Wyatt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-566,93-566
• Citation: 315 Ark. 547,868 S.W.2d 505
• Parties: Ronald and Vicki WYATT, Appellants, v. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY and Lynn Nowlin Bryant, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 505

868 S.W.2d 505

315 Ark. 547

Ronald and Vicki WYATT, Appellants, v.ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY and Lynn Nowlin Bryant, Appellees.

No. 93-566.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 24, 1994.

Ted Boswell, Bryant, for appellants.

Dennis L. Shackleford, El Dorado, for St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.

Brian Allen Brown, Richard N. Watts, Little Rock, for Lynn Nowlin Bryant.

HOLT, Chief Justice.

The appellee, Ms. Lynn Nowlin Bryant, a licensed practical nurse employed by Warner Brown Hospital, gave information to a relative that the appellant, Ronald Wyatt, a hospital patient either had Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or was being tested for AIDS.As a result, Mr. Wyatt sued Ms. Bryant and Warner Brown Hospital's insurance company, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company(St. Paul).The trial court found in essence that the allegations raised by Ronald and Vicki Wyatt against the parties did not constitute medical malpractice pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16-114-201--209 and granted motions for summary judgment in the parties favor.

The issue before us is whether or not the trial court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact in which the court could determine that a medical malpractice occurred.

The appellant, Ronald Wyatt, was admitted to Warner Brown Hospital in El Dorado, Arkansas, for evaluation and treatment resulting from sudden onset of paralysis, weakness, slurred speech, and other symptoms.Mr. Wyatt was given a magnetic resonance imaging scan which revealed that his condition was consistent with "moderately extensive multiple sclerosis and AIDS cannot be excluded."

One of the appellees, Lynn Nowlin Bryant, was a licensed practical nurse employed by Warner Brown Hospital during Mr. Wyatt's hospitalization.Prior to learning of his test results, she told Suzanne Bryant, the manager of the Exxon Store in Hampton, Arkansas (and also the wife of Lynn's husband's first cousin), either that Mr. Wyatt had AIDS or that he was being tested for AIDS (the facts are in dispute as to this point).According to Lynn Bryant's deposition, she wanted to convey this information to Suzanne because:

I knew that she worked with him when he delivered cakes to the store and I guess that I was maybe concerned for her health if he did in fact have it.I told Suzanne Bryant that Ronald Wyatt, who I found out from a nurse on my shift was a routeman for Dolly Madison, was being tested for AIDS, and three or four days later when the test results came back, I did tell her that they were negative and he had multiple sclerosis.

Mr. Wyatt and his wife filed two complaints against Ms. Bryant, alleging that her statements to a third party that he"has AIDS" constituted medical negligence, medical malpractice, invasion of privacy, defamation by slander, and the tort of outrage.His wife claimed as her cause of action that she suffered and continues to suffer loss of consortium and mental anguish.

The Wyatts also filed a complaint again St. Paul, alleging that the failure of the hospital and its employee, Ms. Bryant, to maintain "medical confidentiality" invaded his personal privacy.Further, he claimed that the hospital's and its employee's actions constituted medical negligence, medical malpractice, invasion of privacy, defamation by slander, and the tort of outrage.His wife again claimed damages due to loss of consortium and mental anguish.Together, they claimed $600,000 in compensatory and $600,000 in punitive damages.After the trial court consolidated the three complaints, Ms. Bryant filed a petition for summary judgment, stating that there could be no cause of action for the defamation or slander claim because her statement was true and that no cause of action for medical negligence or medical malpractice existed under the circumstances of the case.The Wyatts responded that, because there was a factual dispute as to what Ms. Bryant had said with regard to Mr. Wyatt's medical condition, summary judgment was inappropriate.

St. Paul also petitioned the trial court for summary judgment contending that Ms. Bryant's statements, whatever they may have been, "occurred outside the course and scope of her employment, and plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case against Warner Brown Hospital on a respondeat superior theory."The Wyatts responded in their pleadings by contending "that the statement made by Lynn Nowlin Bryant was made in the course and scope of her employment and that summary judgment on this issue is improper," and that St. Paul's "failure to offer proof on the causes of action which plaintiffs have filed in their complaint, is fatal to its motion for summary judgment."

A hearing was held by the trial court on the two motions for summary judgment, the centerpiece of which was the question: whether or not Ms. Bryant's statement constituted "malpractice" under Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16-114-201--209(1987).During the course of the hearing, the trial judge noted that he was having a "hard time" with regard to the medical malpractice part of the arguments, although he viewed Ms. Bryant's statements as possible matters of slander and breach of confidentiality.

After this hearing, the trial court issued its written order, which in the main provided:

1.The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, should be granted and the complaint as to St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company should be dismissed with prejudice.

2.The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Lynn Nowlin Bryant, should be denied as to the claims for slander and outrage, and should be granted as to all others.

Thereafter, the Wyatts filed notice of appeal on both findings.Realizing that a claim for slander and outrage against Ms. Bryant remained and that the trial court's order in this regard was not a final appealable order, the Wyatts filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of these claims against Ms. Bryant.This motion was granted and appropriate orders issued, leaving the trial court's determination that an action for medical malpractice did not lie against Ms. Bryant or St. Paul as the primary issue before us, although there is disagreement among the litigants as to what constituted the basis of the court's granting of summary judgment.

The Wyatts approach their argument under the assumption that there is one central issue--whether or not the conduct of the defending parties constituted medical malpractice.St. Paul disagrees and contends that the basis of its motion was premised on whether Ms. Bryant was acting within the scope of her employment.

Although St. Paul's motion for summary judgment addresses the issue of respondeat superior, not medical malpractice, and the trial judge may have based his judgment on this premise, we must first resolve the threshold question: was there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Ms. Bryant's statements constituted medical malpractice.If we hold that the issue of material fact exists, then the granting of a summary judgment to her favor by the trial court must be overturned and the issue of respondeat superior as to St. Paul properly addressed.Conversely, if we hold that the actions of Ms. Bryant did not constitute a medical malpractice, the issue of respondeat superior as to Ms. Bryant's relationship with Warner Brown Hospital is of no concern.

Summary judgment is a remedy that should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be litigated.Hickson v. Saig, 309 Ark. 231, 828 S.W.2d 840(1992).The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is upon the movant, and all proof submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party resisting the motion.Any doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving party.Pinkston v. Lovell, 296 Ark. 543, 759 S.W.2d 20(1988);Cross v. Coffman, 304 Ark. 666, 805 S.W.2d 44(1991).The burden in a summary judgment proceeding is on the moving party and cannot be shifted when there is no offer of proof on a controverted issue.Collyard v. American Home Assurance Co., 271 Ark. 228, 607 S.W.2d 666(1980).When the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement, the respondent must meet proof with proof by showing genuine issue as to a material fact.Harrell v. International Paper Co., 305 Ark. 490, 808 S.W.2d 779(1...