Yagman v. Republic Ins.
| Decision Date | 04 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-55871,91-55871 |
| Parties | Stephen YAGMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REPUBLIC INSURANCE; CNA Insurance; Valley Forge Insurance, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Ramsey Clark and Lawrence W. Schilling, New York City, Stephen Yagman, Yagman & Yagman, Venice, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before: HUG, FLETCHER, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.
Attorney Stephen Yagman appeals from two orders of the district court for the Central District of California: (1) denying a motion to recuse Chief Judge Manuel Real of that district from a case in which Yagman was both a party and counsel for himself, and (2) imposing sanctions on Yagman for certain acts and omissions made during the consideration of that motion.
This case arises from a motion by attorney Stephen Yagman to recuse Chief Judge Manuel Real of the Central District of California from a case in which Yagman was both plaintiff and counsel for himself. Judge William D. Keller of the same court denied Yagman's recusal motion, Yagman v. Republic Ins., 136 F.R.D. 652, 658 (C.D.Cal.1991), and sanctioned him for his conduct during the consideration of that motion, Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 310, 312 (C.D.Cal.1991). Because the events in this case are adequately chronicled in these two orders, we review here only the most pertinent facts.
The underlying action is a civil suit brought by Yagman against four insurance companies seeking damages for breach of contract, various state law torts and bad faith. The complaint was filed on January 24, 1991 and the case was assigned to Judge Real. On February 4, 1991, Yagman filed a motion to recuse Judge Real from sitting in the case on the ground that he was biased against Yagman. 1 Judge Real summarily referred the motion for random reassignment. Judge Keller was chosen to hear the motion.
Yagman's argument for recusal was based solely upon the events during and subsequent to a 1984 defamation trial, Brown v. Baden, in which Yagman served as plaintiffs' attorney and over which Judge Real presided. The trial was marked by numerous heated exchanges between Yagman and Judge Real. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Real imposed a $250,000 sanction on Yagman for his conduct both before and during the trial.
Yagman appealed the sanction to this court, arguing that the sanction was unjust, that Judge Real had demonstrated bias against him during the trial, and that Judge Real therefore should have recused himself from presiding over the sanctions proceeding. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.1986), mandamus granted by Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 390 (1987). We vacated the sanction on various procedural grounds and remanded the matter with an instruction requiring the reassignment of the sanctions issue to another judge in order "to preserve the appearance of justice." In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1188. We noted the tense nature of the trial, but held that Judge Real had not demonstrated bias against Yagman and that he did not err by failing to recuse himself. Id. at 1181-82.
Judge Real did not reassign the case but, instead, stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of a mandamus petition he had filed challenging our authority to order the reassignment of another case not involving Yagman. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.) ( for assignment to a different judge), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988, 107 S.Ct. 580, 93 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). Though the Court denied the Sears petition, Judge Real still did not reassign the case. We then issued a writ of mandamus ordering reassignment, Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.1987), and Judge Real responded by filing an unsuccessful petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 390 (1987) (petition denied).
Yagman now argues that Judge Real's conduct during the Brown trial and his attempt to seek review of our decision reversing Yagman's sanction in that case demand Judge Real's recusal in this case. Yagman made this argument to the district court, but was denied his request. Yagman, 136 F.R.D. at 657-58. He now appeals that denial. 2
In addition, the district court sanctioned Yagman for several instances of purported misconduct during the consideration of the recusal motion. Yagman, 137 F.R.D. at 317. After receiving several declarations and holding a hearing on the matter, the court issued an order which officially sanctioned Yagman and urged that he be disciplined by the State Bar of California. Id. at 319. Yagman appeals the sanction order as well.
Yagman seeks recusal of Judge Real under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Section 144 provides a procedure for a party to recuse a judge. Section 455 imposes an affirmative duty upon judges to recuse themselves. Under both statutes, recusal is appropriate where "a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1179 (applying section 455); see also United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880-81 (9th Cir.) (discussing standard for disqualification under sections 144 and 455), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S.Ct. 568, 66 L.Ed.2d 470 (1980). Accordingly, recusal will be justified either by actual bias or the appearance of bias. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.1991). We review a district court's denial of recusal for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 864, 102 L.Ed.2d 988 (1989).
