Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America

• Citation: 147 US App. DC 193,454 F.2d 1036
• Decision Date: 24 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 24945.,24945.
• Parties: Joseph A. YABLONSKI et al., Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

147 US App. DC 193, 454 F.2d 1036 (1971)

Joseph A. YABLONSKI et al., Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA.

No. 24945.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

November 24, 1971.

Petition for Rehearing Denied January 3, 1972.

Certiorari Denied April 24, 1972.

Messrs. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard, Elliott C. Lichtman, Joseph A. Yablonski and Mrs. Clarice R. Feldman, Washington, D. C., were on the petition for appellants.

Mr. J. Gordon Forester, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the opposition to the petition for appellees Boyle, Titler and Owens.

Messrs. Edward L. Carey, Harrison Combs, Willard P. Owens, Charles L. Widman, and Walter E. Gillcrist, Washington, D. C., were on the opposition to the petition for appellee United Mine Workers of America.

Before McGOWAN, ROBINSON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied April 24, 1972. See 92 S.Ct. 1609.

PER CURIAM:

Last July 21 we held that a law firm retained by the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) could not continue as its counsel in this case.¹ We did so because we found, in the firm's past and ongoing representation of UMWA's president in other litigation, the potential for conflict with obligations owing UMWA in this litigation.² In due course our mandate³ issued to vacate the District Court's denial of a motion to disqualify the firm, and to remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion.⁴

Thereupon, the firm promptly withdrew, and UMWA's general counsel and all four members of his staff entered appearances on behalf of UMWA. Appellants immediately moved the District Court for an order disqualifying them, and the motion was denied. Appellants return here on a petition for further relief, characterizing the District Court's ruling as a failure to give full effect to the mandate.⁵ We agree, and accordingly grant the petition.

I

We confront, at the outset, appellees' objection that we lack jurisdiction to consider the petition. It is contended that the District Court's order refusing disqualification of UMWA house counsel was interlocutory and, as such, nonappealable;⁶ and the record, it is argued, does not show a clear and indisputable right to extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act.⁷ Appellants, on the other hand, charge that the order flies in the face of our earlier mandate, and that mandamus is available to correct the asserted departures.⁸

We think the order now challenged was appealable, just as we felt its predecessor was on the prior appeal where, indeed, our jurisdiction was not seriously questioned.⁹ The present situation differs, however, from the former because the instant order has not been subjected to an appeal.¹⁰ Instead, appellants seek summary relief allegedly needed to exact compliance with the mandate, and the quest is valid if its underlying premise is. A trial court "is without power to do anything which is contrary to either the letter or spirit of the mandate construed in the light of the opinion of the court deciding the case,"¹¹ and it is well settled that mandamus lies to rectify a deviation.¹² That approach may appropriately be utilized to correct a misconception of the scope and effect of the appellate decision,¹³ or to prevent relitigation of issues already decided by the appellate court.¹⁴ These are objectives to which appellants lay claim as justifications for action by this court at this time.

We perceive nothing removing the order under attack from the mainstream of mandamus doctrine.¹⁵ We are mindful, of course, that "the peremptory common-law writs are among the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal"¹⁶ and that, "as extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes."¹⁷ We are mindful, too, "that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial `usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy."¹⁸ We think however, that appellants' petition presents a situation wherein relief in the nature of mandamus would be appropriate.

