Wynn v. City of Richmond

• Decision Date: 28 June 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:21cv530
• Parties: NYSHELLE WYNN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA POLICE DEPARTMENT and DETECTIVE SANDY LEDBETTER-CLARKSON, in her individual and in her official capacity as an officer of the City of Richmond, Virginia's Police Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

NYSHELLE WYNN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA POLICE DEPARTMENT and DETECTIVE SANDY LEDBETTER-CLARKSON, in her individual and in her official capacity as an officer of the City of Richmond, Virginia's Police Department, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:21cv530

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

June 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

M Hannah Lauck, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the City of Richmond Police Department (“RPD”) and the City of Richmond's (“Richmond” or “the City”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Nyshelle Wynn's Amended Complaint (the “Motion to Dismiss”). (ECF No. 7.) Wynn brings this action against RPD; Richmond;^[1] and Detective Sandy Ledbetter-Clarkson, both in Ledbetter-Clarkson's individual capacity and in her official capacity as an officer of RPD.^[2] In her Amended Complaint, Wynn claims that the Defendants violated her constitutional rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983^[3] and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution when Ledbetter-Clarkson used excessive and unreasonable force against Wynn, arrested Wynn without probable cause, and illegally searched Wynn's purse and home without a warrant. (ECF No. 5.)

The Richmond Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Wynn's Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 7), but Ledbetter-Clarkson did not, instead filing an Answer, (ECF No. 6). Wynn responded to the Richmond Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 9) and the Richmond Defendants replied, (ECF No. 10).

These matters are ripe for adjudication. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.^[4] For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court will also strike Wynn's claim for punitive damages against the Richmond Defendants.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background^[5]

Wynn's claims stem from her interactions with Officer Ledbetter-Clarkson while Ledbetter-Clarkson was on duty as an RPD officer. (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 7-32.) “On August 3,2019, Ms. Wynn and her friend were standing in front of their apartment talking when Ledbetter-Clarkson and her partner pulled up in front of Ms. Wynn's home in a possibly unmarked police vehicle.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 8.) “Ledbetter-Clarkson exited the vehicle and approached them” but “did not identify herself as a Police Officer.” (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 9-10.) She was wearing a shirt and slacks, with a bulletproof vest underneath, “but no departmental identification of any form.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 11.)

After approaching Wynn and her friend, Ledbetter-Clarkson asked both individuals for their names. (ECF No. 5 ¶ 12.) Wynn identified herself, but Ledbetter-Clarkson “accused Ms. Wynn of lying.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 13.) She asked Wynn for photo identification, and “after a back and forth[,] Ms. Wynn told Ledbetter-Clarkson that she would go into her apartment and get her ID.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 14.)

Yet, unbeknownst to Wynn, Ledbetter-Clarkson followed Wynn into the apartment. (ECF No. 5 ¶ 15.) “Wynn tried to shut the apartment's front door in order to keep her children inside,” but “Ledbetter-Clarkson prevented Ms. Wynn from doing so by sticking her foot in the door.” (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 16-17.) “Ledbetter-Clarkson then refused Ms. Wynn's request that she leave.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 18.)

Ledbetter-Clarkson's refusal to leave “frightened Ms. Wynn,” who began “putting her children into their rooms and locking their doors.” (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 19-20.) Wynn then “picked up her younger child” while “moving toward her purse containing her ID.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 21.) “[D]espite Ms. Wynn carrying her small child,” Ledbetter-Clarkson grabbed Wynn and “pushed [her] and threw her against a wall.” (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 22-23.) She “then yelled at Ms. Wynn that locking children in their rooms was child neglect[,]... called for backup[,]... [and] refused to allow Ms. Wynn to produce her identification until additional RPD Police Officers arrived.” (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 24-25.) “Wynn's friend began recording Ledbetter-Clarkson, which ultimately resulted in less aggression and silence by Ledbetter-Clarkson.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 26.)

