Wyman v. Mo. Dep't of Mental Health

Citation376 S.W.3d 16
Decision Date10 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. WD 74062.,WD 74062.
PartiesSusan M. WYMAN, et al., Appellants, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, et al., Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

376 S.W.3d 16

Susan M. WYMAN, et al., Appellants,
v.
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, et al., Respondent.

No. WD 74062.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District.

April 10, 2012.


[376 S.W.3d 17]


Thad R. Mulholland, Columbia, MO and Douglas L. Van Camp, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

[376 S.W.3d 18]

Joanna Trachtenberg, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.


Before: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, C.J., ALOK AHUJA, J., and JON BEETEM, Sp. J.

ALOK AHUJA, Judge.

Susan Wyman and fifteen other current or former employees at the Fulton State Hospital (collectively “Wyman”) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Callaway County against the Missouri Department of Mental Health and Marty Martin–Foreman, the Chief Operating Officer of the Hospital. Wyman's petition alleges that the Department, through the actions of Martin–Foreman, retaliated against the plaintiffs for filing workers' compensation claims, or otherwise exercising their rights under the Workers' Compensation Law. The alleged retaliatory acts included demotion and job reassignments, which were allegedly part of a pattern of harassment, intimidation, and coercion. The petition sought damages on behalf of each plaintiff, and also prayed for injunctive relief “enjoin[ing] Defendant Department of Mental Health from removing and/or relocating employees that exercise his/her rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, and to reinstate any and all persons, including but not limited to Plaintiffs, who have been discriminated against for exercising his/her rights under the Workers' Compensation Law.”

The Department and Martin–Foreman moved to dismiss the petition on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court granted the motion. Wyman appeals. We conclude that civil actions seeking monetary relief against the Department, for retaliation against employees for their exercise of workers' compensation rights, are barred by sovereign immunity. Wyman's claims against Martin–Foreman fail because Martin–Foreman, individually, is not an “employer” under the Workers' Compensation Law. We also conclude, however, that sovereign immunity does not necessarily foreclose equitable relief, and that the trial court erred in dismissing Wyman's claim for injunctive relief on immunity grounds. The circuit court's judgment is accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition. A court reviews the petition in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case. The court treats the plaintiff's averments as true and liberally grants the plaintiff all reasonable inferences. The credibility or persuasiveness of the facts alleged are not weighed. Appellate review of a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo.
Edoho v. Bd. of Curators of Lincoln Univ., 344 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Mo.App. W.D.2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In addition, the existence of sovereign immunity, and questions of statutory interpretation, are issues of law which we review de novo. Kelly v. Marvin's Midtown Chiropractic, LLC, 351 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Mo.App. W.D.2011); Ogden v. Iowa Tribe of Ks. and Neb., 250 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Mo.App. W.D.2008).

Analysis
I.

Wyman first argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her compensatory-damage claims against the Department because its sovereign immunity is waived

[376 S.W.3d 19]

by Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 287, RSMo (the “Act”).1

Wyman's retaliatory discharge claims against the Department are based on § 287.780,2 which provides:

No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer.

Wyman does not dispute that her retaliatory discharge claim against the Department seeks to impose tort liability upon it. See Cook v. Hussmann Corp., 852 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. banc 1993) (“ § 287.780 created a judicially cognizable independent tort”); State ex rel. Rival Co. v. Gant, 945 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Mo.App. W.D.1997) (same). Her retaliatory discharge claim therefore implicates the State's sovereign immunity from tort liability, which is codified in § 537.600.1:

Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated or modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full force and effect.... 3

“Section 537.600 ... provides that the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains the general rule in Missouri protecting public entities from liability for negligent acts.” Langley v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 73 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] public entity with the status of a governmental body ... is immune from suit for liability in tort in the absence of an express statutory provision. Liability of a political subdivision for torts is the exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity....” Id.


