Yake v. Yake

• Decision Date: 06 February 1936
• Docket Number: 97.
• Parties: YAKE v. YAKE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

183 A. 555

170 Md. 75

YAKE v. YAKE.

No. 97.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 6, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Joseph N. Ulman, Judge.

Suit by Edward J. Yake against Rose Yake, also known as Rose Harris. From an order sustaining a demurrer to a petition filed by defendant, she appeals.

Affirmed.

OFFUTT PARKE, and JOHNSON, JJ., dissenting.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and URNER, OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL SHEHAN, and JOHNSON, JJ.

Sigmund Levin, of Baltimore (Samuel Lasch, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph H. A. Rogan, of Baltimore (J. Francis Ford and Herbert R O'Conor, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

SHEHAN Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Baltimore City dated September 9, 1935, sustaining a demurrer to a petition filed by Rose Yake, also known as Rose Harris appellant, against Edward J. Yake, appellee. Edward J. Yake is a disabled soldier having received serious injuries in the World War. His legs and arms were broken and his skull badly fractured. On April 6, 1919, while suffering from his injuries and mentally incapacitated, a religious ceremony of marriage was performed between these parties.

It is not necessary to recount at length the cause of his injuries, circumstances relating to his long illness, his confinement in hospitals and asylums, or the procedural steps taken by him with regard to his supposed marriage, which resulted in a decree of annulment. This decree was passed on March 27, 1928. In it a provision was incorporated, approving and confirming an agreement between Edward J. Yake and Rose Yake, dated February 25, 1928. That part of the agreement with which we are here concerned provided that Edward J. Yake, for himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, agrees to pay unto Rose Yake "30% of any and all compensation for injuries received while in the military or naval service of the United States in 1918, to which he may hereafter become entitled from the United States Government, or through the United States Veterans' Bureau, accounting from the first day of March, 1928, as long as the said Rose Yake or Rose Harris may live and remain unmarried."

The Baltimore Trust Company, a substituted guardian for Edward J. Yake, incompetent, or any other person or corporation acting as such guardian, trustee, or committee, by said agreement was directed to pay monthly unto Rose Yake, as long as she lives and remains unmarried, 30 per cent. of any and all compensation for injuries received during the World War that may hereafter be paid unto the said guardian or to any substituted guardian, committee, or trustee. This the Baltimore Trust Company agreed to do, subject to the authority and approval of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore City.

In consideration of the above provisions, Rose Yake waived any claim that she might have against the appellee for alimony, other than that provided in the agreement, in the event of a decree of divorce or annulment of said marriage. It was further agreed that the provisions of the agreement be incorporated in any such decree. The validity of this contract and its enforcement, according to its terms, against any insurance of or allotment made by the federal government to the appellee, is the question presented by this appeal.

This question brings into consideration section 22 of the World War Veterans' Act 1924, 38 U.S.C.A. § 454, relating to assignments of compensation and allowances for support, which provides: "The compensation, insurance, and maintenance and support allowance payable under Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, shall not be assignable; shall not be subject to the claims of creditors of any person to whom an award is made under Parts II, III, or IV; and shall be exempt from all taxation. Such compensation, insurance, and maintenance and support allowance shall be subject to any claims which the United States may have, under Parts II, III, IV, and V, against the person on whose account the compensation, insurance, or maintenance and support allowance is payable."

The manifest intention of Congress in incorporating this provision in this act was to guard those unfortunates who had been disabled in the service of their country from imposition of others or the depletion of their maintenance and support by their own improvidence, and to assure to them a certain subsistence. In the broad terms of the statute above quoted, it was manifestly intended to accomplish this definite purpose. The statute should be construed broadly in favor of disabled soldiers in order that the purpose and intent of the act might be fulfilled.

We have here an agreement whereby Rose Yake, or Rose Harris, shall receive one-third of his allotment so long as she shall live and remain unmarried. As a basis of this claim is the pretended marriage of these parties, which in a few days after the consummation of the agreement was annulled by a decree of the court, and it appears from the recitations in the preamble of the agreement that it was made in contemplation of an annulment or a decree of divorce. It ought to be stated here that alimony is not an incident to, and cannot be predicated upon, or granted in consequence of, an annulment of marriage. Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, vol. 2, § 855.

An independent agreement between the parties, such as this, even though recognized in the decree and stipulated that it...