Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 14168,14168
• Citation: Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 666 P.2d 629, 105 Idaho 102 (Idaho 1983)
• Parties: Gary WYNN, Claimant-Appellant, v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Employer, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 629

666 P.2d 629

105 Idaho 102

Gary WYNN, Claimant-Appellant, v. J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, Employer, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 14168.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 6, 1983.

Keith A. Zollinger, Pocatello, for claimant-appellant.

John W. Barrett, of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Chartered, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission denying a claim for workmen's compensation benefits. We reverse. The sole question presented is whether, as held by the Commission, the claimant failed to establish that his condition was caused by an "accident," i.e., a distinct mishap or event.

At a precise time on a precise day, i.e., 7:30 p.m. on March 17, 1980, claimant-appellant Wynn suffered a "documented left C-3-4, soft disc herniation," which the uncontroverted testimony of his attending physician indicated occurred "while he was working his front end loader" when, "in my medical opinion, forces exerted on his C-3-4 ligamentous structure, at that point in time, exceeded their limits and he suffered the resultant disc protrusion and disability."

Claimant Wynn had been an employee of respondent Simplot for approximately eleven years at the Gay Mine as a truck driver and heavy equipment operator. For the past five years, he had operated a front end loader and on the day in question was removing overburden rock and loading it in trucks. The operation of the front end loader subjected claimant to almost continual and sudden jarring and shaking and required him to continually manipulate the mechanisms controlling the steering, gear changing and bucket control. At 7:30 p.m. of March 17, 1980, claimant experienced sharp pain in his left arm and shoulder as if he "had been hit with a hammer." He stopped work, rested and then attempted to return to work, but he could not stand the pain and was hospitalized at approximately 9:15 p.m. After a brief period in the hospital, claimant attempted to return to work; when the pain persisted he was referred to a neurosurgeon, who diagnosed his injury as a "probable left cervical soft disc herniation."

Approximately eight months later, the neurosurgeon performed surgery and found fibrous tissue binding down the nerve at C-3-4, but did not at that time note a disc rupture. That fibrous tissue was removed, following which claimant improved dramatically. However, three months later, while bending over to pick up a bottle cap, the identical symptoms reoccurred. A claim was subsequently made. Following a hearing thereon, claimant was denied benefits, the Commission stating:

"... the evidence does not establish that a ruptured disc was actually the cause of the claimant's symptoms, since a ruptured disc was not identified during surgery and the claimant's symptoms were apparently relieved by dissecting a fibrous tissue, which had apparently grown over the nerve root over a considerable period of time."

The Commission also held that there was no "separate or distinct injury which was causative of the claimant's problems." Thereafter, claimant moved for reconsideration, indicating that additional surgery had confirmed the existence of the disc herniation. The Commission denied the motion for reconsideration, stating as its reasons:

"The Commission's decision is based upon the failure to establish that the claimant's condition was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, as defined by the Workmen's Compensation Law. No distinct mishap or event was established, which was causative of the claimant's problems."

The uncontradicted evidence is contrary to the Industrial Commission's finding that claimant's symptoms were not caused by a ruptured disc. The ruptured disc appeared upon the discogram prior to the first surgery; thereafter, it remained the surgeon's opinion that the cause of the symptoms was a disc rupture; while the disc rupture was not seen during the first surgery, the surgeon testified that nevertheless he knew there was a rupture present at a location not revealed by the surgery; medical documents submitted with the claimant's motion for reconsideration established that a second surgery performed on February 19, 1981 clearly revealed the existence of the rupture, which was then repaired. Hence, there is no evidence to support the finding of the Commission that claimant's symptoms were not caused by a disc rupture and that finding is reversed.

The Commission denied claimant's motion for reconsideration, stating, as aforesaid, that its decision resulted from claimant's failure to establish that his condition was caused by an accident in that "no distinct mishap or event was established, which was causative of the claimant's problems." There is no question but that on January 17, 1980, at 7:30 p.m., and for eleven years prior thereto, Wynn was and had been an employee of Simplot. At that time and on that date, Wynn was not on a lunch break, it was not after normal working hours, Wynn was not engaged in some recreational or social activity but rather he was laboring at his assigned task, to-wit: operating a front end loader to load overburden rocks into a truck. There is no question as to Wynn being a malingerer. Indeed, such possibility was raised and negated by the medical expert. There is no conflict in the evidence since Simplot offered no direct testimony nor any evidence of any kind.

