Wyman v. Whitehouse

• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PETERS, C. J.
• Citation: Wyman v. Whitehouse, 80 Me. 257, 14 A. 68 (Me. 1888)
• Decision Date: 08 March 1888
• Parties: WYMAN v. WHITEHOUSE.

14 A. 68

80 Me. 257

WYMAN

v. WHITEHOUSE.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 8, 1888.

Report from superior court, Kennebec county.

Assumpsit on a promissory note for $600 given by defendant's intestate to her husband in 1853, and subsequently indorsed to the plaintiff. The opinion states the facts.

Brown & Carver, for plaintiff. Loring Farr, for legatee. E. W. Whitehouse, for defendant.

PETERS, C. J. The plaintiff, as indorsee, sues the estate of Lucy Wyman, deceased, to recover the following note: "VASSALBOKO, February 24, 1853. For value received, I promise to pay to Edward G. Wyman, or order, six hundred dollars, with interest annually, payable at my death out of my estate. [Signed] LUCY WYMAN. "This is a copy of the note as originally given. The. note at some time was indorsed to the plaintiff. The original parties to the note, both now deceased, were at its date husband and wife. On the same paper on which the note was written, the following was also written and signed by the wife: "The above note is given in consideration of six hundred dollars paid by my husband to my brother John and sister Betsey, August, 1852, as their full share out of my father's estate."

At common law,—and that governs this contract,—the note was void. At its date, the statutory changes affecting the business rights of married women had not reached that grade of development which would allow the wife to execute commercial paper to any person. Howe v. Wildes, 34 Me. 566. Several other cases in this state are to the same effect. Since the date of the note, the barriers which prevented her contracting with persons other than her husband have been removed; and it has been held that, by the implication of the later statutes, husband and wife may even contract with each other, though a remedy for the enforcement of contracts strictly between themselves is not available while the marital relation exists. The remedy may come into life by the death of one of the parties, or after their divorce. Webster v. Webster, 58 Me. 139; Blake v. Blake, 64 Me. 177. These statutory provisions, and their implications, can have no retrospective application, and do not give any validity to a contract which was in its beginning void. Bryant v. Merrill, 55 Me. 515. It is readily perceivable that many important contracts would have been subverted, and vested rights impaired, had the construction of the law been otherwise. In 1868, a transaction took place between Lucy Wyman and her husband, which the plaintiff relies upon as rendering the note valid. They procured a person to sign his name to the two papers, note and memorandum, as a witness. The plaintiff goes so far as to contend that the note was really made at that time, and dated back to 1853. It is enough to say, in answer to this suggestion, that the evidence touching the note, both internal and external, disproves it. The more important inquiry is whether that act of the parties ratified and confirmed the note at that time, giving it validity. We are of opinion that it...