Wyman v. Larner, IP 85-108-C.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. IP 85-108-C.,IP 85-108-C.
• Citation: 624 F. Supp. 240
• Parties: Rita Kay WYMAN, Plaintiff, v. John Frederick LARNER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

624 F. Supp. 240

Rita Kay WYMAN, Plaintiff, v. John Frederick LARNER, Defendant.

No. IP 85-108-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

December 3, 1985.

John P. Tobin, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

John Frederick Larner, pro se.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BARKER, District Judge.

This lawsuit arises out of a continuing custody battle between the plaintiff, Rita Kay Wyman ("Wyman"), and the defendant, John Frederick Larner ("Larner"), parents of Leah Renee Wyman ("Leah"). Since Leah's birth in December, 1981, the custody issue has been litigated in both Indiana and Colorado state courts by Wyman and Larner, respectively. The end result of this litigation is conflicting custody decrees. Colorado awarded custody to Larner while Indiana awarded custody to Wyman.

In order to obtain resolution of these inconsistent decrees, Wyman filed the present suit on January 24, 1985, alleging jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. On January 29, 1985, this Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and denied plaintiff's motion to stay the Colorado state court custody proceedings. Wyman immediately filed a motion to reconsider, citing Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir.1984), and Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 11 Family Law Rptr. 1145 (5th Cir.1985), as authority for her contention that the Court had jurisdiction under the PKPA to determine which state court decree should prevail. The Court, on consideration of those recent decisions, on February 26, 1985, reinstated Wyman's case and stayed the Colorado state court proceedings. On the same day that Wyman's complaint was sua sponte dismissed, Larner filed an identical suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.

Presently, the Court is faced with various motions by Larner and one by Wyman. Larner's motions include: 1) consolidation of this action with the Colorado Federal District Court proceeding by deferring to the Colorado court; 2) stay of all further proceedings in any state court and that the Court vacate the Colorado state court stay, or, to vacate the stay and consolidate the Federal District Court actions by deferring to the Colorado District Court, and 3) for an enlargement of time of fifteen (15) days after all motions are decided in which to answer Wyman's complaint. On March 21, 1985, Larner filed an answer and counterclaim to Wyman's complaint. In his answer, Larner alleges that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, both generally and under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, that the complaint is insufficiently verified, that Wyman has not alleged inadequate Colorado state court remedy, and that the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in State, ex rel. Larner v. Martin Circuit Court, 456 N.E.2d 395 (Ind.1983), reh'g denied, Id., cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 138, 83 L.Ed.2d 78 (1984), was erroneous. Larner's counterclaim, in essence, reiterates the procedural history of all prior custody litigation, and alleges that the Marion Circuit Court of Indiana and the Indiana Supreme Court have violated 28 U.S.C. § 1738A by refusing to enforce the Colorado state court custody decree. In his counterclaim, Larner seeks: 1) deferral to the United States District Court, District of Colorado; 2) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; 3) enforcement of the custody order of the Colorado state court; and 4) payment of all attorney fees, costs, and travel expenses incurred in the "defense of various lawsuits." On April 2, 1985, Wyman moved to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Based on the briefs and pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court, being duly advised in the premises, now submits its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In accordance therewith, the Court DENIES the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and sua sponte GRANTS summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Findings of Fact

1. Leah Renee Wyman was born on December 6, 1981, in Indianapolis, Indiana.

2. Wyman and Larner are the parents of Leah Renee Wyman.

3. Since the time of her birth in 1981, Leah Renee Wyman has resided with her mother in the State of Indiana and has never left the state.

4. John Frederick Larner resides in Steamboat Springs, Colorado.

5. On February 25, 1983, the Marion Superior Court No. 5 of Indiana granted custody of Leah Renee Wyman to Wyman.

6. On April 18, 1983, the Routt County District Court of Colorado granted custody of Leah Renee Wyman to Larner.

7. Any finding of fact stated above, to the extent that it constitutes a conclusion of law, is herein incorporated by reference as an additional conclusion of law by the Court.

Conclusions of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A because there are two inconsistent state court custody decrees.

2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the state courts of a child's "home state" have jurisdiction to determine which parent is entitled to custody of the child.

3. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738A defines "home state" as that state where, immediately preceding the home involved, the child lived with her parent(s) for at least six (6) consecutive months. In a case where the child is less than six months old, the home state is the state in which the child lived from birth with any of her parent(s).

4. Leah Renee Wyman was less than six (6) months old when the child custody proceedings were begun; thus, the home state is the state in which she lived from birth. Because Leah Renee Wyman has lived in Indiana since her birth, the Court finds that Indiana is her home state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.

5. Because Indiana is the home state of Leah Renee Wyman, the courts of Indiana have jurisdiction to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A to determine which parent is entitled to custody of Leah Renee Wyman.

6. Further, because all evidence relevant to a determination of the best interests of Leah Renee Wyman is located in Indiana, the courts of Indiana are most properly situated to determine which parent is entitled to custody of Leah Renee Wyman.

7. The undisputed facts presented clearly support the determination that Indiana is Leah Renee Wyman's home state, and summary judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff, Rita Kay Wyman, on her complaint.

8. In his counterclaim, Larner is seeking an enforcement of the Colorado state court's custody order, a determination that the Indiana court issued a custody decree in violation of his rights protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, and a dismissal of Wyman's complaint now before this Court. Because these issues are nearly identical to those presented in the complaint, in that it calls for a decision as to which state court has proper authority to issue a child custody order, the Court finds that the above rulings on Wyman's complaint are also dispositive of the issues presented by Larner's counterclaim. Accordingly, Larner's counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

9. Any conclusion of law stated above, to the extent that it constitutes a finding of fact, is herein incorporated by reference as an additional finding of fact by the Court.

Memorandum

I. Larner's Motion for Summary Judgment

The standards governing a motion for summary judgment are well-established. Summary judgment is not to be granted unless the Court finds from the pleadings and the evidence that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (1985). The nonmoving party's reasonable allegations are to be accepted as true. Yorger v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 733 F.2d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir.1984). Furthermore, inferences drawn from underlying facts contained in pleadings and other documents must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). If any doubt remains as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, such doubt must be resolved against the movant for summary judgment, and the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Yorger, 733 F.2d at 1218; Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Electric, 295 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir.1961).

Larner claims that he is entitled to summary judgment. In order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in the present case, it is necessary to understand the provisions of the PKRA, and to apply them to the facts presented.

II. The PKPA

Federal courts have jurisdiction under the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, to determine which of two inconsistent state court custody decrees is valid. Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 11 Fam.L.Rptr. 1145 (5th Cir.1985); DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir.1984); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.1984). To invoke the PKPA, a plaintiff must allege injury resulting from two inconsistent state court custody decrees. The plaintiff must also allege that one decree was rendered in violation of the PKPA. Although the federal courts have declined to decide whether a plaintiff must exhaust all state court remedies prior to seeking relief in federal court, inconsistent decrees have been held to constitute a sufficient basis to invoke federal jurisdiction. DiRuggiero, 743 F.2d at 1015. See also Flood, 727 F.2d at 312, n. 28. Because both Indiana and Colorado state courts have rendered inconsistent custody decrees in the case at bar, this Court has jurisdiction under the PKRA to address the issues presented.

Once jurisdiction is established, federal courts face the narrow issue of determining which state court exercised jurisdiction in violation of the PKPA. Flood, 727 F.2d at 310. This determination "requires only preliminary inquiry into jurisdictional facts." Id. Furthermore, the statute precisely defines the standards by which to identify the state that erroneously ruled on the custody issue. "Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c), a custody determination is...