Yagman v. Garcetti

• Decision Date: 20 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 14-56223,14-56223
• Citation: 852 F.3d 859
• Parties: Stephen YAGMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Eric GARCETTI, Gilbert Cedillo; Paul Krekorian; Bob Blumenfield; Tom LaBonge; Paul Koretz; Nury Martinez ; Felipe Fuentes ; Bernard Parks; Curren Price, Jr.; Herb Wesson, Jr.; Mike Bonin; Mitchell Englander; Mitch O'Farrell; Jose Huizar ; Joe Suscanio; George E. Moss; Grace Eunkyung Yoo; Ron Carpenter ; David Malcome Carson; Jaime Jesus Rodriguez; Stephanie Rodriguez ; Dana Matthew Perlman; Janny H. Kim; John Ly; Eric Eishenberg; Bryan Kang; Jaime De La Vega; Selwyn Hollins; Detrich Allen; Robert Andalon; Grag Savelli; John Ficke; Sharon Louis Jacobucci, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

852 F.3d 859

Stephen YAGMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Eric GARCETTI, Gilbert Cedillo; Paul Krekorian; Bob Blumenfield; Tom LaBonge; Paul Koretz; Nury Martinez ; Felipe Fuentes ; Bernard Parks; Curren Price, Jr.; Herb Wesson, Jr.; Mike Bonin; Mitchell Englander; Mitch O'Farrell; Jose Huizar ; Joe Suscanio; George E. Moss; Grace Eunkyung Yoo; Ron Carpenter ; David Malcome Carson; Jaime Jesus Rodriguez; Stephanie Rodriguez ; Dana Matthew Perlman; Janny H. Kim; John Ly; Eric Eishenberg; Bryan Kang; Jaime De La Vega; Selwyn Hollins; Detrich Allen; Robert Andalon; Grag Savelli; John Ficke; Sharon Louis Jacobucci, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14-56223

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 9, 2016, Pasadena, California

Filed January 20, 2017

Stephen Yagman (argued), Yagman & Reichmann, Venice Beach, California, pro se Plaintiff–Appellant.

Gerald M. Sato (argued), Deputy City Attorney; Ronald S. Whitaker, Assistant City Attorney; Thomas H. Peters, Chief Assistant City Attorney; Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney; Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants–Appellees.

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges, and Jack Zouhary, District Judge.

OPINION

ZOUHARY, District Judge:

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the California Vehicle Code's procedure for contesting parking citations—as implemented by the City of Los Angeles—deprives contestants of property without due process. The district court answered no. We affirm.

I

Appellant Stephen Yagman alleges that he received and contested three parking citations from the City of Los Angeles ("the City"). While not mentioned in his Complaint or opposition to the City's motion to dismiss, the California Vehicle Code establishes the baseline procedure for contesting those citations. See Cal. Veh. Code § 40215. The contestant must first request an initial review by the "issuing agency." Id. § 40215(a). If the initial review does not result in the citation's cancellation, the contestant may then request an administrative hearing within 21 days after the results of the initial review have been mailed. Id. § 40215(b). Should the challenger make such a request, the issuing agency must hold an administrative hearing within 90 days of the receipt of such request. Id. Before the hearing will be held, the contestant must either deposit the amount of the citation penalty or prove an inability to pay. Id. If still unsatisfied after the formal administrative hearing, the contestant may seek de novo review in the superior court. Id. § 40230.

In his threadbare Complaint, Yagman alleges that he asked for a "hearing" and, after his requests to waive the deposit requirement were denied, deposited the penalties and prevailed at two of the three formal administrative hearings. Yagman does not dispute that he underwent the initial review process and that he offered no proof of an inability to pay.

Yagman filed a putative class action against various city officials alleging Section 1983 claims for due process violations, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and Monell liability, as well as a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The district court dismissed Yagman's claims with prejudice. On appeal, Yagman argues he adequately pled facts supporting each of his claims and, in any event, the district court erred by not granting leave to amend.

II

We review "de novo the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Ebner v. Fresh, Inc. , 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp. , 669 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012) ). A dismissal may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record. Id. And dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff failed to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 962–63 (quoting Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco , 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) ). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements" are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A district court's denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ebner , 838 F.3d at 963. "In dismissing for failure to state a claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Id. (quoting Doe v. United States , 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) ).

III

Yagman first argues that the City's procedure for contesting parking citations violates procedural due process because it requires contestants to surrender property before holding a formal hearing. "Due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation." Shinault v. Hawks , 782 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). "The base requirement of the Due Process Clause is that a person deprived of property be given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."

Buckingham v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 603 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. , 149 F.3d 971, 984 (9th Cir. 1998) ). This principle does not always require a full evidentiary hearing or a formal hearing. Id.

The Supreme Court has held, however, that usually "the Constitution requires some kind of ... hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property." Shinault , 782 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis added and altered) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) ); see also United States v. Clifford Matley Family Trust , 354 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he type of hearing required depends on the circumstances."). Thus, in "situations where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation ... remedy to compensate for the taking." Shinault , 782 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Zinermon , 494 U.S. at 127, 110 S.Ct. 975 ).

The predeprivation hearing, which "need not be elaborate," "serves only as an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges are true and support the proposed action." Brewster , 149 F.3d at 985 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "To that end, a [due process] plaintiff need only be accorded oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the [adverse] evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, where "prompt postdeprivation review is available for correction of administrative error, [due process] generally require[s] no more than that the predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be." Mackey v. Montrym , 443 U.S. 1, 13, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979).

Accordingly, there are no "hard and fast" rules for determining the requisite timing and adequacy of pre- and post-deprivation procedures. See Brewster , 149 F.3d at 984. Rather, once this court has concluded a protected interest is at stake, it must apply the three-part balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1979), to determine "whether a pre-deprivation hearing is required and what specific procedures must be employed at that hearing given the particularities of the deprivation." Shinault , 782 F.3d at 1057. The Mathews factors are: "(1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, and the value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements." Id. "By weighing these concerns, courts can determine whether a State has met the fundamental requirement of due process—the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." City of Los Angeles v. David , 538 U.S. 715, 717, 123 S.Ct. 1895, 155 L.Ed.2d 946 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).

Yagman argues that the Mathews balancing test is inapplicable. He relies on the Supreme Court's observation in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property that it "tolerates some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event." 510 U.S. 43, 53, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67, 82, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) ). Yagman believes the parking-citation process at issue fails to qualify as "extraordinary" and that this failure must end the inquiry. But Yagman ignores Good' s application of Mathews in determining whether an exception to the general rule was warranted. See Good , 510 U.S. at 53, 114 S.Ct. 492 ("Whether the seizure of real property for purposes of civil forfeiture justifies such an exception requires an examination of the competing interests at stake, along with the promptness and adequacy of later proceedings. The three-part inquiry set forth in [Mathews ] provides guidance in this regard.").

Moreover, Yagman mistakenly assumes the initial review does not satisfy Good 's"general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing." Properly framed, the issue is not whether predeprivation notice and a full, formal hearing are required; it is whether the City's procedures as a whole are constitutionally adequate...