Wyka v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 May 1942 |
| Citation | 26 A.2d 465,129 Conn. 71 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | WYKA v. COLT'S PATENT FIRE ARMS MFG. CO. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Carl Foster, Judge.
Proceedings by Genevieve Wyka against Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company for unemployment compensation benefits, wherein defendant appealed to the Superior Court in Hartford County from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commissioner for the First District, adjudging that plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. From a judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision, defendant appeals.
No error.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.
Paul W. Adams, of Hartford, and Richard S. Havourd, of Wethersfield, for appellant.
Frank R. Odium, of Hartford, for appellee.
The defendant has appealed from a decision of the Superior Court sustaining' the unemployment compensation commissioner in ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to recover unemployment compensation. The plaintiff, twenty-one years old and unmarried, had been employed by the defendant from May 25, 1939, until September 20, 1940. On the latter date she ended her employment to become a regularly enrolled student at Temple University. She took a one-year course in dental hygiene, completing it on June 12, 1941. She then returned to Hartford and on July 6, 1941, registered for work. Not being able to obtain it, she claimed benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act. The examiner ruled that she was not entitled to them because of a provision in the act that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits "if it shall be found by the administrator that he has left employment to attend a school, college or university as a regularly enrolled student." General Statutes, Supp.1941, § 718f(b)(6). The commissioner overruled the examiner, interpreting the provision to mean that, while one who had left his employment in order to attend a school, college or university could not receive compensation for the period while he was in attendance at that institution, he would have a right to receive it if he was otherwise qualified when he had completed his course there and become available for employment; and this interpretation was followed by the trial court.
In order to appreciate the issue presented, it is necessary to refer to the general scope of the act. The basic condition for the award of benefits to an unemployed person is that he has been paid wages during the "base period" for his current "benefit year" in an amount at least equivalent to $144, including only wages with respect to which contributions have been paid or are payable. General Statutes, Supp.1941, §,"18f(a)(3). The act is not designed to afford payments to one who has never been gainfully employed. In order to receive compensation he must have earned wages to the amount stated during the "base period" for the year for unemployment in which he claims benefits. The statute defines the "benefit year" as between two fixed days and the "base period" as the calendar year next previous to the beginning of the "benefit year." General Statutes, Supp.1941, § 715f. There is no right to compensation for unemployment unless, within the calendar year next before the "benefit year," compensation to the amount stated has been earned. It should also be noted that one is not debarred from compensation because he has voluntarily left his employment unless the administrator shall be of the opinion that it was "without sufficient cause connected with his employment"; and even if the administrator does so find or if he has been discharged for willful misconduct in the course of his employment he is denied compensation only for the week in which he left his employment and the four following weeks. General Statutes, Cum.Supp. 1941, § 718f(b)(2).
It thus appears that one who has earned wages to the amount stated during the first few weeks of a "base period" and has then voluntarily left his employment, or...
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...138 Conn. 253, 258, 83 A.2d 217; Consiglio v. Administrator, 137 Conn. 693, 696, 81 A.2d 351; Wyka v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 129 Conn. 71, 73-74, 26 A.2d 465. The sole issue before this court, as a matter of first impression, is whether the 1977 amendment to Connecticut's "quits"......
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...in import to our statute, I.C. § 72-1312(a). We shall review the few cases we have been able to find. In Wyka v. Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 129 Conn. 71, 26 A.2d 465, claimant left employment to attend a school. The statute provided that an individual should not be eligible for benef......
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