The essence of Yagman's argument is that Judge Real's behavior during the Brown v. Baden trial and his petition for certiorari to review our decision regarding the sanction imposed against Yagman suggest that Judge Real, in truth and in appearance, is biased against Yagman.
In In re Yagman we found that although Judge Real and Yagman "clashed several times" during the Brown v. Baden trial, these incidents did not necessitate Judge Real's recusal. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1181. After reversing Judge Real's sanction order on various procedural grounds, however, we ordered that the sanctions matter be reassigned to another judge on remand. We did so not because of any inability of Judge Real to act impartially, but instead "to preserve the appearance of justice" in what had become a complicated and acrimonious case. Id. at 1188.
Because we remanded the sanctions issue and ordered its reassignment to another judge, Yagman reads our holding in In re Yagman as an acknowledgment that Judge Real had created the appearance of bias during the Brown v. Baden trial. We disagree. We "firmly rejected Yagman's claims of judicial bias" and ordered reassignment only because we found "unusual circumstances." Id. The attorney bickering and misconduct during the trial, the massive sanction award, the numerous allegations of bias, and the poor lawyering demonstrated throughout the case persuaded us that the matter would be better handled by another judge. Id. Moreover, nothing in our opinion suggested that the reassignment of the sanctions issue in that case would necessitate the recusal of Judge Real from future matters in which Yagman was involved. Therefore, the events of the Brown v. Baden trial, which we previously considered in In re Yagman, will not support recusal in this case.
Likewise, Judge Real's failure to comply with this court's orders in In re Yagman and his filing of a petition for certiorari in that case will not support recusal in this case. Yagman suggests that Judge Real's petition was motivated by some invidious motive against Yagman. His assertions, however, are nothing more than speculation. Yagman has pointed to no evidence other than Judge Real's pursuit of the petition for certiorari itself which would substantiate his claim of actual or apparent bias. 3 The fact that Judge Real had filed a We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yagman's motion to recuse Judge Real. We affirm the order denying the motion, to the extent it addresses this issue. 4
similar petition in the Sears case, in which Yagman was not involved, suggests that Judge Real was legitimately interested in challenging this court's authority to order the reassignment of cases.
The district court issued an order, after hearings on the sanctions matter, which stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Stephen Yagman is sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and the inherent power of the Court.
A copy of this Order and the Order of March 27, 1991 shall be sent to the State Bar of California with a recommendation that Stephen Yagman be disciplined appropriately.
Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. at 319. The district court based its sanction order on three different instances of purported misconduct by Yagman: (A) his characterization of the certiorari petition, Real v. Yagman, in his recusal motion; (B) his response to the court's order requesting documents regarding that action; and (C) his failure to call the court's attention to a recusal motion he had made against Judge Real in an unrelated matter. Id. at 314-17.
"For a sanction to be validly imposed, the conduct in question must in fact be sanctionable under the authority relied upon." United States v. Stoneberger, 805 F.2d 1391, 1392 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Terrebonne, Ltd. of California v. Murray
...115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993) (In sanctioning counsel, "[c]ourts may not invoke [inherent] powers without a `specific finding of bad faith'") (quoting......
-
Cain v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections
...with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' " Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (C.A.9, 1993) (citations omitted). See also Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 85......
-
United States v. Carey
...with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ " Yagman v. Republic Ins. , 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Yagman , 796 F.2d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986) ). Under § 455(a), impartiality must be "evaluated on an ob......
-
Hohu v. Hatch
...in assessing whether the rule has been violated. A violation of the rule does not require subjective bad faith.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Defendant argues that sanctions are warranted in this matter because Plaintiff knew, by virtue of J......
-
Pleading
...Section 455 even though his son personally represented one of the parties in several unrelated matters). In Yagman v. Republic Ins. , 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1993), for example, the court found recusal unnecessary even PLEADING §5:101 Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases 5-48 though: (......