Yaffe v. Board of Ed. of City of Meriden, 108544

• Decision Date: 08 September 1977
• Docket Number: No. 108544,108544
• Citation: 380 A.2d 1,34 Conn.Supp. 115
• Court: Connecticut Court of Common Pleas
• Parties: Inge YAFFE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF MERIDEN.

Page 1

380 A.2d 1

34 Conn.Supp. 115

Inge YAFFE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF MERIDEN.

No. 108544.

Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut, New Haven County.

Sept. 8, 1977.

Gould, Killiam & Krechevsky, Hartford, for plaintiff.

Sullivan, Lettick & Schoen, Hartford, for defendant.

JACOBSON, Judge.

The plaintiff was first employed by the defendant board of education as a supervisor of reading in the Meriden school system for the school year beginning September, 1963. Her initial contract was renewed for three continuous years. Beginning with the fourth year of that continuous employment, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant board of education as a supervisor of reading for the school year beginning September, 1966, under a long-term contract dated April 11, 1966, and she has been employed continuously under that long-term contract as a supervisor of reading since September, 1966. By reason of the length of her employment by the defendant board of education, the plaintiff was and is entitled to all of the benefits and the provisions of General Statutes § 10-151(b). ¹

On May 18, 1976, the defendant board of education voted to eliminate the position of reading supervisor from the school system. At the time that action was taken, the plaintiff held the position of reading supervisor. When notified of the board's action, the plaintiff requested that she be placed in the position of reading teacher serving two of the system's schools. The superintendent of schools complied with that request in June of 1976, and the plaintiff was transferred into the combined position of reading teacher at the Franklin and Hanover elementary schools. At no time during her conversations with the superintendent of schools respecting the elimination of the position of reading supervisor and her request to be assigned to a specific teaching position did the plaintiff request a hearing before the board of education.

Subsequent to the plaintiff's assignment to the teaching position she had requested, the superintendent of schools received a letter from an attorney representing the plaintiff. On receipt of that letter, the superintendent recommended to the defendant that it terminate the plaintiff's contract of employment as a reading supervisor. By letter dated September 8, 1976, the superintendent of schools notified the plaintiff that the defendant board of education was considering the termination of her contract of employment as supervisor of reading because of elimination of the position of supervisor of reading. The plaintiff thereafter requested a hearing before the defendant board of education, and on October 19, 1976, a hearing was held pursuant to § 10-151(b).

At the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff attempted to question the superintendent of schools with regard to the reasons for the elimination of the plaintiff's position as supervisor of reading. The board of education refused to allow the superintendent to testify concerning the reasons for elimination of the position. Also at the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff called an expert witness to give testimony on the question of the elimination of the plaintiff's position. The board of education refused to allow the testimony. Counsel for the plaintiff further offered the testimony of numerous other expert witnesses on the question of the elimination of the plaintiff's position, but all of that testimony was excluded. The plaintiff herself attempted to testify regarding the question of elimination of the position to which she had been appointed, but her testimony was excluded by the board of education.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the defendant voted to terminate the plaintiff's contract of employment as a reading supervisor because of elimination of the position of reading supervisor. The defendant's action in that regard in no way affected the plaintiff's continuing employment status with the defendant. By letter dated October 20, 1976, the plaintiff was informed that the defendant board of education had voted to terminate her contract of employment as supervisor of reading effective immediately.

The question raised by this appeal is whether the defendant board of education, in its purported termination of the plaintiff's contract of employment as supervisor of reading acted in violation of § 10-151(b) and in an unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious manner in refusing to hear evidence regarding the question of the elimination of the plaintiff's position.

I

Because this action is a statutory appeal from an administrative decision, the scope of judicial review generally applicable to review of administrative decisions applies here. In Gibson v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 141 Conn. 218, 221, 104 A.2d 890, 892, the Connecticut Supreme Court set forth the standards applicable to judicial review of administrative quasi-judicial decisions: "(I)t is not the function of the trial court, nor of this court, to retry the cause. The defendant board is an administrative agency, although its acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. To render a decision, it must weigh evidence and reach conclusions. . . . The credibility of witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters within its province." See Canty v. Board of Education, City of New York,312 F.Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y.); Dempsey v. Tynan, 143 Conn. 202, 120 A.2d 700; Adam v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 137 Conn. 535, 79 A.2d 350; Jaffe v. State Department of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 64 A.2d 330; Modeste v. Public Utilities Commission, 97 Conn. 453, 117 A. 494.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has applied the standards of review outlined above to teacher appeals in the case of Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747. In Conley, the court held (p. 493, 123 A. p. 750) that "(t)he test of the action of the board is whether the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to hear and to be heard upon the charges preferred against him and whether the proceedings were conducted in a fair and impartial manner." The court's reasoning in Conley reflects the judicially recognized fact that wide discretion is customarily vested in school boards with regard to the employment of teachers. See §§ 10-151 and 10-220 of the General Statutes. When that discretion is exercised in good faith the courts should not interfere. Doherty v. Wilson, 356 F.Supp. 35 (M.D.Ga.); Robbins v. Board of Education, 313 F.Supp. 642 (N.D.Ill.); Saunders v. Reorganized School District No. 2 of Osage County, 520 S.W.2d 29 (Mo.); 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.) § 46.13b; see Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1.

II

Section 10-151(b) of the General Statutes provides that the contract of employment of a teacher employed under a continuing contract may be terminated for, among other reasons, "elimination of the position to which the teacher was appointed, if no other position exists to which he may be appointed if qualified." It is clear from the language of that statute that a board of education, in order to justify termination of a teacher's contract because of elimination of the position must establish (1) that the position to which a teacher was appointed has been eliminated; and (2) that there exists no other position to which such a teacher might be appointed if qualified. Thus, the issues at any hearing where the reason for proposed termination is elimination of position are (1) whether the position of the teacher in question has been eliminated and (2) whether there is another position in the school system for which the teacher is qualified. Whether or not a board of education should exercise its lawful discretion in determining education policy so as to eliminate a teaching position is not relevant to the issues at such a dismissal hearing. Indeed, the language of § 10-151(b)(5) assumes that a board of education has already exercised its educational judgment to eliminate a teaching position prior to considering termination of the contract of the teacher whose position has been eliminated.

The defendant does not contest the thoroughness and accuracy of the statements and citations in the plaintiff's brief respecting the legislative purpose behind this state's so-called tenure law. The plaintiff's tenure status and her entitlement to the protections afforded by § 10-151(b) are not in dispute. Nor does the defendant dispute the plaintiff's discussion of what constitutes a due process hearing. What is in dispute is the plaintiff's somewhat veiled assertion that she was not afforded an opportunity to confront witnesses or to know the evidence against her. The record shows that the plaintiff was represented by counsel at her hearing and there is no evidence before the court that the plaintiff's contract of employment as a reading supervisor was terminated for any reason other than the elimination of that position.

Thus, the real issue raised on the plaintiff's appeal is whether or not the defendant's refusal to entertain evidence on the educational policy question of providing a reading supervisor for the Meriden school system deprived the plaintiff of a fair hearing. In this regard, the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant refused to hear evidence "regarding the question of the elimination of the plaintiff's position" is not correct. What the defendant did refuse to hear was evidence to the effect that, as a matter of educational policy, the city of Meriden should provide a reading supervisor as a part of its educational program. The distinction is critical because the defendant does not dispute the plaintiff's right to introduce evidence regarding the elimination of her position which bears upon the issue of whether or not legal cause for termination exists. Thus, the plaintiff would have been entitled to present evidence to show that the defendant had not really eliminated her position,...