Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. v. Jefferson, No. 96-CV-1863

• Citation: 725 A.2d 487
• Decision Date: 18 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 96-CV-1863, No. 97-CV-857.
• Parties: WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant v. Cheleen JEFFERSON, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

725 A.2d 487

WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant v. Cheleen JEFFERSON, et al., Appellees.

Nos. 96-CV-1863, 97-CV-857.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 16, 1998.

Decided February 18, 1999.

Steven M. Farina, Washington, DC, for appellant.

Brandon J. Levine, with whom Aaron M. Levine, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellees.

Before TERRY and STEADMAN, Associate Judges, and BELSON, Senior Judge.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Appellant, Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. ("Wyeth"), appeals from an order denying its motion to dismiss, on the ground of forum non conveniens,¹ product liability claims filed by four Maryland residents. Wyeth contends that because none of the four appellees lives or works in the District of Columbia and none of the events giving rise to their claims occurred in the District of Columbia, there is no reason for this case to be tried in the District of Columbia courts. Appellees contend that because the parties have had "contacts with the District of Columbia and its neighboring jurisdictions," and because Wyeth's motion was filed after the commencement of discovery, the trial court did not err in denying the motion. We agree with Wyeth, reverse the order denying the motion to dismiss, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I

On December 31, 1994, twenty-five plaintiffs, each residing in Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia, jointly filed suit in the Superior Court against Wyeth, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been injured by Wyeth's product Norplant² and sought to recover damages under theories of negligence (failure to warn), strict liability, and breach of warranty.

At a status conference on March 17, 1995, the trial court ordered the parties to meet and confer on the scheduling of discovery. On November 14, by agreement of the parties, the court entered a scheduling order which provided, among other things, that discovery would close on June 30, 1996. By agreement of the parties, the scheduling order was twice modified, and the deadline for closing discovery was eventually extended to October 21, 1996. No trial date was set.

Discovery began, and on January 25, 1996, appellees provided answers to written interrogatories propounded by Wyeth.³ On March 27 Wyeth noticed the depositions of six plaintiffs, but at the request of plaintiffs' counsel these depositions were rescheduled. The first two plaintiffs were deposed on April 12. A third plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, who was also scheduled to be deposed on that day, instead dismissed her claim.

In the course of the April 12 depositions, Wyeth's counsel questioned plaintiff Cheleen Jefferson about her contacts with the District of Columbia. At the conclusion of this line of questioning, plaintiffs' counsel asked Wyeth's counsel, "Is it your intention to move to dismiss for forum?" Wyeth's counsel responded, "It may well be, depending on the result of my legal research and these depositions."

On May 8 Wyeth noticed the depositions of six more plaintiffs. Again, plaintiffs' counsel canceled these depositions and indicated that many of the plaintiffs would probably be dismissing their claims. He also suggested that the depositions of the remaining plaintiffs should be deferred pending their decisions on whether to remain in the case. On July 2 Wyeth's counsel wrote to plaintiffs' counsel asking him to identify those plaintiffs who were still expecting to go forward with the lawsuit. Wyeth's counsel also said that Wyeth "intend[s] to file a forum non conveniens motion once we know which plaintiffs intend to continue with their claims."

On September 14, 1996, sixteen plaintiffs from Maryland, Virginia, and the District voluntarily dismissed their claims against Wyeth, leaving only nine of the original twenty-five plaintiffs still in the case. On September 17 Wyeth filed a motion to dismiss the claims of four remaining Maryland plaintiffs—Cheleen Jefferson, Sallie Epps, Donna Shepherd, and Robin McNair—on the ground of forum non conveniens.⁴ Wyeth argued for dismissal because, as stipulated by both counsel, none of these plaintiffs lived in the District and none of the events giving rise to the action occurred in the District. On October 25, in a one-page order, the court denied the motion, noting that "the untimeliness of the motion ... was a substantial factor in [its] decision." Wyeth moved for reconsideration, but the court denied the motion. These appeals followed.⁵

II

This court reviews a trial court ruling on a forum non conveniens motion for abuse of discretion but, at the same time, conducts an independent analysis of both the private and the public interests involved. See, e.g., Jimmerson v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 663 A.2d 540, 542 (D.C.1995)

; Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C.1987) (en banc). "[A]lthough only a `clear showing' of abuse of discretion will suffice to reverse the trial court's decision, `such rulings receive closer scrutiny than most exercises of trial court discretion,' and `convincing circumstances' may demonstrate trial court error as a matter of law." Dunkwu v. Neville, 575 A.2d 293, 294 (D.C.1990) (citations omitted). That is what we find here.

