Wynn v. City of Indianapolis

Decision Date26 October 2020
Docket Number1:20-cv-1638-JMS-MJD
Citation496 F.Supp.3d 1224
Parties Demetree WYNN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, Randal Taylor, Kendale Adams, De'Joure Marquise Mercer, and Steven Scott, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

Fatima T. Johnson, Swaray Edward Conteh, The Law Firm of Fatima Johnson, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Adam Scott Willfond, Andrew J. Upchurch, Anne Celeste Harrigan, Office of Corporation Counsel City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, Randal Taylor, Kendale Adams, Steven Scott.

Adam Scott Willfond, Andrew J. Upchurch, Anne Celeste Harrigan, Office of Corporation Counsel City of Indianapolis, Andrew R. Duncan, Edward J. Merchant, John F. Kautzman, Martin Austin Brown, Ruckelshaus Kautzman Blackwell Bemis Duncan & Merchant, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant De'Joure Marquise Mercer.

ORDER

Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge

Plaintiff Demetree Wynn files this action following the fatal shooting of her son, Dreasjon Ire Reed. Ms. Wynn, individually, as the mother of Mr. Reed, and as the personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Reed, asserts various claims under federal and state law against Defendants the City of Indianapolis ("the City"), the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD"), IMPD Chief Randal Taylor, IMPD Deputy Chief Kendale Adams, IMPD Officer De'Joure Marquise Mercer, and IMPD Officer Steven Scott in connection with Mr. Reed's death. Defendants have filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 15 ], which is now ripe for the Court's decision.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim that does not state a right to relief. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Schaumburg , 930 F.3d 812, 821 (7th Cir. 2019). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief "to a degree that rises above the speculative level." Munson v. Gaetz , 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

II. BACKGROUND

The following are the factual allegations contained in the Complaint, which, consistent with the standard of review articulated above, the Court must accept as true for purposes of deciding the Partial Motion to Dismiss.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on May 6, 2020, Mr. Reed was driving a gray Toyota Corolla on Interstate 65 near West 30th Street in Indianapolis. [Filing No. 1 at 5.] According to the information provided by IMPD Assistant Chief Chris Bailey to the news media, Deputy Chief Adams was also driving on Interstate 65, in an unmarked vehicle, and observed the Corolla "being driven recklessly as the driver exited the highway." [Filing No. 1 at 5.] Assistant Chief Bailey further stated to the media that Chief Taylor was also driving on the same highway, just behind Deputy Chief Adams. [Filing No. 1 at 6.] Deputy Chief Adams called for backup as he and Chief Taylor began to pursue the Corolla. [Filing No. 1 at 6.] "According to a subsequent but unsubstantiated police press statement, the driver of the Toyota Corolla almost struck another car." [Filing No. 1 at 6.] At some point, Mr. Reed realized that he was being pursued by the police, and he positioned the camera on his cellular phone and activated his Facebook account to begin live streaming the pursuit. [Filing No. 1 at 6.]

According to information provided to the press by Assistant Chief Bailey, after ten minutes, a police sergeant ordered that the pursuit of the Corolla be terminated because of the speed at which the Corolla was travelling. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] For a moment, Mr. Reed believed that the police were no longer following his vehicle. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] However, as he approached West 62nd Street heading south on North Michigan Road, he noticed that the police were still pursuing him and decided to park the car at the back of a building and flee on foot. [Filing No. 1 at 7.]

Officer Mercer came upon the parked Corolla and continued to pursue Mr. Reed on foot. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] Seconds after Mr. Reed began running, Officer Mercer deployed his electronic control device ("ECD"), also known as a taser, and struck Mr. Reed. [Filing No. 1 at 5; Filing No. 1 at 7.] Mr. Reed fell to the ground and began to convulse, and Officer Mercer immediately began firing multiple shots with his firearm at Mr. Reed. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] Mr. Reed was struck and died instantly. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] At no time prior to shooting Mr. Reed did Officer Mercer command Mr. Reed to drop a weapon or warn Mr. Reed that he (Officer Mercer) was going to shoot. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] None of the other police officers involved in the chase did anything to intervene or prevent the fatal shooting of Mr. Reed. [Filing No. 1 at 7.]

The Facebook live recording captured the sounds of the shooting and the conversations of the police officers that occurred immediately thereafter. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] Unaware that their conversation was being recorded, and in response to viewing the wounds on Mr. Reed's body, Officer Scott remarked, "I think it's going to be a closed casket, homie." [Filing No. 1 at 7-8.] Shortly thereafter, the officers became aware that their conversations were being recorded, and at that point they "began to formulate a theory about what transpired just prior to the fatal shooting," which "was contrary to the objective evidence." [Filing No. 1 at 8.]

The Complaint alleges that the City "has a longstanding record of not providing IMPD officers with adequate training and not preventing excessive use of force against racial minorities," including "the failure to provide meaningful training and supervision regarding the use of non-lethal force and the use of deadly force, such as force used against people fleeing from police officers; inadequate post-incident review; and a lack of meaningful discipline for excessive force, including the use of unjustified deadly force." [Filing No. 1 at 8.] Specifically, Ms. Wynn alleges that the IMPD failed to provide: (1) adequate training to Officer Mercer and other officers concerning the use of ECDs and the use of deadly force; and (2) adequate training to Chief Taylor, Deputy Chief Adams, Officer Mercer, and others concerning the appropriate methods and techniques for initiating and terminating vehicle pursuits and foot pursuits. [Filing No. 1 at 10.]

Ms. Wynn asserts various claims, organized into eight counts. At the outset, the Court notes that Ms. Wynn does not specify against which Defendant(s) each claim is asserted and seeks judgment "against Defendants"—presumably, all Defendants—with respect to each count. [Filing No. 1 at 10-18.] Ms. Wynn also uses vague phrases referencing the conduct of "Officer Mercer and others" or "the Defendants’ misconduct." This practice is imprecise and unhelpful. Nevertheless, the Court has done its best to determine which claims are lodged against which Defendants and, where appropriate, considers the claim to be asserted against all Defendants.

In Count I, "Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Excessive Use of Force)," Ms. Wynn alleges that "[t]he actions of the Defendant Officer Mercer and others in fatally shooting Dreasjon Ire Reed, without just cause, constituted the use of excessive force" in violation of Mr. Reed's Fourth Amendment rights. [Filing No. 1 at 11.] Ms. Wynn further alleges that this misconduct was undertaken pursuant to policies and practices of the City and the IMPD, pursuant to which those entities encourage, facilitate, condone, and fail to remedy uses of excessive force. [Filing No. 1 at 11-13.] The Court interprets this count to assert claims against all individual Defendants and against the City and the IMPD under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (establishing municipal liability under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by the municipality's official policy or custom), related to the use of excessive force.

In Count II, "Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Failure to Train)," Ms. Wynn alleges that "Officer Mercer and other police officers at the scene of the shooting incident were acting under color of law and acting pursuant to the customs practices and policies of the City of Indianapolis and IMPD with regards to the use of deadly force as authorized and/or ratified by the City of Indianapolis and IMPD." [Filing No. 1 at 13.] Ms. Wynn further alleges that the City and the IMPD failed to provide proper training regarding the use of deadly force and proper procedures...

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