Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq

• Decision Date: 14 November 2018
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:10-cv-01182-RCL
• Parties: WYE OAK TECHNOLOGY, INC., Plaintiff, v. REPUBLIC OF IRAQ et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

WYE OAK TECHNOLOGY, INC., Plaintiff, v. REPUBLIC OF IRAQ et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 1:10-cv-01182-RCL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

November 14, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Wye Oak and the Republic of Iraq (Iraq) and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Iraq (MoD) have been engaged in this litigation based on an alleged breach of contract for nearly a decade. The Court now examines plaintiff Wye Oak's motion for summary judgment, defendants Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment, Wye Oak's motion to strike Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment, various motions to strike filings related to Wye Oak's motion for summary judgment and Iraq and MoD' cross-motion for summary judgment, and multiple motions for extension of time. Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 234 [hereinafter ECF No. 234]; Defs.' Opp'n & Cross-Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 242 [hereinafter ECF No. 242]; Defs.' Cross-Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 244 [hereinafter ECF No. 244]; Pl.'s Mot. Strike Defs.' Cross-Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 252 [hereinafter ECF No. 252]; Defs.' Mot. Strike Pl.'s Two Statements Additional Facts, ECF No. 290 [hereinafter ECF No. 290]; Defs.' Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 282 [hereinafter ECF No. 282]; Defs.' Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 284 [hereinafter ECF No. 284]; Defs.' Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 288 [hereinafter ECF No. 288]; Def. Iraq's Am. Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 294 [hereinafter ECF No. 294]; Pl.'s Mot. Strike Decls., ECF No. 327 [hereinafter ECF No. 327]. The Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Wye Oak's motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 234. The Court will DENY Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 244, and GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Wye Oak's motion to strike Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 252, because Iraq and MoD filed this motion after the deadline for filing dispositive motions set by this Court in its scheduling order. Omnibus Order, ECF No. 191 [hereinafter ECF No. 191]. The Court will only treat Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment as an opposition to Wye Oak's motion for summary judgment. The Court will DISMISS AS MOOT the motions to strike various filings related to Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment and DISMISS AS MOOT Iraq and MoD's motions for extension of time to file their reply regarding Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment because the Court will GRANT IN PART plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 290; ECF No. 282; ECF No. 284; ECF No. 288; ECF No. 294; ECF No. 327.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The parties dispute a significant portion of the relevant facts in this case. Wye Oak, entered into the Broker Services Agreement (BSA) with MoD on August 16, 2004. Under the BSA, MoD was required to "work exclusively with [Wye Oak] regarding furnishing of Military Refurbishment Services, Scrap Sales and the sale of Refurbished Military Equipment with respect to all Military Equipment." Broker Services Agreement, ECF No. 122-2. The BSA contained a compensation provision, which stated that "[MoD] shall pay [Wye Oak] a commission of minimum of ten percent (10%) based on the Contract Value set out in each Sales Contract entered into by the Ministry, pursuant to this Agreement. With respect to Refurbished Military Equipment, the Ministry will pay [Wye Oak] ten percent (10%) of such equipment's refurbishment cost." Id. The BSA declaredthat the "Agreement shall not be amended or supplemented except in writing, signed by both parties." Id. The parties dispute whether the BSA was validly amended and supplemented by a document signed by both parties.

On September 28, 2004, Wye Oak granted Mr. Raymond Zayna of General Investment Group sal (GIG) a "limited power of attorney to arrange financing and the [sic] request banking guarantees for and on behalf of the Wye Oak Iraqi Military Equipment Recovery Program ('IMERP Contract')" signed between Wye Oak and MoD. Letter from Dale C. Stoffel (Sept. 28, 2004), ECF No. 122-5. In October 2004, Wye Oak presented three invoices to MoD regarding the construction of military vehicle repair facilities, purchasing parts for repairing military vehicles, hiring and training maintenance workers, and repairing military vehicles. ECF No. 122-7. On October 19, 2004, there was a meeting between Dale Stoffel (Wye Oak's president), Mr. Zayna of GIG, and representatives of MoD. Talib Certificate Authenticity Business Records, Memorandum from Mr. Patrick Marr, at Attachment B, ECF No. 242-5 [hereinafter Memorandum from Mr. Patrick Marr, ECF No. 242-5]. The parties vigorously dispute what occurred at this meeting and whether an agreement was reached to determine how MoD would pay Wye Oak for the three invoices. MoD subsequently paid Mr. Zayna amounts mirroring the invoiced totals.

Dale Stoffel was killed while traveling in Iraq on December 8, 2004. Following Mr. Stoffel's death, Wye Oak at least temporarily recalled American personnel from Iraq, at least temporarily. The invoiced work for repair and refurbishment of a sufficient number of armored vehicles to be effective leading up to the Iraqi election was completed in January 2005. The parties dispute whether it was Wye Oak or GIG who completed this work.

B. Procedural Background

Wye Oak filed its motion for summary judgment regarding selected affirmative defenses proffered by Iraq and MoD on July 2, 2018. ECF No. 234. July 2, 2018 was the due date for dispositive motions as set by this Court in its scheduling order. ECF No. 191. Iraq and MoD subsequently filed a single document styled as an opposition to Wye Oak's motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment as to certain defenses raised by Iraq and MoD on July 16, 2018. ECF No. 242; ECF No. 244. This cross-motion for summary judgment was therefore filed after the Court's due date for dispositive motions. Wye Oak filed a motion to strike Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment based on the fact that Iraq and MoD did not file this motion until after the July 2, 2018 deadline. Iraq and MoD filed a motion to strike Wye Oak's statements of additional material facts, which were filed in opposition to Iraq and MoD's cross-motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 290. Iraq and MoD also filed several motions for extensions of time to file their reply to Wye Oak's opposition to their cross-motion for summary judgment. ECF. No. 282; ECF No. 284; ECF No. 288; ECF No. 294. Finally, Wye Oak filed a motion to strike four declarations that accompany Iraq and MoD's reply in support of defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 327.

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is a fact that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers tointerrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

In making a summary judgment determination, the court must believe the evidence of the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party" is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 252. Instead, evidence must exist on which the decision-maker could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Id. Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

III. Discussion

A. Defendants' untimely filed cross-motion for summary judgment will not be considered as a motion for summary judgment, but will be considered as an opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Iraq and MoD filed their cross-motion for summary judgment on July 16, 2018, which was two weeks after this Court's July 2, 2018 deadline for filing dispositive motions as set forth in the scheduling order. ECF No. 191. District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to consider summary judgment filings that have been submitted in an untimely manner. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 provides that

when an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time:

(A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or

(B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Iraq and MoD did not seek leave to file their cross-motion for summary judgment late, and they have not demonstrated good cause or excusable neglect to justify the untimely filing of this motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 permits a court to issue "any just orders . . . if a party . . . fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). The Court will not consider Iraq and MoD's untimely filing as a cross-motion for summary judgment. See Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414, 424-25 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that a district...