Wyatt v. United States

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Wyatt v. United States, 263 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1959)
• Decision Date: 18 February 1959
• Docket Number: No. 17295.,17295.
• Parties: James Ivey WYATT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

263 F.2d 304 (1959)

James Ivey WYATT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17295.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

January 14, 1959.

Rehearing Denied February 18, 1959.

J. Hubert Farmer, Dothan, Ala., for appellant.

Ralph M. Daughtry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Hartwell Davis, U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., for appellee.

Before RIVES, TUTTLE, and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for white slavery, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421. The questions presented are thus stated in appellant's brief:

"1. May a conviction be had against a defendant on the charge commonly known as `white slavery\' on his extra judicial confession uncorroborated by proof aliunde of the corpus delicti as to the transportation element of the offense charged?

"2. May the wife of a defendant be compelled by the District Judge to testify against her husband?"

The indictment charged, in substance, that on or about December 12, 1957, the defendant did knowingly transport in interstate commerce from Columbus, Georgia, to Dothan, Alabama, a woman, Mary Kathleen Byrd, for the purpose of prostitution.

Leroy Mills testified that in December 1957, he was a bellboy at the Hotel Martin in Dothan, Alabama; that on December 13 he made several calls to Room 110, then occupied by the woman and defendant; that on one of those calls, the defendant asked him, "Boy, how is business?" "And I said, `What kind of business?' And then he said that, `We are working, and if you get anything, to let us know.' Q. All right, and did — did the woman say anything in his presence at that time or not? A. Yes, she says — Q. Speak out loud? A. She says, `You haven't had any business?' I said, `Yes'm, I had two this morning, but I have turned them down.'" On this next visit to the room, the woman asked, "You haven't had any business yet," and he answered "No," whereupon the defendant said: "We are going out for awhile, and if you have any business to be sure to hold it for us; we will be back after a little while"; that later he went back to carry coca-colas, whereupon the following conversation ensued:

"A. Well, now, let\'s see, he said on this time, he asked me how was the night boy at — was he all right. I said, `No, this boy is young, and just don\'t fool with him, the old boy will be back tonight.\' He said, `Well, you know a man when you see him,\' he said, `We will split fair with you and better than that, we will split —\'

"Q. I didn\'t catch that last. A. `We will split fair with you,\' divide the money equal or fair, you know, that was what he meant; I understood what he meant.

"Q. Did he tell you how it was divided with you? A. Forty sixty.

"Q. Is that sixty to you or forty to you? A. It is forty to me and sixty to him.

"Q. I see. All right. And — A. And then he says, `If business increases, we will do better, we will split fifty fifty.\'"

He further testified that the man and woman became noisy and he went to the room to ask them to be quiet, that in the defendant's presence, "She said, `How about the business, there ain't no business'; I said, `No, it is just slow today.'"

Henry W. Hilson testified that he was a detective for the City of Dothan, Alabama; that he arrested the defendant on December 13, 1957, and found on his person two Southeastern Greyhound Lines bus stubs showing that they were issued December 12, 1957, for transportation from Columbus, Georgia, to Dothan, Alabama; that he made no threats or promises to the defendant, but the defendant made a voluntary statement to him. The defendant objected to that statement on the ground that the corpus delicti had not been proved. The court overruled the objection, and Hilson testified:

"A. He stated to me, sir, that he had purchased these tickets in Columbus, Georgia, and was going to Laguna Beach to see Mrs. Byrd\'s mother, and he was just stopped over in Dothan.

"Q. Did he tell you who rode from Columbus, Georgia, to Dothan, Alabama, on those tickets that he said he had purchased in Columbus, Georgia? A. He said he and Mrs. Byrd accompanied him to Dothan."

Mary Kathleen Byrd testified that she was formerly known as Mary Kathleen Byrd, that she is now Mary K. Wyatt, that the defendant is her husband. The following then occurred:

"Mr. Farmer: Your honor please may I — I don\'t want to be out of order, but I just want to remind your honor under — I withdraw — just —

"The Court: Get along.

"Q. But you are now married to this defendant?

"Witness: Your honor, may I say something?

"The Court: Yes, ma\'m.

"Witness: I have here in my possession my marriage license that I would like to present to the court, and I refuse to testify in this case against my husband.

"The Court: All right. Is that your ground for refusing?

"Witness: That is my ground for refusing.

