Wynn v. State
Decision Date | 19 July 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 876,876 |
Citation | 322 A.2d 564,22 Md.App. 165 |
Parties | Joseph Eugene WYNN v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Gerald A. Kroop, Baltimore, for appellant.
James L. Bundy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Milton B. Allen, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, and Stephen R. Tully, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before ORTH, C. J., and THOMPSON and LOWE, JJ.
This Court's first impression of this case will hopefully be its last one as well. Time has so eroded the circumstances that the judge who presided at the initial arraignment is no longer a member of the court, the original state's attorney is a member of this Court, the original defense attorney is the present state's attorney, the succeeding defense attorney is an assistant attorney general and the assistant state's attorneys assigned to prosecute have changed not only their identities but their 'bargains' as well.
Nearly five years ago, on December 5, 1969, Joseph Eugene Wynn was indicted by a grand jury in Baltimore City. After two mistrials in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, his case was set for trial in November of 1971. At the joint request of counsel a continuance was granted to permit the conditions of a plea bargain substantially agreed upon to be reduced to writing. The essence of the inducement to plead guilty to one of several charges was the State's recommendation of probation on that charge and a 'stet' for the remainder. Appellant also agreed to consent to subject himself to 'a search and seizure without warrant' during the probationary period. For some reason, unexplained in the record, no written agreement was ever prepared or consummated. In the meantime the cast of characters on behalf of the State changed and the newly assigned assistant state's attorney was reluctant to abide by the proposed agreement of his predecessor. 1
Appellant filed a 'Motion for Specific Performance of Plea Bargaining Agreement,' an imaginative if unprecedented effort. Although no order appears in the record, counsel below and on appeal all agree that a judge, sitting as the Criminal Court of Baltimore, granted the motion and ordered the State specifically to perform the agreement. The judge who presumably granted the sui generis order declined Appellant's request to bind himself to follow the State's recommendation in sentencing the Appellant. As a consequence, Appellant requested permission to withdraw his guilty plea. The request was granted and the case was returned for assignment to another judge.
On August 29, 1973 Wynn was rearraigned and submitted a plea of guilty to one count, '. . . as the result of plea bargaining.' After the foundation had '. . . been gone into about as completely as I have ever heard,' the newly assigned sentencing judge insisted that she wanted '. . . any promises or inducements to encourage this plea . . .' before the court. The assistant state's attorney then summarized the plea negotiations for the judge and chose gratuitously to offer his own personal opinion.
The matter was set for sentencing on October 24, 1973, pending the submission of a pre-sentence investigation report. Appellant's counsel, arguing in mitigation, reminded the court of the plea bargain after which the court asked the assistant state's attorney if he wished to say anything. The following colloquy ensued:
In sentencing the Appellant to three years imprisonment the judge acknowledged that it had been made clear to her that '. . . the precise State's Attorney, Mr. Tully, who is assigned to this case does not personally agree with the plea bargaining arrangement, but he is bound to follow it because of the ruling of Judge Levin.'
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, makes it clear that '. . . when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be...
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Butler v. State
...supra; Brockman v. State, 27 Md.App. 682, 341 A.2d 849 (1975); Sturgis v. State, 25 Md.App. 628, 336 A.2d 803 (1975); Wynn v. State, 22 Md.App. 165, 322 A.2d 564 (1974). This was the clear context in which the Court of Appeals reached its holding in State v. Brockman, supra, that "plea agre......
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State v. Warren
...v. State, 465 So.2d 1088 (Miss.1985); People v. Boyt, 109 Ill.2d 403, 94 Ill.Dec. 438, 444, 488 N.E.2d 264, 270 (1986); Wynn v. State, 22 Md.App. 165, 322 A.2d 564 (1974); People v. Heiler, 79 Mich.App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890, 894 (1978); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash.2d 579, 564 P.2d 799, 80......
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State v. Johnson
...the state is free to withdraw.” Id. at 151, 747 S.W.2d at 101 (citing State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979), and Wynn v. State, 22 Md.App. 165, 322 A.2d 564 (1974)). The court further rejected Caldwell's claim that he had proven that he detrimentally relied on the agreement, noting tha......
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Rojas v. State, 1664
...constitute an unfair derogation of the State's reasonable expectation that the public would be protected. See Wynn v. State, 22 Md.App. 165, 172, 322 A.2d 564, 568 (1974); See J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas, § 7.19(b) at 7-62 (2d ed. 1982). Mere severance of an unenforceable sent......