Wynn v. Campbell, Case No. 17-10204

Decision Date05 November 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 17-10204
PartiesEDWARD V. WYNN, Petitioner, v. SHERMAN CAMPBELL, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Honorable Sean F. Cox

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

This matter has come before the Court on petitioner Edward V. Wynn's pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The habeas petition challenges Petitioner's convictions for one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(c), and one count of unlawful imprisonment, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.349b(1)(c).

Petitioner argues as grounds for relief that certain evidence was improperly admitted at his trial, that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions, that the prosecutor withheld evidence, and that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective. Respondent Sherman Campbell argues in an answer to the petition that Petitioner's claim about his trial attorney is procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner's other claims are not cognizable on habeas review or they were reasonably decided by the state court. Petitioner argues in a reply brief that the state courts' rulings were unreasonable and that "Respondent got it wrong" in his answer to the petition.

The Court agrees with the State that Petitioner's claims do not warrant habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the Court is denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. Background

The charges against Petitioner arose from an incident that occurred in Flint, Michigan on April 28, 2009. The state court briefly summarized the facts as follows:

Defendant and the victim were involved in a romantic relationship over a number of years. The relationship was volatile and at one point the victim had a personal protection order against defendant. On the night of the assault, the victim and a friend were at a bar when they encountered defendant. All three had been drinking and smoking marijuana. Although the victim asked defendant to leave them alone, he refused and got into the victim's car with them when they attempted to leave. At one point, the victim and her friend both jumped out of the car and began to run. Defendant caught the victim, dragged her back to the vehicle, drove her to his apartment complex, dragged her to his apartment, and sexually assaulted her.

People v. Wynn, No. 297373, 2011 WL 4467678, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2011) (unpublished).

Petitioner was tried before a jury in Genesee County Circuit Court. He testified that the complainant consented to the sexual encounter, and his attorney argued to the jury that the prosecution had failed to prove its case. The trial court instructed the jury on third-degree criminal sexual conduct as a lesser offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but on January 22, 2010, the jury found Petitioner guilty, as charged, of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and unlawful imprisonment.1 On March 10, 2010, the trialcourt sentenced Petitioner as a fourth habitual offender to two concurrent terms of twenty to forty years in prison with credit for 208 days already served.

Petitioner appealed his convictions on grounds that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of his right to due process when it permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Petitioner's medications; (2) the trial court erred reversibly and violated his right to due process by allowing the prosecutor to admit evidence of Petitioner's prior criminal conduct; and (3) there was insufficient evidence of an element in both crimes. These arguments form the basis for Petitioner's first three habeas claims.

Petitioner moved to postpone oral argument in his appellate case or to supplement his appellate brief with new information that the complainant was arrested four days before the incident that led to the charges against Petitioner. The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, denied Petitioner's motion to file a supplemental brief and affirmed Petitioner's convictions in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. See People v. Wynn, No. 297373 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2011, and Sept. 27, 2011) (unpublished). On September 4, 2012, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was not persuaded to review the issues. See People v. Wynn, 492 Mich. 864; 819 N.W.2d 880 (2012).2

In 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the state trial court. He argued that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective. The trial court denied Petitioner's post-conviction motion because the claims lacked merit and because Petitioner had failed to show "cause" for his failure to raise his arguments on direct appeal.See People v. Wynn, No. 09-24999-FC (Genesee Cty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2015), ECF No. 9-21.

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision on grounds that: (1) the prosecutor withheld material impeachment evidence from him and allowed false testimony to go uncorrected at trial; (2) his trial attorney failed to investigate, obtain information, and call exculpatory defense witnesses; and (3) his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise obvious and significant issues on direct appeal. These arguments comprise Petitioner's fourth, fifth, and sixth habeas claims.

The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal because Petitioner had failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying his post-conviction motion. See People v. Wynn, No. 331918 (Mich. Ct. App. July 25, 2016) (unpublished). On January 5, 2017, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). See People v. Wynn, 500 Mich. 925; 888 N.W.2d 99 (2017).

On January 16, 2017, Petitioner signed and dated his habeas corpus petition, and on January 20, 2017, the Clerk of Court filed the petition. See ECF No. 1. Respondent initially moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that Petitioner did not comply with the one-year statute of limitations. See ECF No. 5. The Court denied Respondent's motion, ECF No. 7, and on April 11, 2018, Respondent filed an answer to the habeas petition, ECF No. 8. Petitioner filed a reply brief, ECF No. 10, and the case is now ready to be adjudicated.

II. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires prisoners who challenge "a matter 'adjudicated on the merits in State court' to show that the relevant state court 'decision' (1) 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,' or (2) 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,' Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed. 2d 279 (2002) (per curiam)." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on his or her claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103. Thus, "[o]nlyan 'objectively unreasonable' mistake, [White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014)], one 'so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,' slips through the needle's eye of § 2254." Saulsberry v. Lee, 937 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103), cert. denied, ___S. Ct.___, No. 19-419, 2019 WL 5301304 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2019). A state-court's factual determinations, moreover, are presumed correct on federal habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and review is "limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

III. Analysis
A. Evidence of Petitioner's Prescription Medications

Petitioner alleges first that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process when it permitted the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Petitioner's prescription medications and Petitioner's failure to take most of the medications. Petitioner contends that the evidence was not relevant to the charges because there was no testimony regarding any connection between the medications and his perceptions on the night of the crimes.

Petitioner also contends that the evidence was prejudicial because one of the medications (Methadone) is commonly known as a treatment for an addiction to heroin, and some of the other medications treat mental illness. Petitioner concludes that evidence of his medications painted him as unstable, mentally ill, and a recovering drug addict. Petitioner also contends that the jury could have assumed he was unpredictable and violent when he did not take his medications.

The ...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT