found that the plaintiff was not capable of returning to his particular occupation.

At this step in the analysis, it becomes the Secretary's burden to establish the plaintiff's ability to work. Allen, 613 F.2d at 145. The Secretary must prove that, taking into consideration present job qualifications such as age, experience, education and physical capacity, and the existence of jobs to match those qualifications, a plaintiff retains the capacity to perform a different kind of job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1953-54, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983). The Secretary's burden can, on occasion, be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as the "grid." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.2. In the instant case, the ALJ found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of sedentary work, that he was a younger individual, had a tenth grade education, that his previous work experience had been unskilled, and that he had no transferable skills. Accordingly, the ALJ, using the grid as a framework because plaintiff possessed non-exertional restrictions, found that there were a significant number of sedentary jobs which the plaintiff could perform consistent with his limitations, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not disabled at any time prior to February 16, 1990. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f).

III.

Plaintiff first argues that the Secretary's policy of relying on the results of a treadmill exercise test in determining disability from ischemic heart disease is inconsistent with the requirements of the Social Security Act because it "precludes consideration of relevant and reliable evidence in adjudicating claims." Plaintiff contends that this policy violates the Act's requirement of making individualized assessments of disability and unlawfully precludes consideration of subjective symptoms and functional limitations.

Plaintiff contends that the entirety of the evidence demonstrates that he has met or equaled the listed impairment for ischemic heart disease as specified in section 4.04(B). However, the ALJ was precluded from considering evidence beyond the treadmill test results according to section 4.04(A). "When a treadmill test is available, either from a treating physician's file or because the SSA required the test, and ischemia is the only ailment alleged, the Listings dictate that the results of the treadmill test control the analysis to the exclusion of all other medical findings." State of New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.1990). Because there were acceptable treadmill test results available in this case, the ALJ was limited to these results and could not consider other evidence in determining whether plaintiff met the listed impairment for ischemic heart disease at step three of the analysis. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, 4.04(A). As noted by the ALJ, plaintiff was not able to demonstrate that he met or equaled the listed impairment for ischemic heart disease under § 4.04(A) which required a test result of "5 METS or less." Dr. Robert Reed, who administered the test, found that plaintiff had an exertional capacity to a "workload of 6.6 METS" and that plaintiff "could be expected to function at a level of about 5 METS." Joint Appendix at 289. Therefore, plaintiff was not disabled at the third step of the sequential evaluation process.

Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ's sole reliance on treadmill test results pursuant to section 4.04(A), to the exclusion of all other evidence, violates the Act. In support of his challenge to the listings, plaintiff cites State of New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1990). That case held that the Secretary's sole reliance on treadmill test results when evaluating claims of ischemic heart disease, to the exclusion of all other available relevant evidence, violates Congress' requirement of particularized treatment and significant input from treating physicians. Id. at 916. The court concluded that the "failure to consider other available relevant evidence at steps 3, 4 and 5 is inconsistent with the personalized approach to disability adjudications required by the Social Security Act." Id.

In the present case, however, the ALJ did consider other available evidence beyond the treadmill test results at both steps four and five. Therefore, unlike State of New York, the Secretary, in the present case, did not completely abdicate his responsibility of making an individualized...