Wynn v. State

• Decision Date: 11 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 115,115
• Citation: 388 Md. 423,879 A.2d 1097
• Parties: Kareem WYNN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

879 A.2d 1097

388 Md. 423

Kareem WYNN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 115, September Term, 2004.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

August 11, 2005.

Stephen B. Mercer (Rene Sandler, Sandler & Mercer, P.C., Rockville; William G. McLain, Washington, DC), on brief for Petitioner.

Kathryn Grill Graeff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore), on brief for Respondent.

Argued Before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

In this case, we must decide whether a trial court, following a mistrial, may dismiss an indictment in a criminal case in response to the State's violation of a pre-trial scheduling order. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County erred in granting Wynn's motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. We agree and affirm.

I.

Around midnight on July 2, 2002, traffic was stalled on Interstate 270 in Montgomery County as construction compelled drivers to merge from three lanes into one. This case concerns two drivers from amongst the many who navigated the lane convergence that night. William Humphrey, accompanied by his six month old daughter, drove in the middle lane, and Kareem Wynn, accompanied by his wife, drove in the right lane. As Humphrey attempted to merge into the right lane, Wynn blocked his path. Humphrey opened his passenger window and questioned Wynn about his driving. Wynn passed Humphrey. Humphrey then approached Wynn and again expressed concern about his fellow driver's actions.

It is at this point that Humphrey's and Wynn's stories diverge. Wynn claims that he could not understand Humphrey's comments, closed his window, and waved to encourage Humphrey to pass. Humphrey claims that Wynn pointed a semi-automatic pistol at him.

Humphrey called 911 and reported his version of the events. Soon after, State Police officers stopped Wynn's car. Wynn acknowledged that he had a gun in his car, which he had a permit to carry in Pennsylvania. He denied, however, that he had removed the gun from the car's center console that night, or even in the previous five months.

Wynn was charged with first degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or a crime of violence, and transporting a handgun in a vehicle.¹ Wynn was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The jury found Wynn guilty of transporting a handgun in a vehicle. The jury deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial on the other two charges. Regarding those two charges, the court stated as follows:

"Madam State, the Court will grant leave to the State 30 days to decide whether or not to proceed further in this matter. All right. On the determination as to counts one and two, then the Court will either defer on sentence if there is to be a further proceeding or to impose sentence if there is not to be a further proceeding as to count number three. All right.

"So from today, you have 30 days to elect and you do in writing in the form of indicating to counsel and to the Assignment Office if there needs to be a new trial set. It could go before any judge. It doesn't have to come back before me. All right."

Forty-five days later, the court held a status conference, and Wynn moved to dismiss the outstanding charges. The following colloquy ensued:

"[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. It is not a matter of recharging the case obviously. The charges are still out there and this is the first opportunity to get a trial date in the case. This is the first date set by the Assignment Office for all parties to come in and pick a date. That is the purpose of the status conference. The date chosen by the Assignment Office is not an inordinate time, amount of time from the time the mistrial was declared.

"THE COURT: Well let me ask this question. Did you file a request by Line that the matter be reset?

"[PROSECUTOR]: I talked with the Assignment Office. They called me about a week after the mistrial was declared and asked if they could go ahead and schedule a status conference date and I said schedule a status conference date.

"THE COURT: Well, that is not requesting to proceed as to counts one or two or both.

"[PROSECUTOR]: I assumed that by setting a status conference date we would come in and we would set a date to retry these two counts. Frankly, one of the reasons the State has been waiting is that the main officer in this case is a member of the Maryland National Guard and it has been unclear as to whether he was going to be called in to serve. He's in Iraq. I have been waiting to kind of find out what his status is. I talked to him again yesterday and he is still available. This is the first time this has been set in for a date and I am ready to pick —

"THE COURT: Well, I know it is the first time it is set in but all he had to do was file a Line that said the State elects to proceed forward on the trial in counts one and two or count one or count two. The problem is that no notice was given.

"[PROSECUTOR]: I assumed that this would be sufficient to come into court today and pick a date.

* * *

"THE COURT: ... the indication that I have is that this trial was held on the 11th. The mistrial was declared on the 11th as to counts one and two. Notices were sent out to all parties according to the Court file on February 14th notifying of a status conference regarding counts one and two on this date.

"The Court notes also that the docket entry granted leave to the State for 30 days to determine whether they intended to proceed on counts one and two and/or I should say count one and/or two.

"The file contains nothing else and I have received nothing else. Anything that you can enlighten me on?

"[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I didn't file a Line.

"THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think that omission is fatal frankly, and accordingly, counts one and two will stand as dismissed with prejudice."

The State noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, the court reversed, holding that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to dismiss the charges against Wynn.

We granted Wynn's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 384 Md. 449, 863 A.2d 997 (2004). Wynn raises the following issue before this Court:

"Whether a trial judge has the inherent power to dismiss an indictment or other charging document for the State's violation of a scheduling order entered following a mistrial and without objection by the State, absent a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial or a violation of the 180-day rule contained in Maryland Rule 4-271 (the Hicks Rule)?"

II.

Wynn argues that a trial court has an implied power to dismiss criminal cases as a remedy for the State's violation of a scheduling order. Wynn describes this asserted power as a "necessary corollary" of the court's inherent authority to control its own docket. Without the power to dismiss, Wynn contends, a trial court would have no recourse when the State violates its scheduling order and, thus, could not enforce its role of administering justice. Wynn continues that the decision of the Circuit Court was a proper employment of its discretion. He claims that the prosecutor's delay caused him severe anxiety and distress, because he did not know whether he would face a new trial, potential convictions, and imprisonment.

The State responds that a trial court does not possess inherent authority to dismiss a criminal case for the violation of a scheduling order. A trial court's ability to control its docket by holding a prosecutor to a scheduling order does not lead to the conclusion that a court may dismiss charges when the State does not comply with a scheduling order. In the alternative, the State argues that even if a trial court has inherent authority to dismiss a case to control its docket, the court may not dismiss the case with prejudice. Finally, the State argues that even if a trial court has the power to dismiss a case with prejudice for violating a scheduling order, the Circuit Court abused its discretion in this case. The State asserts that given the short interval between the mistrial and status conference and the prosecutor's apparent good intentions, the Circuit Court acted to teach the State a lesson — an inappropriate reason for dismissing the State's charges.

III.

This case concerns the scope of the inherent power of the trial court to control its docket. Wynn argues that the inherent authority of the trial court to control its docket implies the power to dismiss criminal prosecutions for scheduling order violations. We disagree. Inherent authority should be applied only when necessary to the performance of the judicial function. The interest of the trial court in enforcing its scheduling order through the invocation of the ultimate remedy of dismissal does not support such a severe constraint on the broad discretion of the State, representing the interests of society, to prosecute cases. Accordingly, we hold that the Circuit Court had no power to remedy the State's scheduling order violation by dismissing the indictment.

The State had discretion to retry Wynn on the surviving charges after the jury deadlocked and the court declared a mistrial. It is well-established that, ordinarily, "when a mistrial has been declared as the result of a manifest necessity or with the consent of the defendant, retrial of the same charge is not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause." State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 490, 659 A.2d 876, 879 (1995); see, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)

; United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Wooten-Bey v. State, 308 Md. 534, 542-43, 520 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1987). See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Double Jeopardy as Bar to Retrial After Grant of Defendant's Motion for Mistrial, 98 A.L.R.3d 997 (1980).

Wynn relies solely on the inherent authority of the court as authority to support the action of ...