It is clear that the case may be sufficiently extraordinary for mandamus "where it is necessary to confine a lower court to the terms of an appellate tribunal's mandate."¹⁹ It seems just as clear that the circumstances may be extraordinary when an attorney plainly disqualified by standards articulated in a prior appellate judgment is nonetheless permitted to function as counsel in the litigation. "Continued participation as an attorney, by one who is disqualified by conflict of interest from so doing, will bring about the very evil which the rule against his participation is designed to prevent, and a subsequent reversal based upon such participation cannot undo the damage that will have been done as a result of such participation."²⁰ That, we believe, is the more so in the case at bar. As our first opinion pointed out, representation of a labor union by counsel free of possibly conflicting obligations to adverse parties is directly related to attainment of the goals Congress envisioned when it passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.²¹ Consequently, "if the order denying disqualification was in error, the harm resulting therefrom is in the nature of the frustration of a public policy which cannot be avoided or mitigated by any appeal taken after the trial, with counsel participating, is finally ended."²² We conclude, then, that we possess jurisdiction to entertain appellants' petition, and to afford relief if the showing it makes demands.

II

We had thought that the factual basis for our earlier decision was evident from the circumstances we cited as relevant, and its legal basis equally so from the principles we identified as controlling. By the same token, we believed that we had furnished the District Court with unequivocal standards which successor counsel for UMWA would have to meet. We can explain the court's latest ruling on union counsel only as a misunderstanding of what our opinion and mandate really meant. As much for future as for present purposes, then, we briefly recapitulate our initial holding.

This suit, brought under Section 501(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,²³ is for an accounting and restitution of allegedly misspent union funds. Joined as defendants and charged with the expenditures are W. A. Boyle, UMWA's president, and two other UMWA officers. The firm originally appearing for UMWA had represented and was still representing Boyle in other lawsuits accusing him of misconduct in office. Appellants sought to disqualify the firm as union counsel, and the District Court upheld the arrangement.²⁴ On appeal, firm counsel insisted that UMWA's institutional interests and Boyle's individual interests were substantially the same²⁵ — a proposition we were unable to accept.²⁶ They saw no conflict in the dual representation — a matter on which we disagreed²⁷ — and gave assurances that if any arose they would withdraw as union counsel.²⁸ While recognizing that any conflict might well be ascertained in this fashion,²⁹ we concluded

that the objectives of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act would be much better served by having an unquestionably independent new counsel in this particular case. The public interest requires that the validity of appellants\' charges against the UMWA management of breach of its fiduciary responsibilities be determined in a context which is as free as possible from the appearance of any potential for conflict of interest in the representation of the union itself.³⁰

The record now reveals a new arrangement for union counsel which in final analysis does not differ essentially from the older. To be sure, some of the voluminous allegations the parties make are in apparent conflict, and in some particulars the general picture is obscure. Nevertheless, from the mass of data presented by the parties critical facts emerge sharply and without controversy. UMWA general counsel and three members of his staff are representing or have represented to some extent union officers who are accused of wrongdoing in this case.³¹ One staff member is the son of one of such officers, and another is the son of a nonparty officer whom the charges conceivably could implicate. Atop that, three of the five attorneys are themselves named in appellants' complaint as recipients of payments allegedly made by officers in breach of fiduciary duties.

Considerably more is both charged and largely denied, but merely to recite only these several uncontested circumstances is to demonstrate satisfactorily that house counsel as a group³² do not fit the specifications we previously laid down for those who would undertake representation of UMWA in this cause. They simply are not "unquestionably independent new counsel"³³ whose contemplated appearance would enable resolution of the issues "in a context which is as free as possible from the appearance of any potential for conflict of interests in the representation of the union itself."³⁴ It follows that the license the District Court gave them to remain union counsel is a grave departure from the terms of our prior mandate, and sounds the call for corrective action here.³⁵

III

The District Court's ruling on appellants' latest motion for disqualification appears to have been influenced primarily by the court's belief that "a passive role" was in store for UMWA in this case. The thought seemingly was that, irrespective of other factors, house counsel could function as counsel for UMWA as long as the latter's part in the litigation did not become aggressive. The short answer is that on that basis the law firm originally retained as union counsel was not disabled from continuing in that capacity. Our holding that it could not be permitted to do so necessarily ruled out the theory which the District Court saw fit to adopt.³⁶ The court was not at liberty to utilize as ground for a fresh determination a consideration which our earlier decision...