Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 42201,42201
• Citation: 503 P.2d 108,81 Wn.2d 528
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: YAKIMA FRUIT & COLD STORAGE CO., a Washington corporation; and Cohodas-Lancaster-Frank Co., a Washington corporation, Appellants, v. CENTRAL HEATING & PLUMBING CO., a Washington corporation, Respondent.

Page 528

81 Wn.2d 528

503 P.2d 108

YAKIMA FRUIT & COLD STORAGE CO., a Washington corporation;

and Cohodas-Lancaster-Frank Co., a Washington

corporation, Appellants, v. CENTRAL HEATING & PLUMBING CO., a Washington corporation, Respondent.

No. 42201.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1973.

Horswill, Keller, Rohrback, Waldo & Moren, Kenneth L. Cornell, Seattle, for appellants.

Halverson Applegate, McDonald, Bond, Grahn & Wiehl, Alan A. McDonald, Yakima, for respondent.

WRIGHT, Judge.

This is an action for property damage allegedly caused by the defective design and installation of a certain faulty refrigeration system and equipment in a cold storage warehouse.

Appellant Cohodas-Lancaster-Frank Company, Inc., is the owner of a cold storage warehouse in the city of Yakima, Washington, which it leases to the Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Company, Inc. The owners and officers of the Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Company, Inc., are: S. M. Cohodas, President; Paul Lancaster, Vice-President; and Herbert Frank, Secretary-Treasurer and General Manager. Respondent, Central Heating & Plumbing Company, Inc., is a corporation engaged in construction work specializing, inter alia, in refrigeration systems.

On July 3, 1961, Yakima Fruit and respondent entered into a written contract whereby respondent was to construct and install a refrigeration system and equipment in the above-mentioned warehouse in order to modernize its use as a cold storage warehouse.

The refrigeration system and equipment were to be similar to those in another of Yakima Fruit's cold storage warehouses located across the street from the structure here involved. The installation in the warehouse across the street had been designed by a registered professional engineer, and that system was copied, as closely as was feasible. In conjunction with the installation of the refrigeration system, an entire floor of the warehouse was removed. Eighteen thousand feet of pipe, which had been attached to the same building for more than forty years, was refashioned and reinstalled to the building, utilizing approximately 500 welds to join the system in as permanent a fashion as was possible.

Payment for the work done by the respondent was made by the owner of the building, Cohodas-Lancaster-Frank Company, Inc., after the work had been completed during the calendar year 1961.

On May 26, 1968, a portion of the cold storage system and equipment collapsed, causing damage to fruit stored in the warehouse in excess of $100,000.

Appellants' complaint for property damage was dismissed upon respondent's motion for summary judgment, on the basis that the action was barred by RCW 4.16.300 through 4.16.320, because such action did not accrue within six years of the date of completion of the work performed by the respondent. This appeal is taken from the trial court's summary judgment of dismissal.

The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment and thereby finding that no genuine issue existed as to any material fact.

Pursuant to CR 56(c), a summary judgment is only available where, '. . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'

For purposes of a summary judgment procedure, a reviewing court is required, as was the trial court, to review material submitted for and against a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Robert Wise Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Alpine Dev. Co., 72 Wash.2d 172, 432 P.2d 547 (1967). The motion should be granted only if, from the evidence, reasonable men could reach but one conclusion. CR 56(c); Meissner v. Simpson Timber Co., 69 Wash.2d 949, 421 P.2d 674 (1966).

In the instant case, appellants urge that a material question of fact was presented, i.e., whether the construction by respondent constituted an improvement to real property (making RCW 4.16.300 et seq., applicable or whether it constituted installation of a removable trade fixture, which would be personalty.

While in some cases the line between what is real property and what is personal property may be difficult to define, here it seems extremely plain that we are dealing with realty.

In Wade v. Donau Brewing Co., 10 Wash. 284, 38 P. 1009 (1894), a refrigerating plant installed in a brewery was held to be a part of the realty. The court adopted as the test for determining whether improvements or installations on the realty retain their character as personalty or become a part of the realty, the rule that the manner, purpose and effect of annexation to the freehold must be regarded. Referring to Cherry v. Arthur, 5 Wash. 787, 32 P. 744 (1893), the court stated that if a building is erected for a definite purpose, whatever is built into it to enhance its value for occupation becomes a part of it.

Indeed, the above-cited case is strikingly similar to the instant case. The building here in question could be utilized as a cold storage...