Evidently, the holding of the Commission was based on its view that Wynn's life had been very physically active, including recreational activities as a rodeo performer and hence his spine had, through repeated trauma, become predisposed to the injury which he ultimately sustained. Indeed, respondent on this appeal suggests that under the definition of "accident," it is required "that an injury to be compensible must be caused by an event or mishap which can reasonably be located as to time when and place where it occurred, conditions resulting from repetitive trauma over a period of time which is not reasonable are not compensible." We disagree.

As to the "event" or "mishap," however it might be characterized, there is no question but that it took place at 7:30 p.m., March 17, 1980, on the premises of the employer at the Gay open pit mine approximately 17 miles from Pocatello while Wynn was engaged in his usual work of operating a front end loader. Hence, the sole basis for the Commission's holding must be that what occurred on that day at 7:30 p.m. was not an "accident" as contemplated by Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Act.

We cannot agree with the Commission or Simplot's overly narrow and overly technical construction in view of the circumstances presented in the instant case. If the injury had occurred from the "event" which Wynn testified occurred some days earlier, i.e., that he, while working, stepped down from the loader, slipped on some ice and fell, the Commission and the respondent would evidently concede that such constituted a "accident" for which claimant would be compensated. If a small pebble had been thrown up from the wheels striking Wynn in the face and causing him to jerk his body and the injury had resulted, we doubt not that such would be deemed an "accident" for which claimant should be compensated.

Although respondent Simplot invites the Court to engage in a semantic distinction analysis of whether an injury which results from repeated trauma falls within the category of occupational disease as distinguished from the category of industrial accident or neither, we decline the invitation. It is enough to note that claimant here, as indicated by the medical evidence, suffered his injury at a particular time, at a particular place, while engaged in his normal and ordinary work for his employer. The fact that Wynn's spine may have been weak and predisposed him to a ruptured disc does not prevent an award since our compensation law does not limit awards to workmen who, prior to injury, were in sound condition and perfect health. Rather, an employer takes an employee as he finds him. Miller v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957); Lewis v. Department of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957); Warlick v. Driscoll, 68 Idaho 552, 200 P.2d 1014 (1948); Teater v. Dairy-men's Cooperative Creamery, 68 Idaho 152, 190 P.2d 687 (1948); Cain v. C.C. Anderson Co., 64 Idaho 389, 133 P.2d 723 (1943); Woodbury v. Arata Fruit Co., 64 Idaho 227, 130 P.2d 870 (1942); Aranguena v. Triumph Min. Co., 63 Idaho 769, 126 P.2d 17 (1942); Paull v. Preston Theaters Corp., 63 Idaho 594, 124 P.2d 562 (1942); In re Soran, 57 Idaho 483, 67 P.2d 906 (1937); Beaver v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 55 Idaho 275, 41 P.2d 605 (1935); Fealka v. Federal Min. Etc. Co., 53 Idaho 362, 24 P.2d 325 (1933); Strouse v. Hercules Min. Co., 51 Idaho 7, 1 P.2d 203 (1931); Hanson v. Independent School Dist. 11, 50 Idaho 81, 294 P. 513 (1930); In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087 (1929).

As this Court has repeatedly stated, "If the claimant be engaged in his ordinary usual work and the strain of such labor becomes sufficient to overcome the resistance of the claimant's body and causes an injury, the injury is compensible." Whipple v. Brundage, 80 Idaho 193, 327 P.2d 383 (1958); Lewis v. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957). In Hammond v. Kootenai County, 91 Idaho 208, 419 P.2d 209 (1966), this Court affirmed a Commission award when a deputy sheriff died of a rupture or occlusion of a major vessel within the brain while he was engaged in normal routine activities of investigating an accident scene. Claimant had for some years suffered from hypertensive cardiovascular disease. The Court, at 209, 419 P.2d at 210, quoting from Pinson v. Minidoka Highway Dist., 61 Idaho 731, 106 P.2d 1020 (1940), stated:

"To constitute an 'accident' it is not necessary that the workman slip or fall or that the machinery fail. An 'accident' occurs in doing what the workman habitually does if...