In the absence of an express waiver in a particular statute, a state agency generally has sovereign immunity from common-law tort actions in all but three circumstances: negligent operation of a motor vehicle, § 537.600.1(1); a dangerous condition on public property, § 537.600.1(2); and where the entity has purchased liability insurance (but only to the extent of the policy's coverage), § 537.610.

[376 S.W.3d 20]

Bennartz v. City of Columbia, 300 S.W.3d 251, 259 (Mo.App. W.D.2009).4 None of these exceptions apply here.

Wyman claims that the Workers' Compensation Law itself waives the State's sovereign immunity from retaliatory discharge claims. She cites § 287.030, which defines “employer” to include “[t]he state.” Because the State is included in the definition of an “employer” under the Act, and because § 287.780 expressly recognizes “a civil action for damages against [the aggrieved worker's] employer,” Wyman argues that the Act explicitly provides a cause of action against the State for retaliatory discharge.

We are unpersuaded. The Workers' Compensation Law is not the only statute addressing the degree to which the State and its employees are subject to the Act. Sections 105.800 through 105.850 specify the manner in which state employees are to be made subject to the Workers' Compensation Law. Section 105.810 provides that “[t]he provisions of chapter 287, RSMo, governing workers' compensation are extended to include all state employees,” and specifies the manner in which the State will insure its workers' compensation liability, and fund claim-related expenses. See also § 105.820 (specifying the officials within particular agencies who are responsible for implementing the provisions of §§ 105.800 to .850); § 105.830 (specifying that “every employee of each department and agency shall be covered by the provisions of chapter 287, RSMo”). Section 105.850 then provides:

Nothing in sections 105.800 to 105.850 shall ever be construed as acknowledging or creating any liability in tort or as incurring other obligations or duties except only the duty and obligation of complying with the provisions of chapter 287, RSMo.5

Section 105.850 has been interpreted in two prior cases as preserving the State's

[376 S.W.3d 21]

sovereign immunity against workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claims, despite the fact that the State is otherwise made subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law. In Krasney v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 765 S.W.2d 646 (Mo.App. W.D.1989), this Court held that the inclusion of “the state” in the definition of an “employer” in § 287.030 was insufficient to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity, because—according to Krasney—“[t]he waiver of sovereign immunity ... must be by express consent to be sued.” Id. at 650. This aspect of Krasney may be questionable in light of Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home District, 110 S.W.3d 799 (Mo. banc 2003).6 Be that as it may, Krasney went on to hold that the claimed sovereign-immunity waiver was “even more conclusively rebutted by an express legislative disclaimer,” namely § 105.850. 765 S.W.2d at 650. After quoting the provision, Krasney held that “[t]his declaration means that, any intimations to the contrary notwithstanding, none of the provisions of the Workers Compensation Law shall be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity in favor of a state employee.” Id.

In King v. Probate Division, Circuit Court of County of St. Louis, 958 S.W.2d 92 (Mo.App. E.D.1997), the Eastern District reaffirmed the result in Krasney, despite the plaintiff's contention that § 105.850 should be read as a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity for retaliatory discharge claims founded on the Workers' Compensation Law. The Court explained:

Plaintiff would have us read Section 105.850 so that the phrase “except only the duty and obligation [of complying with the provisions of chapter 287, RSMo]” would follow and modify the word “tort.” The structure and meaning of the sentence do not allow such a reading. The word “tort” is followed by the words “or as incurring other obligations or duties.” The phrase “except only the duty and obligation” follows this phrase and specifically modifies and makes an exception to “other obligations or duties,” not to the word “tort.” Under this section the state has the duty and obligation to comply with the provisions of Chapter 287, but has not waived tort liability in connection therewith.

Id. at 93.7


Like the plaintiff in King, Wyman asks us to refuse to follow the earlier

[376 S.W.3d 22]

decisions addressing this specific sovereign-immunity issue. Wyman argues that Krasney and King are no longer good law in...

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