"The Court: Your objection is overruled.

"Mr. Davis: Let me see it.

"The Court: Just a minute; I am not interested in seeing it, it doesn\'t make any difference in a White Slave Traffic Act case, I checked the law on it at lunch. The United States Courts in the case, most recently, Shores against United States, said that that is no ground for a wife refusing to testify, that the old common law privilege that gave a wife the right to refuse to testify did not exist in a White Slave Traffic Act case, where the wife is the alleged victim. She will testify.

"Mr. Varner: Your honor, I think it would be a little safer on that, we would like to offer to try to prove she is not actually married to this defendant, if the court refuses —

"The Court: I am not interested in whether she is married or not married to him, as far as the refusal to testify is concerned, because it doesn\'t make any difference."

The witness then testified that she was in Dothan on December 13, 1957; that she and the defendant came on the same bus from Columbus, Georgia; that the defendant bought her ticket, but that she gave him the money to purchase her ticket; that they came to the Martin Hotel and that she registered for herself and the defendant as Mr. and Mrs. James Wyatt; that both of them went to Room 110 at the Martin Hotel; that she stayed only a few minutes and then went to the Houston Hotel in Dothan, where she registered as Mary K. Byrd. She testified that she could not recognize Leroy Mills and that she was not present in the Martin Hotel during any conversation between the defendant and a bellhop, "only when the boy called it a disturbance when we was having an argument."

John W. Lill, Jr., testified that he is a Special Agent of the F.B.I. stationed at Dothan, that on December 14, 1957, the defendant made a free and voluntary statement to him. The defendant again objected on the ground that "* * * the Government has not proved the corpus delicti in this case." The court overruled the objection, and Mr. Lill testified:

"A. He told me at that time that he had been living at an apartment at 804-A Riverview Apartments in Phenix City, and that he was married on November 15, 1957, to Mary Kathleen Byrd.

* * * * * *

"A. He stated on December 12 he and Mary Kathleen Byrd, whom he referred to as `Kitty\' Byrd, left Columbus, Georgia, by bus and proceeded to Laguna Beach, Florida, that he had bought — had purchased the bus tickets to Dothan, and that after they arrived at Dothan that evening, they took a cab from the Greyhound Bus Station to the Hotel Martin, and Mary Kathleen Byrd Wyatt registered for both of them, and they were roomed at Room 110. He stated that they remained in that room that night and the next afternoon they had a quarrel about his drinking, and that she left to go to the home of an aunt in Dothan, and that he didn\'t see her again up until the time of that interview. He stated that the purpose of stopping in Dothan was that he had planned to do some drinking, and that he didn\'t want to go to the home of his mother-in-law, Mrs. Rogers, at Laguna Beach while he was drinking, and that he had decided to stop at the hotel in Dothan while — to wait until he was in condition to go on. And that is pretty much the summation of what he told me then. I went into some details.

"Q. Did he — did he — did you exhibit to him any — these bus stubs marked Government\'s Exhibits numbers 1 and 2? A. I did.

"Mr. Davis: May I have them please? A. Yes, I did.

"Q. What did he say about those? A. He said that these were stubs to the tickets that he had purchased for he and his wife to Dothan.

"Q. Did he tell you who this wife was? A. Mary Kathleen Byrd — Wyatt, he said. I interviewed him again the following day, on December 15, and at that time he told me that he had resided at the apartment of Mary Kathleen Byrd, and that he — he had previously mentioned at the end of the interview on the 14th that he was not married to Mary Kathleen Byrd, he told me on the interview on the 15th that he had been living at an apartment at 1907 Avenue A in Phenix City, which was owned by Mary Kathleen Byrd, and that they left together on the afternoon of December 12, and that he purchased the bus tickets and they proceeded to Dothan, and that they stayed that night at the Hotel Martin, and that he got to drinking, that night he had sexual relations with her, and then she left the next day * * *."

The defendant did not testify and no witnesses were offered in his behalf.

Admittedly, a conviction cannot be sustained on the uncorroborated admissions or statements of a defendant. It is sufficient, however, if there be some evidence independent of a confession, which, when taken with the confession, will warrant the jury in finding defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.¹ There was sufficient proof of the corpus delicti to authorize the admission of the defendant's statements and admissions.

The jury could believe such parts of a witness' testimony as they found credible, and disbelieve other parts, and could draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. In our opinion, the evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain the...