Wynn v. Vilsack

• Decision Date: 23 June 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:21-cv-514-MMH-JRK
• Citation: Wynn v. Vilsack, 545 F.Supp.3d 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2021)
• Parties: Scott WYNN, an individual, Plaintiff, v. Thomas J. VILSACK, in his official capacity as U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and Zach Ducheneaux, in his official capacity as Administrator, Farm Service Agency, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

545 F.Supp.3d 1271

Scott WYNN, an individual, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas J. VILSACK, in his official capacity as U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and Zach Ducheneaux, in his official capacity as Administrator, Farm Service Agency, Defendants.

Case No. 3:21-cv-514-MMH-JRK

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

Signed June 23, 2021

Daniel M. Ortner, Wencong M. Fa, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, Glenn Evans Roper, Pacific Legal Foundation, Highlands Ranch, CO, Christina Marie Martin, Pacific Legal Foundation, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Plaintiff.

Emily Newton, U.S. Department of Justice, Kyla Snow, DOJ-Civ, Federal Programs Branch, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 11; Motion) filed May 25, 2021, Defendants Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 22; Response) filed June 4, 2021, and Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 23; Reply) filed June 9, 2021.¹ On June 16, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the Motion at which the parties argued their respective positions. Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for review.

I. Background

In this action, Plaintiff challenges Section 1005 of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA),² which provides debt relief³ to "socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers" (SDFRs). (Doc 1; Complaint). Specifically, Section 1005(a)(2) authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to pay up to 120% of the indebtedness, as of January 1, 2021, of an SDFR's direct Farm Service Agency (FSA) loans and any farm loan guaranteed by the Secretary (collectively, farm loans). Section 1005 incorporates 7 U.S.C. § 2279 ’s definition of an SDFR as "a farmer of rancher who is a member of a socially disadvantaged group." 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a)(5). A "socially disadvantaged group" is defined as "a group whose members have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice because of their identity as members of a group without regard to their individual qualities." 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a)(6). Racial or ethnic groups that categorically qualify as socially disadvantaged are "Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Hispanic, Asian, and Pacific Islander." Complaint at ¶ 3; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric., American Rescue Plan Debt Payments, https://www.farmers.gov/americanrescueplan (last visited June 22, 2021). White or Caucasian farmers and ranchers do not.

Plaintiff is a White farmer in Jennings, Florida who has qualifying farm loans but is ineligible for debt relief under Section 1005 solely because of his race. Complaint ¶ 9. He sues Thomas J. Vilsack, the current Secretary of Agriculture, and Zach Ducheneaux, the administrator of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and head of the FSA, in their official capacities. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Section 1005 violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Count I) and, by extension, is not in accordance with the law such that its implementation should be prohibited by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Count II). See generally Complaint. Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that Section 1005's provision limiting debt relief to SDFRs violates the law, (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Section 1005, either in whole or in part, (3) nominal damages, and (4) attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 20-21.

II. Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy. See McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) ; see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ("A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right."); Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, "[a] preliminary injunction is a powerful exercise of judicial authority in advance of trial." Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990). This is particularly true with respect to preliminary injunctions of legislative enactments, which "must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict legal and equitable principles that restrain courts." Id. at 1287. This is because such injunctions "interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits ...." Id.; see also Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2020) ("[t]he chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated." (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. The Eleventh Circuit recently described the heavy burden on a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief as follows:

A district court may grant a preliminary injunction only if the moving party establishes that: (1) [he] has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) [he] will suffer an irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; (3) the harm from the threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction would cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Gonzalez v. Governor of Georgia, 978 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2020) ; see also Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, the court also instructed that "the third and fourth factors merge when, as here, the Government is the opposing party." Id. at 1271 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The movant, at all times, bears the burden of persuasion as to each of these requirements. See Ne. Fla., 896 F.2d at 1285. In deciding whether a party has met its burden, "[a] district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding." Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1171 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Preliminary injunctions are, by their nature, products of an expedited process often based upon an underdeveloped and incomplete evidentiary record."). Notably, a party's failure to establish any one of the essential elements will warrant denial of the request for preliminary injunctive relief and obviate the need to discuss the remaining elements. See Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) ); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1339 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2001).

III. Discussion

a. Likelihood of Success

Beginning with the first element required to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff contends that the record before the Court shows that he has a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that Section 1005 is unconstitutional because it violates his right to equal protection under the law. Motion at 10. This element is often considered the most important factor in granting preliminary injunctive relief. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986).

Since Section 1005 is a race-based governmental action, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003). As noted by the Supreme Court,

Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (plurality opinion). Indeed, the Supreme Court instructs that "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).

"Although all government uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27, 123 S.Ct. 2325 ; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (seeking to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). To survive strict scrutiny, a law must serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097 ("Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest."). Thus, Plaintiff's likelihood of...