The need to consider both public and private factors is derived from the Supreme Court decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-509, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947).

The private factors include potential obstacles to a fair trial, including the relative ease of access to proof, the availability and cost of compulsory process, the enforceability of any judgment obtained, and evidence of vexatiousness or harassment.... The public factors are those affecting the District's own interests, including the congestion of its court dockets with foreign litigation, the imposition of jury duty on District residents for litigation in which the District has no concern, and the inappropriateness of calling on District of Columbia courts to construe the law of another jurisdiction.

Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d at 1369 (citing Gilbert and other cases); see Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. v. Rose, 583 A.2d 156, 158 (D.C.1990)

. When all is said and done, however, the basic question to be resolved is "whether the District has so little to do with [the] case that its courts should decline to hear it." Jenkins, 535 A.2d at 1371.

Generally, a defendant invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens bears the burden of establishing a basis for dismissal, Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Co., 511 A.2d 8, 10 (D.C.1986), and "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil, supra, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839. However, "[w]hen the plaintiff is from another jurisdiction ... it is much less reasonable to assume that his choice of a District of Columbia forum is convenient," and therefore the plaintiff's choice deserves substantially less deference. Mills, supra, 511 A.2d at 10-11; see Eric T. v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 700 A.2d 749, 754 (D.C.1997)

; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 158. Moreover, when neither party resides in the District and the plaintiff's claim has arisen in another jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to justify bringing suit in the District rather than in a forum more significantly connected to the case. Eric T., supra,

700 A.2d at 754; Neale v. Arshad, 683 A.2d 160, 163 (D.C.1996); Dunkwu v. Neville, supra, 575 A.2d at 295.

In this case it is undisputed that neither Wyeth nor any of the appellees are residents of the District and that none of the events giving rise to appellees' claims occurred in the District.⁶ Appellees justify their choice of forum by pointing out in their brief that "[a]ll appellees reside or work either in the District or [in] counties contiguous to the District of Columbia"⁷ and that Wyeth "is a multinational conglomerate ... [which] does massive business in the District of Columbia and derives millions of dollars per year from residents and inhabitants of the District."⁸ These assertions, even if true, are insufficient to sustain appellees' burden. See Neale v. Arshad, supra, 683 A.2d at 163

. First, the "counties contiguous to the District"—i.e., Montgomery and Prince George's Counties in Maryland—are plainly not the District of Columbia. See 1 Stat. 139, ch. 28 (July 16, 1790) (congressional acceptance of territory ceded from Maryland to form the District of Columbia); Md. Acts, ch. 46 (December 23, 1788) (Maryland statute ceding territory to federal government). Second, although a defendant's presence in the District is not irrelevant, "by itself, [it] is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens." Smith v. Alder Branch Realty Ltd. Partnership, 684 A.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C. 1996) (emphasis in original); see Mills, supra, 511 A.2d at 12 (affirming dismissal when the only connection with the District was the fact that the defendant was licensed to do business in the District). Moreover, contacts with the District sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant under our long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-425 (1995), do not necessarily require adjudication of a particular claim or claims by the courts of the District of Columbia. See Pitts v. Woodward & Lothrop, 327 A.2d 816, 817 (D.C.1974),

cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911, 95 S.Ct. 832, 42 L.Ed.2d 841 (1975).

Comparison of this case with others involving motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens can be useful. See, e.g., Smith v. Alder Branch Realty, 684 A.2d at 1289

; Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d at 1370. Two cases from a few years ago are particularly instructive. In Dunkwu v. Neville, we held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying a motion to dismiss a medical malpractice action brought by...