Eventually, “RPD [officers] escorted Ms. Wynn outside of her apartment... while Ledbetter-Clarkson searched Ms. Wynn's purse.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 27.) “Ultimately, Ledbetter-Clarkson realized that Ms. Wynn had properly identified herself.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 28.) Wynn was taken into custody and “charged with child neglect and assault on a law enforcement officer,” but “[t]hese charges were dropped and/or dismissed.” (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 29-30.) “Ledbetter-Clarkson's conduct caused Ms. Wynn to suffer mental distress and pain, requiring medical attention [and] continued counseling.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 31.) She also suffered “economic damage including but not limited to, medical and counseling ... expenses and lost wages.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 31.)

B. Procedural Background

Wynn originally filed suit in the Richmond City Circuit Court, and the Richmond Defendants properly removed the case to this Court. (ECF No. 1, at I.)^[6] The Richmond Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Wynn's original Complaint, (ECF No. 2), and Wynn filed an Amended Complaint as a matter of right, (ECF No. 5).^[7]

Wynn brings eight Counts^[8] in the Amended Complaint:^[9]

Count I: Unreasonable Seizure and Excessive Force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wynn at no time “g[a]ve Ledbetter-Clarkson any reason to believe that [she] presented a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to [Ledbetter-Clarkson] or anyone else.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 34). “At all times relevant to this Complaint, Ledbetter-Clarkson was employed with the RPD, and acting within the course and scope of her employment as an officer with the RPD.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 39.) (“Unreasonable Search and Excessive Force Count.”)

Count III: Deprivation of Substantive Due Process Rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Ledbetter-Clarkson “acted with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Ms. Wynn with the purpose to harm unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement objective” when she conducted an unconstitutional arrest. (ECF No. 5 ¶ 44.) (“Unlawful Arrest Count.”)^[10] Count IV: Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Custom or Policy, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Richmond Defendants “knowingly maintained, enforced and applied an official recognized custom, policy, and practice” of (1) employing police officers the Richmond Defendants “knew or reasonably should have known had dangerous propensities for abusing their authority,” (2) inadequately supervising officers with this propensity, (3) failing to “adequately train officers” and “institute appropriate policies” regarding arrest and use of force, and (4) inadequately training police officers “with respect to making proper and constitutional arrests.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 51.) (“Unconstitutional Custom or Policy Count.”)

Count V: Municipal Liability for Failure to Train, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. RPD's training policies “were not adequate to train its police officers ... with regards to making proper constitutional arrests” and resulted in officers' inability “to handle the usual recurring situations with which they must deal.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 60.) (“Failure to Train Count.”)

Count VI: False Imprisonment, in violation of Virginia common law. Ledbetter-Clarkson “intentionally deprived Ms. Wynn of her freedom of movement by use of force, threats of force and unreasonable duress.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 68.) (“State Law False Imprisonment Count.”)

Count VII: Malicious Prosecution, in violation of Virginia common law. Ledbetter-Clarkson “maliciously, and without probable cause, arrested Wynn for child neglect and assault on a law enforcement officer.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 74.) (“State Law Malicious Prosecution Count.”)

Count VIII: Battery, in violation of Virginia common law. All Defendants “jointly and severally caused Ms. Wynn to suffer an unwanted touching without justification, excuse or consent,” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 77), and all Defendants “are jointly and severally indebted to her for the damages caused by the battery.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 81). (“State Law Battery Count”)

Count IX: Assault, in violation of Virginia common law. All Defendants “jointly and severally[] put Wynn in reasonable fear of imminent physical injury without justification, excuse, or consent,” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 83), and all Defendants “are jointly and severally indebted to Ms. Wynn for damages caused by the assault.” (ECF No. 5 ¶ 86). (“State Law Assault Count.”) The Court refers to Counts VI through IX collectively as the “State Law Counts.”

In response to the Amended Complaint, the Richmond Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, seeking to dismiss all Counts in the Amended Complaint and Wynn's prayer for punitive damages. (ECF No. 7, at 1.) Wynn responded, (ECF No. 9), and RPD replied, (ECF No. 10). For the following reasons, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court will dismiss all Counts against RPD and all Counts against Richmond. The Court will also strike Wynn's claim for punitive damages against both Richmond Defendants.

II. Standard of Review: Rule 12(b)(6)

“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a complaint's statement of the claim may be “short and...